Posts Tagged ‘UN Arms Trade Treaty’

French Gun Rights Group Joins Growing International Coalition Against Gun Control

Tuesday, December 24th, 2013

The International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (IAPCAR) announced today that French gun rights group National Union of Owners Arms Hunting and Shooting (UNPACT) have joined the international coalition of 29 associations in 21 countries dedicated to defending civilian firearms rights.

UNPACT’s membership in the civilian arms rights coalition expands the European membership to eleven groups from eleven different EU and non-EU countries.

“We’re on the side of everyday people in all countries that wish to exercise their right to use firearms for legitimate purposes, including self-defense,” IAPCAR’s Executive Director Philip Watson said. “We’re very pleased to have UNPACT as our newest ally in the fight against extremist groups and individuals attempting to diminish firearms and self-defense rights.”

Gilles Proffit, UNPACT’s Secretary General recently issued a statement critical of an EU ‘White Paper’ proposing new regulatory schemes aimed at curtailing the legitimate ownership of commonly used firearms.

“European citizens cannot and shall not any further trust people, be they designated or elected, who do not trust them,” Proffit said. “They have long memories and will remind voters in all EU countries of this incredible matter in due course every time a national or European ballot comes up.”

IAPCAR and its affiliates issued a call to action last May on the newly proposed EU firearms regulations. The result of public input across Europe was over 92 percent opposed to the new restrictions.

IAPCAR Director Julianne Versnel, who is also the Second Amendment Foundation’s Director of Operations, submitted testimony to the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) meeting in March objecting to the exclusion of civilian arms rights from the ATT. “Nothing that is in an Arms Trade Treaty should affect a woman’s right to defend herself,” Versnel told the delegates.

The IAPCAR civilian arms rights coalition is focused on opposition to the ATT, which has passed the U.N. General Assembly and was made available for countries to sign on June 3. The ATT does not acknowledge or protect civilian arms rights or recognize the right to self-defense in its enforceable language.

The International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (www.iapcar.org) is the only worldwide political action group focusing on the human right to keep and bear arms. Founded in 2010, IAPCAR has grown to 29 major gun-rights organizations in 21 countries and conducts campaigns designed to inform the public and promote the right of self-defense and gun-ownership.

Gun Trade World Article: Arms Trade Treaty Under Scrutiny

Monday, November 11th, 2013

Feature story in November 2013 print edition of Gun Trade World.

Available online linked here.

Taking Stock of the UN Arms Trade Treaty

Tuesday, July 9th, 2013

The Arms Trade Treaty As Gateway Framework For National Small Arms Control And Disarmament

By Jeff Moran | Geneva

(c) Jeff Moran

Image: (c) Jeff Moran

On 20 June Ambassador Roberto Moritán (Argentina), the former President of the 2012 UN ATT Conference and Chairman of the pre-negotiations process, spoke as part of a public briefing on the ATT at the United Nations in Geneva titled “The Arms Trade Treaty: Past, Present, Future.”

Amb. Moritán explained the ATT should not be seen as a static treaty, like others within the traditional arms control and disarmament field.  Instead, he explained that the ATT is best understood as an ongoing process and a framework…dynamic and expandable with amendments and additional protocols perhaps.  Additional protocols were understood to mean distinct treaties negotiated in addition to the ATT.  An example of a disarmament treaty with additional protocols of would be the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

Expanding on this theme, Amb. Moritán stated the current “scope,” “parameters,” and “criteria” within the existing treaty “need additional negotiation.”  In particular, he said the scope of the treaty should be expanded over time in light of technological developments, and cited scientific achievements in robotics as one reason for this.  He concluded by stating “the ATT has to lead to negotiations in conventional weapons.  Negotiations of conventional weapons cannot continue to be a taboo in the United, Nations.”

If the ATT is to become a broader framework for ongoing negotiations on conventional arms control and disarmament, it is only a matter of time before the volume of the UN small arms control discussion turns up.  This was hinted at during the follow-on presentation by Sarah Parker of the Small Arms Survey, the UN’s go-to resource for small arms control research and policy development.

Ms. Parker presented a PowerPoint version of a report she published earlier this month called: “The Arms Trade Treaty: A Step Forward in Small Arms Control?”.  She explained in her report that while “the ATT has contributed several missing pieces to the framework of controls governing the international transfer of small arms,” it nonetheless has “provisions that are, in many cases, weaker than existing commitments on small arms transfers agreed more than a decade ago.”  The key takeway: the ATT needs more work with respect to controlling and documenting international small arms transfers at the very least.

But normative developments within the ATT and broader small arms process framework will not likely be limited to controlling and documenting international small arms transfers.  Given the history of the ATT negotiations and the small arms process, restrictions on transfers of small arms to “non-state actors” or “private actors” (diplomatic homonyms that often mean rebel groups, private corporations, or individuals) will probably reappear on the UN agenda through implementation and expansion of the ATT framework.  So might global restrictions in the form of national controls on civilian access or even outright prohibitions on civilian possession of certain types of small arms.

In this direction, a coalition of UN agencies and contracted small arms control advocates have been quietly developing a series International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) since 2008.  Some ISACs were released last year, but the project coordinator reports remaining ones are going to be released this year.  Privately, diplomats and ISACS advocates confirm that these will be “of use” and that many states hope a critical mass of these standards become the basis for future negotiations to amend the ATT.  Amendments to the ATT can be voted on six years after the instrument enters into force, and during meetings of States Parties only every third year thereafter.  Decisions on amendments will not be made by consensus, but through a three-fourths majority vote of States Parties in the room.

Two ISACS are thought to be of particular interest to those seeking to amend the ATT.  The first is ISACS number 03.20, “National Controls Over The International Transfer Of Small Arms And Light Weapons.”  Among other things, 03.20 has a provision that prohibits international transfers to private actors without “end-user certification.”  The second is ISACS number 03.30,“National Controls Over the Access of Civilians to Small Arms and Light Weapons.”  Among other things, 03.30 requires national registration of firearms and owners, prohibitions on civilian  possession of certain weapons Americans can already legally and legitimately possess with additional licensing, and even has language advocating for national home inspections of private gun collections for “safety compliance.”  This second standard was written by Dr. Ed Laurance, who is a former strategic planner for IANSA.  IANSA stands for the International Action Network on Small Arms, which, according to page 3 of its foundation document, is committed to “reducing the availability of weapons to civilians in all societies.”  (More information on draft versions of ISACS 03.30 and 03.20 and other ISACS involving national controls can be found here.)

If the ATT negotiations to date and the 112 signatories to the 2006 Geneva Declaration are any indicator, most if not a three-quarters majority of UN member states would endorse “private actors,” “end-user certification,” and “civilian access” appearing on the UN’s small arms control and disarmament agenda with the ATT.  In fact, Ms. Parker, along with her colleague Markus Wilson, even suggest in their small arms process guide for diplomats that a prohibition on transfers to private or non-state actors and prohibitions on civilian possession would have already become established, if not binding, international norms by now were it not for the singular opposition of the United States during the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which resulted in the politically binding Program of Action (PoA).

Of course, the ATT can and should do much good to help establish badly needed  import/export controls with respect to conventional weapons in States currently lacking them.  The ATT should also and rightly compel appropriate humanitarian criteria into exporting State decision making where such criteria are missing or weak.  But can anybody deny at this point that the ATT is also a giant milestone towards global small arms control and disarmament, toward “reducing the availability of weapons to civilians in all societies?”  The truth is that a legally binding ATT, among other things, can and most likely will be revised and expanded to substantially achieve all that the politically-binding PoA was hoped to achieve but hasn’t, and then some.

At bottom, if the US is already the “gold standard” in terms of export controls and already applies humanitarian criteria in international weapons transfers, why again is it so imperative the US sign the ATT?   Some key diplomats suggest the US signature is necessary to create a symbolic demonstration of communitarian international engagement, and that this would help encourage other key states to do the same.  But if the American payment terms for signing and ratifying the ATT include a balloon payment 6 years from entry into force ultimately requiring a roll-back of American civil arms rights and privileges, perhaps the US ought not sign the treaty after all.  Instead, perhaps the US and other states should focus less on international trade controls and focus more on addressing root causes of armed violence in the developing or fragile states most affected by it, namely, lack of rule of law, weak if not incompetent local governance, and corruption.  Even Sarah Parker has apparently, finally, admitted in the conclusion of her aforementioned report:

“Small arms related problems have less to do with inadequate international transfer controls and more to do with controlling small arms already within their territories.” 

Ms. Parker’s remark is supported by prior research making the stronger point that, in fact, for most countries around the globe, particularly for most developing or fragile states, a combination of deficient domestic regulation of legal firearms possession with theft, and loss or corrupt sale from official inventories is a more serious problem than illicit trafficking across borders.[*]  Though the timing of Ms. Parker’s apparent admission (after the conclusion of the ATT negotiations) may raise certain ethical questions to some, her acknowledgement is nonetheless welcomed by this author in the spirit of it being better late than never.

Note

[*] This author first called attention to the apparent overselling of the ATT’s benefits in this regard in 2012. See http://tsmworldwide.com/dishonest-humanitarianism/ at notes 17, 18, and 19, which address research invalidating the overhyped claim by many ATT proponents, including the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, that there was ever and still is a large problem of international trafficking of small arms.  Real scholarship shows, contrary to ATT advocacy campaigning message, that the problem of international trafficking of small arms is actually quite small, and isolated to specific troubled states or sub-regions.  Key source:  Owen Greene and Nicholas Marsh, eds. Small Arms, Crime and Conflict: Global Governance and the Threat of Armed Violence. Routledge: 2012. P. 90-91.

About The Author

Jeff Moran lives in Geneva, Switzerland and is a consultant specializing in the ethical and responsible development  of the international defense, security, and shooting sports industries at TSM Worldwide LLC.  Previously Mr. Moran was a strategic marketing leader for a multi-billion dollar business unit of a public defense & aerospace company and an American military diplomat.  He is currently studying weapons law within the Executive LL.M. Program of the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights.  Mr. Moran has an Executive Master in International Negotiations and Policymaking from the Graduate Institute of Geneva, an MBA from Emory University’s Goizueta Business School, and a BSFS from Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.

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US State Dept. Press Release: “US Welcomes Opening of Arms Trade Treaty for Signature”

Monday, June 3rd, 2013

Press Statement

John Kerry
Secretary of State
Washington, DC
June 3, 2013

 

The United States welcomes the opening of the Arms Trade Treaty for signature, and we look forward to signing it as soon as the process of conforming the official translations is completed satisfactorily.

The Treaty is an important contribution to efforts to stem the illicit trade in conventional weapons, which fuels conflict, empowers violent extremists, and contributes to violations of human rights. The Treaty will require the parties to implement strict controls, of the kind the United States already has in place, on the international transfer of conventional arms to prevent their diversion and misuse and create greater international cooperation against black market arms merchants. The ATT will not undermine the legitimate international trade in conventional weapons, interfere with national sovereignty, or infringe on the rights of American citizens, including our Second Amendment rights.

We commend the Presidents of the two UN negotiating conferences – Roberto Garcia Moritan of Argentina and Peter Woolcott of Australia –for their leadership in bringing this agreement to fruition. We also congratulate all the states that helped achieve an effective, implementable Treaty that will reduce the risk that international transfers of conventional arms will be used to carry out the world’s worst crimes.

NMLRA Speaks Out at UN

Wednesday, May 22nd, 2013

Via: TheGunMag.com

by James C. Fulmer | Past President, NMLRA

Becky Waterman, NMLRA president, speaking at the UN.

Becky Waterman, NMLRA president,
speaking at the UN.

The National Muzzle Loading Rifle Association is celebrating its 80th anniversary this year. Founded in 1933 during the Great Depression, the NMLRA has grown and changed with the times, moving into the 21st century while holding on to the past. The NMLRA continues to promote this country’s firearm heritage through shooting, hunting and competition with muzzleloading rifles, pistols and shotguns. Last year during the September NMLRA Board of Directors’ meeting the directors voted in the first woman president of the NMLRA, Becky Waterman. She was born into an NMLRA family and grew up living and breathing muzzleloading firearms and American heritage.

During the 2013 SHOT Show in Las Vegas, as newly elected president of NMLRA, Becky met with Tom Mason, secretariat of the World Forum on Shooting Activities in America (WFSA).

The NMLRA is an associate member of the WFSA and has worked with them in the past. Here the NMLRA again offered to give any assistance to the WFSA.

The WFSA is an association of hunting, shooting and industry organizations.

For over 15 years the WFSA and its member associations have attended every major UN conference affecting hunting or sport shooting. The WFSA is an official United Nations Non-governmental Organization (NGO) recognized by the Economic and Social Council of the UN General Assembly. It is one of the few NGOs in the world to be invited to speak before one of the five committees of the UN General Assembly.

When the WFSA asked the NMLRA to speak at the UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty on March 21, the NMLRA didn’t hesitate to represent and defend the muzzleloading shooting sport at the world level.

NMLRA President Rebecca Waterman and NMLRA Managing Director Morgan Mundell made the trip to the UN in New York City. Here late Thursday afternoon with many other members of WFSA the president of the NMLRA presented the following remarks before the UN: “Mr. President, I am Rebecca Waterman, President of the National Muzzle Loading Rifle Association, an association member of World Forum on Shooting Activities. Our primary membership is in the United States, but I believe I speak for the many, many users of antique and muzzle loading arms in other jurisdictions.

“Mr. President, I will be extremely brief. I wish to address the question of the inclusion of antique firearms and their replicas, which most muzzleloaders are, within the scope of the ATT.

“Mr. President, there is no need or justification for the inclusion of antique firearms within the category of small arms. There is substantial international commerce in antique firearms and their replicas, but by no stretch of the imagination are they some kind of threat that should be included within the ATT.

“Mr. President, examining the record, we have not found one mention of antique firearms and their replicas being perceived as a threat.

“Mr. President, subjecting the international commerce in antique firearms and their replicas to an ATT will be an unjustified and unnecessary burden on that commerce.

“Indeed, Mr. President, this very issue was addressed during the drafting of the UN Firearms Protocol.

Article 3 (a) excludes antique firearms from the Protocol. It says, and I quote, ‘Antique firearms and their replicas shall be defined in accordance with domestic law. In no case, however, shall antique firearms include firearms manufactured after 1899.’ “Mr. President, we have submitted a version of this Firearms Protocol language to effectuate the exclusion of antique firearms and their replicas from the ATT.

“We sincerely hope that you and this body will follow the precedent of the Firearms Protocol.” The UN Arms Trade Treaty was followed by the media. The Shooting Wire, The Outdoor Wire, the National Shooting Sports Foundation and many, many others including this publication. They all gave excellent coverage to the treaty in many press releases. The sad part about all this is why would the National Muzzle Loading Rifle Association even have to attend? Why has common sense become so un-common? In the treaty itself it reads, “This Treaty shall apply to all conventional arms within the following categories: Battle Tanks; Armored combat vehicles; Large-caliber artillery systems; Combat aircraft; Attack helicopters; Warships; Missiles and missile launchers; and small arms and light weapons.”

Why would it be so hard to separate out antique or replica muzzleloading firearms from other modern military small arms and light weapons?

The Treaty will be talked about and discussed by everybody over the next few weeks. The National Shooting Sports Foundation’s Senior Vice-President and General Counsel Lawrence Keane stated, “We hope that the Members of the US Senate are closely watching the White House abandon its principles and promises in the rush to ramrod the flawed treaty into effect.

Not only will they later be asked to ratify this attack on our constitution and sovereignty, but they will also be lavished with new promises from the administration in its drive to push a broad gun control agenda through the US Senate when it returns from recess. They would be right to question those promises strongly.”

What this all means to the reader is be informed! Read, watch, listen, get your facts and act. I am sure in the next few weeks you will be asked to contact your state senator. Do it! This is not about letting the other person do it; you are the other person. If you are reading this and don’t vote, change that: get registered—your vote counts. Talk to everybody you know, and if they are not registered to vote, get them registered. It is time for common sense. It is time for action.

 

The Real Truth About Gun Homicides

Monday, May 20th, 2013

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) global map of homicide rate shows lower rates in countries with higher gun ownership.

 

Source UNODC

Source UNODC

Brazilian Group Movimento Viva Brasil Joins IAPCAR Coalition

Friday, May 10th, 2013

The International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (IAPCAR) announced today that Brazilian gun rights group Movimento Viva Brasil has joined the international coalition of 25 groups in 16 different countries dedicated to the preservation and defense of civilian firearms rights.logo_mvb_200_200

“Our international alliance of like-minded civilian arms rights groups has a strong representation in Brazil now,” IAPCAR’s Executive Director Philip Watson said. “Movimento Viva Brasil brings another voice to the movement for civilian arms rights.”

Movimento Viva Brasil was involved in the coalition that defeated the nation-wide gun control referendum in 2005 with 64% of the voters casting their ballot against the measure.

Bene Barbosa, president of Movimento Viva Brasil, stated that their organization wants to help “visualize the true and utter failure of the gun-control measures enforced in Brazil, as well as contribute to the strengthening of a worldwide effort to protect civilian gun-rights.”

IAPCAR co-founder Julianne Versnel praised IAPCAR’s newest group for their accomplishments and hard work. “Their record speaks for itself. They’ve been effective and unwavering in defending the rights of Brazilians to defend themselves.”

As a representative to the United Nations, Versnel, who is also the Second Amendment Foundation’s Director of Operations, submitted testimony to the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) meeting in March objecting to the exclusion of civilian arms rights from the ATT. “Nothing that is in an Arms Trade Treaty should affect a woman’s right to defend herself,” Versnel told the delegates.

The IAPCAR gun rights coalition is focused on opposition to the ATT, which has passed the UN General Assembly and will be available for countries to sign on June 3. The ATT does not acknowledge or protect civilian arms rights or recognize the right to self-defense in its enforceable language.v 

Movimento Viva Brazil may be accessed on the Internet via: (www.mvb.org.br/)

The International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (www.iapcar.com) is the only worldwide political action group focusing on the human right to keep and bear arms. Founded in 2010, IAPCAR has grown to 25 major gun-rights organizations and conducts campaigns designed to inform the public and promote the right of self-defense and gun-ownership.

Canada’s NFA Opposes UN ATT

Tuesday, April 2nd, 2013

Original Story Via:  NFA.CA

The UN General Assembly passed a flawed Arms Trade Treaty this morning in New York City with 3 no votes, 23 abstaining, and 154 voting in favour.  According to NFA President Sheldon Clare, “The Arms Trade Treaty will set a dangerous precedent as a bad international agreement that will do nothing to prevent the misuse of major weapons systems and much to limit access of firearms and ammunition to legitimate users.” He continued, “As we see it, this ATT will harm legitimate users. We expect that it will increase the cost of ammunition, firearms, parts, and accessories for normal civilian users.” Canada’s National Firearms Association has gone on record as opposing the inclusion of civilian small arms and light weapons in the Arms Trade Treaty. “Canada will now need to decide whether or not to ratify this treaty, and we strongly suggest that our government not ratify it.”

Clare pointed to several problems with the draft treaty, part of which calls on states to “…establish and maintain a national control system, including a national control list, in order to implement the provisions of this Treaty.  The treaty is vague in many sections and in our view this vagueness opens doorways for many additional regulations and restrictions to be introduced in a treaty that we expect would be ever-expanding.”

Clare said, “We see this vague phrasing as having the potential to create a national registry which would be all the more offensive as it would be made public.”  He continued, “Several articles are about “end user” documentation, and the NFA submits that the end user of small arms and ammunition cannot be known in the absence of a heavily regulated registration and licensing program, which we vigorously oppose. The peer-reviewed evidence shows that neither licensing nor registration prevents criminal use of firearms. Furthermore, the ATT ignores personal defence as a legitimate form of firearm use.”

“Another significant problem is that parts of the draft treaty open the door to widespread corruption as well as to potential costly demands for real and necessary assistance. Our members hope that Canada will push for fiscal responsibility at the UN to ensure that funding is better monitored and controlled. Improved financial controls would save more lives than this Arms Trade Treaty ever would,” Clare stated. “Though we are disappointed that Canada voted for the treaty, we are pleased that Canada did not sponsor the treaty during the vote, and we hope that Canada will not ratify the Arms Trade Treaty. The Canadian government stood strongly in favour of civilian firearms owners during the treaty process to obtain some helpful preamble language, but the treaty remains a bad deal.  The present domestic burdens on Canadian firearms owners are already excessive, and the effect of this treaty would be to add more onerous and costly requirements for firearms ownership, as well as build further disrespect for firearms law. This treaty does not have the support of a significant proportion of the firearms owning public, and it appears to be in direct conflict with the stated aims of the Government in regards to not having any new burdens for firearms owners.”

Canada’s National Firearms Association is this country’s largest advocacy organization promoting the rights and freedoms of all responsible firearm owners and users.

IAPCAR comment on UN ATT approval

Tuesday, April 2nd, 2013

The International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (IAPCAR) expressed concern about the passage of the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (UN ATT) after its approval on April 2, 2013 in the UN General Assembly. This is not the path that the ATT should have taken. The Treaty had not been able to reach consensus, where all parties agreed, and it was hurried to the General Assembly. There were 154 votes in favor, 3 against and 23 abstentions.

Philip Watson, IAPCAR’s executive director, stated, “An ATT without any provision protecting civilian use of firearms for the purpose of self-defense is unacceptable. While the preamble makes vague reference to civilian arms, there is nothing acknowledging the right in the operative language of the treaty.”

IAPCAR co-founder Julianne Versnel addressed the global body at the ATT conference on March 27 along with other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) and defended the use of firearms in self-defense. “Almost half of the handguns in the US are owned by women. They are used daily for self-defense. I fully endorse, as should every person in this room, the idea that women must have the means to defend themselves. Nothing that is in an Arms Trade Treaty should affect a woman’s right to defend herself,” she told the delegates.

Pro-civilian rights supporters, collectors, industry and other participated in the process; however, were given less than half the time allotted to the self-titled ‘arms control’ groups in testimony to the global body.

The ATT will be open for signature on June 3 and will enter into force 90 days after the 50th signatory ratifies it.

The International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (http://iapcar.org/) is the only worldwide political action group focusing on the human right to keep and bear arms. Founded in 2010, IAPCAR has grown to 24 major gun-rights organizations and conducts operations designed to inform the public and promote the right of self-defense and gun-ownership.

NSSF Objects to U.S. Government Abandoning Position that U.N. Treaty Must be based on International “Consensus”

Monday, April 1st, 2013

Via:  National Shooting Sports Foundation (NSSF)

The National Shooting Sports Foundation today strongly objected to the last-minute reversal of the U.S. government position regarding the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty. In the closing hours of negotiations on Thursday, March 28, the government abandoned its previous insistence that the treaty be approved only through achieving “consensus” of all the member states. Requiring consensus had been the United States position going back to earlier administrations.

At the end of the session, a U.S. government spokesperson told reporters “It’s important to the United States and the defense of our interests to insist on consensus. But every state in this process has always been conscious of the fact that if consensus is not reached in this process, that there are other ways to adopt this treaty, including via a vote of the General Assembly.” The spokesperson went on to say that the United States would vote “yes” on the treaty in the General Assembly, regardless of the positions of other member states. By abandoning the requirement for consensus the United States is assuring passage of the treaty by the United Nations.

“This abrupt about-face on the long-standing United States requirement for ‘consensus’ illustrates that the Obama Administration wants a sweeping U.N. arms control treaty,” said Lawrence Keane, NSSF senior vice president and general counsel. “We are troubled by the timing of the Obama Administration’s decision to abandon consensus on the eve of the Senate debate on pending gun control measures. The United Nations treaty would have a broad impact on the U.S. firearms industry and its base of consumers in the U.S.”

Industry analysts have identified three major areas of concern with the treaty text. The treaty clearly covers trade in civilian firearms, not just military arms and equipment. It will have a major impact on the importation of firearms to the United States, which is a substantial source for the consumer market. And it will impose new regulations on the “transit” of firearms, the term defined so broadly that it would cover all everything from container ships stopping at ports to individuals who are traveling internationally with a single firearm for hunting or other sporting purposes.

“We hope that the Members of the U.S. Senate are closely watching the White House abandon its principles and promises in the rush to ramrod this flawed treaty into effect. Not only will they later be asked to ratify this attack on our constitution and sovereignty, but they will also be lavished with new promises from the administration in its drive to push a broad gun control agenda through the U.S. Senate when it returns from recess. They would be right to question those promises strongly,” concluded Keane.

Proposed arms treaty shows UN is its own worst enemy

Wednesday, March 27th, 2013

Original Article Via:  Dave Workman, Seattle Gun Rights Examiner

The final draft of the proposed United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is out, and it contains language that may be incendiary to gun rights activists in the United States, with references to maintaining “national control systems” for small arms and ammunition.

From the proposed treaty on Page 4: “Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export of ammunition/munitions fired, launched or delivered by the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), and shall apply the provisions of Article 6 and Article 7 prior to authorizing the export of such ammunition/munitions.”

Bellevue’s Alan Gottlieb, executive vice president of the Second Amendment Foundation, has been vocally critical of the ATT process and is concerned about “vagueness” in the current language. SAF’s Julianne Versnel was at the UN last week to testify about unintended consequences of international gun control measures.

From the proposed treaty on Page 5: “Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system, including a national control list, in order to implement the provisions of this Treaty.” Versnel suggested this may be one of the “core problems” of the proposed treaty, but it might take a determination from someone skilled in diplomatic speech to figure it out.

On Page 9 of the document, there is an entire section on record keeping that just might be enough to cause many people on Capitol Hill to follow the lead shown by Republican Senators Rand Paul, Mike Lee and Ted Cruz, discussed by this column that might prevent the U.S. from signing on.

Record keeping:

1. Each State Party shall maintain national records, pursuant to its national laws and regulations, of its issuance of export authorizations or its actual exports of the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

2. Each State Party is encouraged to maintain records of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) that are transferred to its territory as the final destination or that are authorized to transit or trans-ship territory under its jurisdiction.

3. Each State Party is encouraged to include in those records: the quantity, value, model/type, authorized international transfers of conventional arms covered under Article
2 (1), conventional arms actually transferred, details of exporting State(s), importing State(s), transit and trans-shipment State(s), and end users, as appropriate.

4. Records shall be kept for a minimum of ten years.

But does all of this treaty language really mean what a lot of people will think it means: The UN dictating some sort of national gun registry, at least on imported firearms? Because of the way this document is written, even if some UN spokesperson says “No,” there will be a legion of gun rights advocates who say “Yes,” and they will have compelling, if not convincing arguments.

The draft documents do include some caveats in the Preamble, including:

Reaffirming the sovereign right of any State to regulate and control conventional arms
exclusively within its territory, pursuant to its own legal or constitutional system,

Emphasizing that nothing in this Treaty prevents States from maintaining and adopting additional effective measures to further the object and purpose of this Treaty,

Mindful of the legitimate trade and lawful ownership, and use of certain conventional
arms for recreational, cultural, historical, and sporting activities, where such trade, ownership and use are permitted or protected by law…

But the Preamble is just that. It’s apparently not part of any binding language.

The authors of this document will be largely to blame for any misunderstanding, and they have opened themselves up to criticism that the language seems deliberately foggy and far too steeped in diplomatic semantics. That translates to being something less than “plain English.” Since the Obama administration has indicated a willingness to sign onto such a treaty, the Senate just might reject it out of hand, but before that happens, somebody will have to translate it for them.

UN Arms Trade Treaty Final Draft

Wednesday, March 27th, 2013

Document Via:

UN.org/Disarmament

http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/docs/ATT_text_%28As_adopted_by_the_GA%29-E.pdf

PRESIDENT’S NON PAPER, 27 MARCH 2013

1

United Nations Final Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty

New York, 18-28 March 2013

Draft decision

Submitted by the President of the Final Conference

The Final United Nations Conference of the Arms Trade Treaty,

Adopts the Arms Trade Treaty, the text of which is annexed to the present decision.

Annex

The Arms Trade Treaty

Preamble

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations which seeks to promote the

establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for

armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,

Underlining the need to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms

and to prevent their diversion to the illicit market, or for unauthorized end use and end users,

including in the commission of terrorist acts,

Recognizing the legitimate political, security, economic and commercial interests of

States in the international trade in conventional arms,

Reaffirming the sovereign right of any State to regulate and control conventional arms

exclusively within its territory, pursuant to its own legal or constitutional system,

2

Acknowledging that peace and security, development and human rights, are pillars of

the United Nations system and foundations for collective security and recognizing that

development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing,

Recalling the United Nations Disarmament Commission Guidelines for international

arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36H of 6 December 1991,

Noting the contribution made by the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent,

Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects,

as well as the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their

Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention

against Transnational Organized Crime, and the International Instrument to Enable States to

Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons,

Recognizing the security, social, economic and humanitarian consequences of the

illicit and unregulated trade in conventional arms,

Bearing in mind that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast

majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict and armed violence,

Recognizing also the challenges faced by victims of armed conflict and their need for

adequate care, rehabilitation and social and economic inclusion,

Emphasizing that nothing in this Treaty prevents States from maintaining and

adopting additional effective measures to further the object and purpose of this Treaty,

Mindful of the legitimate trade and lawful ownership, and use of certain conventional

arms for recreational, cultural, historical, and sporting activities, where such trade, ownership

and use are permitted or protected by law,

Mindful also of the role regional organizations can play in assisting States Parties,

upon request, in implementing this Treaty,

Recognizing the voluntary and active role that civil society, including nongovernmental

organizations, and industry, can play in raising awareness of the object and

purpose of this Treaty, and in supporting its implementation,

Acknowledging that regulation of the international trade in conventional arms and

preventing their diversion, should not hamper international cooperation and legitimate trade

in materiel, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing the desirability of achieving universal adherence to this Treaty,

Determined to act in accordance with the following principles;

Principles

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– The inherent right of all States to individual or collective self-defense as recognized

in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;

– The settlement of international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that

international peace and security and justice, are not endangered in accordance with Article 2

(3) of the Charter of the United Nations;

– Refraining in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the

territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent

with the purposes of the United Nations in accordance with Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the

United Nations;

– Non-intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of

any State in accordance with Article 2 (7) of the Charter of the United Nations;

– Respecting and ensuring respect for international humanitarian law in accordance

with, inter alia, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and respecting and ensuring respect for

human rights, in accordance with, inter alia, the Charter of the United Nations and the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

– The responsibility of all States, in accordance with their respective international

obligations, to effectively regulate the international trade in conventional arms, and to

prevent their diversion, as well as the primary responsibility of all States in establishing and

implementing their respective national control systems;

– The respect for the legitimate interests of States to acquire conventional arms to

exercise their right to self-defense and for peacekeeping operations; and to produce, export,

import and transfer conventional arms;

– Implementing this Treaty in a consistent, objective and non-discriminatory manner,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Object and Purpose

The object of this Treaty is to:

– Establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or

improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms;

– Prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their

diversion;

for the purpose of:

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– Contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability;

– Reducing human suffering;

– Promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in

the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among

States Parties.

Article 2

Scope

1. This Treaty shall apply to all conventional arms within the following categories:

(a) Battle tanks;

(b) Armoured combat vehicles;

(c) Large-calibre artillery systems;

(d) Combat aircraft;

(e) Attack helicopters;

(f) Warships;

(g) Missiles and missile launchers; and

(h) Small arms and light weapons.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, the activities of the international trade comprise export,

import, transit, trans-shipment and brokering, hereafter referred to as “transfer”.

3. This Treaty shall not apply to the international movement of conventional arms by, or on

behalf of, a State Party for its use provided that the conventional arms remain under that

State Party’s ownership.

Article 3

Ammunition/Munitions

Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export

of ammunition/munitions fired, launched or delivered by the conventional arms covered

under Article 2 (1), and shall apply the provisions of Article 6 and Article 7 prior to

authorizing the export of such ammunition/munitions.

Article 4

Parts and Components

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Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export

of parts and components where the export is in a form that provides the capability to

assemble the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Each State Party shall apply the

provisions of Article 6 and Article 7 prior to authorizing the export of such parts and

components.

Article 5

General Implementation

1. Each State Party shall implement this Treaty in a consistent, objective and nondiscriminatory

manner, bearing in mind the principles referred to in this Treaty.

2. Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system, including a

national control list, in order to implement the provisions of this Treaty.

3. Each State Party is encouraged to apply the provisions of this Treaty to the broadest range

of conventional arms. National definitions of any of the categories covered in Article 2

(1) (a-g) shall not cover less than the descriptions used in the United Nations Register of

Conventional Arms at the time of entry into force of this Treaty. For the category covered

in Article 2 (1) (h), national definitions shall not cover less than the descriptions used in

relevant United Nations instruments at the time of entry into force of this Treaty.

4. Each State Party, pursuant to its national laws, shall provide its national control list to the

Secretariat, which shall make it available to other States Parties. States Parties are

encouraged to make their control lists publicly available.

5. Each State Party shall take measures necessary to implement the provisions of this Treaty

and shall designate competent national authorities in order to have an effective and

transparent national control system regulating the transfer of conventional arms covered

under Article 2 (1) and of items covered in Article 3 and Article 4.

6. Each State Party shall designate one or more national points of contact to exchange

information on matters related to the implementation of this Treaty. A State Party shall

notify the Secretariat, established under Article 18, of its national point(s) of contact and

keep the information updated.

Article 6

Prohibitions

1. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article

2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if the transfer would violate its

obligations under measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council acting under

Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular arms embargoes.

6

2. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article

2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if the transfer would violate its

relevant international obligations under international agreements to which it is a Party, in

particular those relating to the transfer of, or illicit trafficking in, conventional arms.

3. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article

2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if it has knowledge at the time of

authorization that the arms or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes

against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed

against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes as defined by

international agreements to which it is a Party.

Article 7

Export and Export Assessment

1. If the export is not prohibited under Article 6, each exporting State Party, prior to

authorization of the export of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items

covered under Article 3 or Article 4, under its jurisdiction and pursuant to its national

control system, shall, in an objective and non-discriminatory manner, taking into account

relevant factors, including information provided by the importing State in accordance

with Article 8 (1), assess the potential that the conventional arms or items:

a) would contribute to or undermine peace and security;

b) could be used to:

i. commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law;

ii. commit or facilitate a serious violation of international human rights law;

iii. commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions

or protocols relating to terrorism to which the exporting State is a Party; or

iv. commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions

or protocols relating to transnational organized crime to which the exporting State

is a Party.

2. The exporting State Party shall also consider whether there are measures that could be

undertaken to mitigate risks identified in (a) or (b) in paragraph 1, such as confidencebuilding

measures or jointly developed and agreed programmes by the exporting and

importing States.

7

3. If, after conducting this assessment and considering available mitigating measures, the

exporting State Party determines that there is an overriding risk of any of the negative

consequences in paragraph 1, the exporting State Party shall not authorize the export.

4. The exporting State Party, in making this assessment, shall take into account the risk of

the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of the items covered under Article 3

or Article 4, being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender based violence or

serious acts of violence against women and children.

5. Each exporting State Party shall take measures to ensure that all authorizations for the

export of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article

3 or Article 4, are detailed and issued prior to the export.

6. Each exporting State Party shall make available appropriate information about the

authorization in question, upon request, to the importing State Party and to the transit or

trans-shipment States Parties, subject to its national laws, practices or policies.

7. If, after an authorization has been granted, an exporting State Party becomes aware of

new relevant information, it is encouraged to reassess the authorization after

consultations, if appropriate, with the importing State.

Article 8

Import

1. Each importing State Party shall take measures to ensure that appropriate and relevant

information is provided, upon request, pursuant to its national laws, to the exporting State

Party, to assist the exporting State Party in conducting its national export assessment

under Article 7. Such measures may include end use or end user documentation.

2. Each importing State Party shall take measures that will allow it to regulate, where

necessary, imports under its jurisdiction of conventional arms covered under Article 2

(1). Such measures may include import systems.

3. Each importing State Party may request information from the exporting State Party

concerning any pending or actual export authorizations where the importing State Party is

the country of final destination.

Article 9

Transit or trans-shipment

Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to regulate, where necessary and feasible,

the transit or trans-shipment under its jurisdiction of conventional arms covered under Article

2 (1) through its territory in accordance with relevant international law.

8

Article 10

Brokering

Each State Party shall take measures, pursuant to its national laws, to regulate brokering

taking place under its jurisdiction for conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Such

measures may include requiring brokers to register or obtain written authorization before

engaging in brokering.

Article 11

Diversion

1. Each State Party involved in the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1)

shall take measures to prevent their diversion.

2. The exporting State Party shall seek to prevent the diversion of the transfer of

conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) through its national control system,

established in accordance with Article 5 (2), by assessing the risk of diversion of the

export and considering the establishment of mitigation measures such as confidencebuilding

measures or jointly developed and agreed programmes by the exporting and

importing States. Other prevention measures may include, where appropriate: examining

parties involved in the export, requiring additional documentation, certificates,

assurances, not authorizing the export or other appropriate measures.

3. Importing, transit, trans-shipment and exporting States Parties shall cooperate and

exchange information, pursuant to their national laws, where appropriate and feasible, in

order to mitigate the risk of diversion of the transfer of conventional arms covered under

Article 2 (1).

4. If a State Party detects a diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article

2 (1), the State Party shall take appropriate measures, pursuant to its national laws and in

accordance with international law, to address such diversion. Such measures may include,

alerting potentially affected State Parties, examining diverted shipments of such

conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), and taking follow-up measures through

investigation and law enforcement.

5. In order to better comprehend and prevent the diversion of transferred conventional arms

covered under Article 2 (1), State Parties are encouraged to share relevant information

with one another on effective measures to address diversion. Such information may

include information on illicit activities including corruption, international trafficking

routes, illicit brokers, sources of illicit supply, methods of concealment, common points

of dispatch, or destinations used by organized groups engaged in diversion.

9

6. States Parties are encouraged to report to other State Parties, through the Secretariat, on

measures taken in addressing the diversion of transferred conventional arms covered

under Article 2 (1).

Article 12

Record keeping

1. Each State Party shall maintain national records, pursuant to its national laws and

regulations, of its issuance of export authorizations or its actual exports of the

conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

2. Each State Party is encouraged to maintain records of conventional arms covered under

Article 2 (1) that are transferred to its territory as the final destination or that are

authorized to transit or trans-ship territory under its jurisdiction.

3. Each State Party is encouraged to include in those records: the quantity, value,

model/type, authorized international transfers of conventional arms covered under Article

2 (1), conventional arms actually transferred, details of exporting State(s), importing

State(s), transit and trans-shipment State(s), and end users, as appropriate.

4. Records shall be kept for a minimum of ten years.

Article 13

Reporting

1. Each State Party shall, within the first year after entry into force of this Treaty for that

State Party, in accordance with Article 22, provide an initial report to the Secretariat of

measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, including national laws, national

control lists and other regulations and administrative measures. Each State Party shall

report to the Secretariat on any new measures undertaken in order to implement this

Treaty, when appropriate. Reports shall be made available, and distributed to States

Parties by the Secretariat.

2. States Parties are encouraged to report to other States Parties, through the Secretariat,

information on measures taken that have been proven effective in addressing the

diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

3. Each State Party shall submit annually to the Secretariat by 31 May a report for the

preceding calendar year concerning authorized or actual exports and imports of

conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Reports shall be made available, and

distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat. The report submitted to the Secretariat

may contain the same information submitted by the State Party to relevant United Nations

10

frameworks, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Reports may

exclude commercially sensitive or national security information.

Article 14

Enforcement

Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to enforce national laws and regulations that

implement the provisions of this Treaty.

Article 15

International Cooperation

1. States Parties shall cooperate with each other, consistent with their respective security

interests and national laws, to effectively implement this Treaty.

2. States Parties are encouraged to facilitate international cooperation, including exchanging

information on matters of mutual interest regarding the implementation and application of

this Treaty pursuant to their respective security interests and national laws.

3. States Parties are encouraged to consult on matters of mutual interest and to share

information, as appropriate, to support the implementation of this Treaty.

4. States Parties are encouraged to cooperate, pursuant to their national laws, in order to

assist national implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, including through sharing

information regarding illicit activities and actors and in order to prevent and eradicate

diversion of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

5. States Parties shall, where jointly agreed and consistent with their national laws, afford

one another the widest measure of assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial

proceedings in relation to violations of national measures established pursuant to this

Treaty.

6. States Parties are encouraged to take national measures and to cooperate with each other

to prevent the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) becoming subject

to corrupt practices.

7. States Parties are encouraged to exchange experience and information on lessons learned

in relation to any aspect of this Treaty.

Article 16

International Assistance

1. In implementing this Treaty, each State Party may seek assistance including legal or

legislative assistance, institutional capacity building, and technical, material or financial

11

assistance. Such assistance may include stockpile management, disarmament,

demobilization and reintegration programmes, model legislation, and effective practices

for implementation. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide such assistance,

upon request.

2. Each State Party may request, offer or receive assistance through, inter alia, the United

Nations, international, regional, subregional or national organizations, non-governmental

organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

3. A voluntary trust fund shall be established by States Parties to assist requesting States

Parties requiring international assistance to implement this Treaty. Each State Party is

encouraged to contribute resources to the fund.

Article 17

Conference of States Parties

1. A Conference of States Parties shall be convened by the provisional Secretariat,

established under Article 18, no later than one year following the entry into force of this

Treaty and thereafter at such other times as may be decided by the Conference of States

Parties.

2. The Conference of States Parties shall adopt by consensus its rules of procedure at its first

session.

3. The Conference of States Parties shall adopt financial rules for itself as well as governing

the funding of any subsidiary bodies it may establish as well as financial provisions

governing the functioning of the Secretariat. At each ordinary session, it shall adopt a

budget for the financial period until the next ordinary session.

4. The Conference of States Parties shall:

(a) Review the implementation of this Treaty, including developments in the field of

conventional arms

(b) Consider and adopt recommendations regarding the implementation and operation of this

Treaty, in particular the promotion of its universality;

(c) Consider amendments to this Treaty in accordance with Article 20;

(d) Consider issues arising from the interpretation of this Treaty;

(e) Consider and decide the tasks and budget of the Secretariat;

(f) Consider the establishment of any subsidiary bodies as may be necessary to improve the

functioning of this Treaty; and

(g) Perform any other function consistent with this Treaty.

12

5. Extraordinary meetings of the Conference of States Parties shall be held at such other

times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference of States Parties, or at the written

request of any State Party provided that this request is supported by at least two thirds of

the States Parties.

Article 18

Secretariat

1. This Treaty hereby establishes a Secretariat to assist States Parties in the effective

implementation of this Treaty. Pending the first meeting of the Conference of States

Parties, a provisional Secretariat will be responsible for the administrative functions

covered under this Treaty.

2. The Secretariat shall be adequately staffed. Staff shall have the necessary expertise to

ensure that the Secretariat can effectively undertake the responsibilities described in

paragraph 3.

3. The Secretariat shall be responsible to States Parties. Within a minimized structure, the

Secretariat shall undertake the following responsibilities:

(a) Receive, make available and distribute the reports as mandated by this

Treaty;

(b) Maintain and make available to States Parties the list of national points of

contact;

(c) Facilitate the matching of offers of and requests for assistance for Treaty

implementation and promote international cooperation as requested;

(d) Facilitate the work of the Conference of States Parties, including making

arrangements and providing the necessary services for meetings under this

Treaty; and

(e) Perform other duties as decided by the Conferences of States Parties.

Article 19

Dispute Settlement

1. States Parties shall consult and, by mutual consent, cooperate to pursue settlement of any

dispute that may arise between them with regard to the interpretation or application of

this Treaty including through negotiations, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement or

other peaceful means.

2. States Parties may pursue, by mutual consent, arbitration to settle any dispute between

them, regarding issues concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty.

13

Article 20

Amendments

1. Six years after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose an

amendment to this Treaty. Thereafter, proposed amendments may only be considered by

the Conference of States Parties every three years.

2. Any proposal to amend this Treaty shall be submitted in writing to the Secretariat, which

shall circulate the proposal to all States Parties, not less than 180 days before the next

meeting of the Conference of States Parties at which amendments may be considered

pursuant to paragraph 1. The amendment shall be considered at the next Conference of

States Parties at which amendments may be considered pursuant to paragraph 1 if, no

later than 120 days after its circulation by the Secretariat, a majority of States Parties

notify the Secretariat that they support consideration of the proposal.

3. The States Parties shall make every effort to achieve consensus on each amendment. If

all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment

shall, as a last resort, be adopted by a three-quarters majority vote of the States Parties

present and voting at the meeting of the Conference of States Parties. For the purposes of

this Article, States Parties present and voting means States Parties present and casting an

affirmative or negative vote. The Depositary shall communicate any adopted amendment

to all States Parties.

4. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 shall enter into force for each

State Party that has deposited its instrument of acceptance for that amendment, ninety

days following the date of deposit with the Depositary of the instruments of acceptance

by a majority of the number of States Parties at the time of the adoption of the

amendment. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party ninety days

following the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance for that amendment.

Article 21

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature at the United Nations Headquarters in New York

by all States from the Third Day of the Sixth Month of 2013 until its entry into force.

2. This Treaty is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by each signatory State.

3. Following its entry into force, this Treaty shall be open for accession by any State that

has not signed the Treaty.

4. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with

the Depositary.

14

Article 22

Entry into Force

1. This Treaty shall enter into force ninety days following the date of the deposit of the

fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval with the Depositary.

2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or

accession subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, this Treaty shall enter into

force for that State ninety days following the date of deposit of its instrument of

ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 23

Provisional application

Any State may at the time of signature or the deposit of instrument of its ratification,

acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally Article 6 and

Article 7 pending its entry into force.

Article 24

Duration and Withdrawal

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw

from this Treaty. It shall give notification of such withdrawal to the Depositary, which

shall notify all other States Parties. The notification of withdrawal may include an

explanation of the reasons for its withdrawal. The notice of withdrawal shall take effect

ninety days after the receipt of the notification of withdrawal by the Depositary, unless

the notification of withdrawal specifies a later date.

3. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising

from this Treaty while it was a Party to this Treaty, including any financial obligations

that it may have accrued.

Article 25

Reservations

1. At the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, each State may

formulate reservations, unless the reservations are incompatible with the object and

purpose of this Treaty.

15

2. A State Party may withdraw its reservation at any time by notification to this effect

addressed to the Depositary.

Article 26

Relationship with other international agreements

1. The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States

Parties with regard to existing or future international agreements, to which they are

parties, where those obligations are consistent with this Treaty.

2. This Treaty shall not be cited as grounds for voiding defense cooperation agreements

concluded between States Parties to this Treaty.

Article 27

Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Treaty.

Article 28

Authentic Texts

The original text of this Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and

Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the

United Nations.

DONE AT NEW YORK, this twenty-eighth day of March, two thousand and thirteen

http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/docs/Presidents_Non_Paper_of_27_March_2013_%28ATT_Final_Conference%29.pdf

 

US Senate Votes to Block UN Arms Trade Treaty

Tuesday, March 26th, 2013

Original Story Via:  PJ Media

by Howard Nemerov

During the Senate’s passing of their (congressional budget) Concurrent Resolution 8 on March 23, Oklahoma Senator James Inhofe successfully inserted Senate amendment 139 to “prevent the United States from entering into the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty.” (Text of bills can be retrieved from Library of Congress “Thomas” site.)

In a 53-49 vote, the Senate passed Inhofe’s amendment. The list of Yeas and Nays is what’s important going forward, and contains both good news and a warning.

Along with all 45 Republicans, 8 Democrat senators voted Yea:

  • Mark Begich, Alaska
  • Joe Donnelly, Indiana
  • Kay Hagan, North Carolina
  • Martin Heinrich, New Mexico
  • Heidi Heitkamp, North Dakota
  • Joe Manchin, West Virginia
  • Mark Pryor, Arkansas
  • Jon Tester, Montana

Full story:  http://pjmedia.com/tatler/2013/03/26/senate-votes-to-block-un-arms-trade-treaty/

Stacked Deck at UN ATT Talks

Thursday, March 21st, 2013

Via TheGunMag.com

By Philip L. Watson

The Second Amendment Foundation released a statement today highlighting testimony to the UN on the pending ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty.

Little reported was the fact pro self-defense advocates received 15 minutes to address the global body; however, the ‘Control Arms Coalition’ was allotted 35 minutes.

There is currently no explanation for this disparity listed on any of the UN websites.

Julianne Versnel represents three groups at the UN, the American Conservative Union (ACU), the Second Amendment Foundation (SAF), and the International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (IAPCAR). Her statements highlighted self-defense as a human right.

“The right of self-defense is particularly important to women,” Versnel stated. “As women, we have a right to protect our bodies and to protect ourselves against assault and rape. No one questions that violence against women is endemic.”

There are genuine concerns that any international gun control treaty would ultimately strip individual firearms rights from people all over the world.

“Most of the delegates here know that in the U.S. there is extensive firearms ownership,” Versnel testified. “What they do not know is that almost half of the handguns in the US are owned by women. They are used daily for self-defense. I fully endorse, as should every person in this room, the idea that women must have the means to defend themselves. Nothing that is in an Arms Trade Treaty should affect a woman’s right to defend herself.”

The UN ATT talks are scheduled to wrap up by the end of next week.

SAF and IAPCAR Defend Women’s Right of Self-Defense at UN

Thursday, March 21st, 2013

The Second Amendment Foundation today defended the right of women to defend themselves with firearms during testimony at the United Nations regarding the proposed Arms Trade Treaty.

Speaking for SAF was Julianne Versnel, who was also representing the American Conservative Union and the International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (IAPCAR). She told the world body that “the right to life must be given real meaning” and that “A right to life must include the fundamental right to defend that life.”

“The right of self-defense is particularly important to women,” Versnel stated. “As women, we have a right to protect our bodies and to protect ourselves against assault and rape. No one questions that violence against women is endemic.”

There are genuine concerns that any international gun control treaty would ultimately strip individual firearms rights from people all over the world.

“Most of the delegates here know that in the U.S. there is extensive firearms ownership,” Versnel testified. “What they do not know is that almost half of the handguns in the US are owned by women. They are used daily for self-defense. I fully endorse, as should every person in this room, the idea that women must have the means to defend themselves. Nothing that is in an Arms Trade Treaty should affect a woman’s right to defend herself.”

She reminded the panel that former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, a staunch supporter of the United Nations and the first U.S. ambassador to the organization, also carried a handgun for personal protection while working in the South on civil rights issues.

“Eleanor Roosevelt was known and revered for her beliefs in woman’s rights—including the right to defend oneself with a firearm if necessary,” Versnel stated. “Mrs. Roosevelt practiced what she preached. In 1958 Mrs. Roosevelt drove though the American South by herself. The Klu Klux Klan had put a $25,000 bounty on her head and the Secret Service told her not to go. She went anyway and on the seat of the car was her own .38 caliber revolver.

“We can learn from Mrs. Roosevelt,” she concluded. “No one supported the U.N. more than she did, but at the same time she insisted on her right, as a woman and as a person to have the means to defend herself.”

U.N. global gun control effort begins anew

Wednesday, March 20th, 2013

Via Dave Workman, Seattle Gun Rights Examiner

New talks about an old subject – international gun control – begin today at the United Nations in New York, and sure to be involved at some point is the Bellevue-based International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (IAPCAR), founded with the cornerstone involvement of gun rights advocates Alan Gottlieb and Julianne Versnel.

IAPCAR Executive Director Phil Watson keeps an office at Gottlieb’s Liberty Park complex. Attorney Mark Barnes is IAPCAR’s managing director with an office in Washington, D.C.

In addition, the National Rifle Association is keenly interested in these talks. Indeed, U.S. gun rights organizations have every reason for alarm, in the wake of a statement published Friday by the Washington Post from Amnesty International’s Michelle A. Ringuette.

“The NRA claim that there is such a thing as ‘civilian weapons’ and that these can and need to be treated differently from military weapons under the Arms Trade Treaty is — to put it politely — the gun lobby’s creativity on full display,” Ringuette insisted, according to the newspaper. “There is no such distinction. To try to create one would create a loophole that would render the treaty inoperative, as anyone could claim that he or she was in the business of trading ‘civilian weapons.’ ”

This suggests that global gun banners equate rifles and shotguns with tanks and surface-to-air missiles. For example, during last Thursday’s Senate Judiciary debate on her gun ban legislation, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) defended her efforts to ban “just a few guns” and leave others alone by arguing, “Is this not enough for the people of the United States? Do they need a bazooka?”

Raising further alarms is the fact that within hours of confirming his re-election in November. President Barack Obama had joined a handful of other nations to rekindle the U.N.’s long-running effort to adopt an international gun control treaty. Gottlieb, who heads the Second Amendment Foundation, raised alarms about this last Nov. 7.

Amnesty International is part of an international gun control group called IANSA (International Action Network on Small Arms). That group also includes the Brady Campaign for the Prevention of Gun Violence, and the Law Center for Smart Gun Laws (LCSGL).

It could be that the deck has been carefully stacked by the U.N. According to Fox News, last week, IANSA co-hosted – with the UN – a “series of meetings” with representatives from 48 African nations to push global gun control. The session was held in Addis Ababa, Ethopia.

Gottlieb was in Europe recently attending a meeting of the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting, and he takes the threat of global gun control seriously. That the U.N. is hosting these talks on American soil, in a building that has a statute out front of a Colt Python with its barrel twisted into a knot is a not-so-subtle insult to the Second Amendment and American firearms owners.

Gun rights leaders are warning American gun owners that this is not the time to become complacent, or to be entirely focused on state-level gun control measures, or bills passed out of the Senate Judiciary Committee last week, including Sen. Dianne Feinstein’s effort to renew and make permanent a ban on so-called “assault rifles” and ammunition magazines.

That all of this is occurring at the same time – barely two months into Obama’s second term – does not seem coincidental to some activists, who are now saying “We warned you.”

Thwarting global gun grabbers: Congress moves to stop Obama from signing U.N. Arms Treaty

Thursday, November 29th, 2012

Original Story Via: The Washington Times

The United Nations is pushing gun control on a global scale, and President Obama is on board. Just a few hours after re-election was assured, the president’s representative cast a vote for the Arms Trade Treaty at a U.N. committee meeting. The loosely drafted agreement doesn’t go after guns directly, but the language enables activist judges to get creative in restricting Americans’ exercise of their Second Amendment rights. A final General Assembly decision on the treaty is expected in March, and House Republicans are locked and loaded to stop it.

Rep. Mike Kelly introduced a resolution earlier this month urging the president not to sign the treaty. “If we don’t enshrine this Constitution and these amendments, then we are in great danger of losing them,” the freshman Pennsylvania Republican said in an interview with The Washington Times. “People need to understand that we are constantly under aggressive acts to take these rights away from us, and it’s done in such a way that people don’t see it coming.”

Read the full story at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/28/thwarting-global-gun-grabbers/

Rep. Kelly Introduces Resolution to Protect Second Amendment Rights from UN Arms Trade Treaty

Monday, November 26th, 2012

In addition to the Second Amendment Protection Act (HR 3594) introduced by Rep. Joe Walsh, HR 814 sponsored by Rep. Mike Kelly and 76 other co-sponsors would prohibit federal funding to implement the UN ATT and other similar agreements if signed by President Obama. Other representatives such as Rep. Joe Barton recently voiced strong support for the bill. Both of the bills are bipartisan with co-sponsors from the Democrat and Republican party.

Original Story Via:  Kelly.House.Gov

Washington, D.C. – U.S. Representative Mike Kelly (PA-03) introduced a resolution today urging the president not to sign the United Nations (UN) Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which is in the final stages of negotiation, and warns the president that if he does indeed sign the ATT, it will not be binding and no federal funds will be appropriated to implement it unless it has consent in the Senate and has been the subject of implementing legislation by the Congress.

Just hours after President Obama’s reelection, the administration voted in the UN to move forward with finalizing the ATT, which was previously delayed and is now scheduled to take place during a March 2013 conference.

The bipartisan resolution addresses concerns over language included in the July 2012 ATT draft, which failed to expressly recognize the fundamental, individual right to keep and to bear arms and the individual right of personal self-defense, among other things. In doing so, the current draft threatens the Second Amendment rights of United States citizens, as well as United States sovereignty.

In addition, the ATT poses significant risks to the national security, foreign policy, and economic interests of the United States, placing free democracies and totalitarian regimes on a basis of equality and recognizing their equal right to transfer arms, while imposing onerous reporting requirements that could damage the domestic defense manufacturing base and related firms.

Seventy-six original cosponsors, including Chairmen Jim Jordan (OH-04), Mike Rogers (MI-08), Fred Upton (MI-06), Lamar Smith (TX-21), Sam Graves (MO-06), and Jeff Miller (FL-01), have joined Rep. Kelly in his effort to uphold the Second Amendment rights of Americans and maintain the sovereignty of the United States of America through this critical and timely resolution, which is supported by the National Rifle Association, Heritage Action, and the Endowment for Middle East Truth.

Rep. Kelly issued the following statement:

“There is considerable cause for alarm regarding the UN’s renewed efforts to forge an Arms Trade Treaty that could trample the constitutional rights of Americans, and could seriously compromise our national security and the security of our allies, whom we will be less able to arm and less quick to defend due to the restrictions placed on us by the ATT. My colleagues and I stand committed to fighting this threat to our sovereignty and to standing up for the U.S. Constitution, which we are all sworn to support and defend.”

Background

On June 29, Rep. Kelly sent a letter to President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton outlining his concerns that the ATT would compromise national security and infringe on Americans’ Second Amendment rights. The letter, which was signed by 130 Members of the House, stated, in part, that:

•    The ATT should not cover small arms, light weapons, or related material such as firearms ammunition;
•    The ATT should expressly recognize the individual right of personal self-defense, as well as the legitimacy of hunting, sports shooting, and other lawful activities pertaining to the private ownership of firearms and related materials; and
•    The ATT must not hinder the U.S. from fulfilling strategic, legal, and moral commitments to provide arms to allies such as Taiwan and Israel.

To read the full letter, click here.

To read the Washington Times editorial titled, “The U.N. is coming for your guns,” which mentions Rep. Kelly’s letter, click here.

To read the Townhall.com article highlighting Rep. Kelly’s letter, click here.

CLICK TO PLAY (July 25 Interview on ATT)

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Arms Trade Treaty Discussed at UN, Second ATT Conference Scheduled for 2013

Friday, November 16th, 2012

Original Story Via:  TheGunMag.com

by Philip L. Watson

New York, NY—The UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was discussed at length with testimony from both pro and anti-gun groups during the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly’s 67th session.

On Nov. 7, a resolution was passed for a second ATT conference beginning March 18. The UN already spent 11 weeks in meetings for the ATT with four Preparatory Committee meetings leading toward the final failed ATT conference last July. The General Assembly will consider the resolution; it’s likely that it will be approved.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) were scheduled for Oct. 29; however, the UN was closed due to Hurricane Sandy. Statements for all NGOs were delivered in written form to the delegates. The NGO statements to the UN against guns were juxtaposed against looting in the wake of Hurricane Sandy, with many local New York and New Jersey citizens unable to protect themselves due to some of the most strict gun laws in the country. TheGunMag.com (TGM) outlined the tragic irony of the situation here: SAF: Post-Storm Brooklyn Looting Shows Importance of Gun Rights.

The Second Amendment Foundation delivered its remarks to the UN with other groups as detailed in a previous TGM stories here:  SAF, others weigh in on new round of UN gun control talks, and SAF Statement to UN Stopped by Storm, Still Carries Powerful Message. SAF also addressed the UN’s Programme of Action in August defending the human right of self-defense.

At the first committee meetings, the right to keep and bear arms in self-defense was not discussed. Canada reaffirmed the right of its citizens to own and use firearms for sporting purposes. The delegates focused primarily on consensus, negotiation, and implementation. The case was made for expansion of the scope and parameters of the ATT document from July 2012. Of particular note were points made about registration, tracing, and tracking of guns and ammunition. An official version of the meeting is available here.

The draft ATT in July didn’t win any acclaim from any Second Amendment or self-defense rights groups. That’s not stopping NGO’s like Control Arms from claiming the July draft of the ATT was “missing pieces.

The following are statements from the Defense Small Arms Advisory Council (DSAAC), the World Forum on Shooting Activities (WFSA), the Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers’ Institute (SAAMI), the Manufacturers Advisory Group to the World Forum on Shooting Activities, and the International Committee of Museums and Collections of Arms and Military History.

TheGunMag and IAPCAR were among the first to make the July 24 initial draft and final UN ATT proposal publicly available. More information about the ATT will be reported as it becomes available on TheGunMag.com, SAF.org, and IAPCAR.org.

Statement of the Defense Small Arms Advisory Council

First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly

29 October 2012

Thank you, Mister President, for the opportunity to offer remarks from the perspective of an industry that manufactures military small arms and light weapons to enable states to meet their legitimate national security and law enforcement requirements and does so in strict compliance with the most demanding and rigorous export licensing system in the world.  We believe that a legally binding Arms Trade Treaty that subjects all military arms manufacturers and exporters world-wide to a similar level of regulation can be of benefit in combating the armed violence caused by the absence of common standards governing the international trade in military weapons.  It is difficult to ignore the fact that the vast majority of states currently lack even the most rudimentary export licensing systems, much less comprehensive ones with correspondingly effective enforcement mechanisms.  The ATT was, we thought, to begin addressing that lack.

From our perspective as observers of the negotiations conference in July, it appears that the chief obstacle to achieving consensus on an effective treaty text was the insistence by some on creating an overly broad document, one that went well beyond the committee’s mandate, irrespective of the fact that such language was unlikely to ever be agreed and, even if agreed, effectively carried into force.  A treaty can be likened to a vessel: it can carry only so much freight and attempting to overload it with too many things that, although desirable to some are objectionable to others, poses the risk of sinking it.  In July, the vessel was overloaded and nearly sank; fortunately, it was still tied to the pier and may yet set sail, once the excess weight is removed.

It is our understanding that the sole purpose of the ATT is to legally compel state-parties to adopt procedures for determining if a proposed export of military arms meets basic, internationally agreed standards.  Treaty language that is narrowly focused on achieving that single purpose is, we believe, well worth working for and still well within reach.  It is to be hoped that future negotiations retain that focus and that the perfect—in the eyes of some—does not once again become the enemy of the good.

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Statement From: Manufacturers Advisory Group

Ted Rowe, Chairman

Mr. Chairman:

I am Ted Rowe, Chairman of the Manufacturers Advisory Group to the World Forum on Shooting Activities (WFSA). Speaking on behalf of the world’s leading manufacturers of civilian firearms and ammunition, we must insist on the recognition of civilian possession and ownership of firearms and ammunition in accordance with national law.

Unless and until the United Nations in its various proposals recognizes the right of lawful civilian ownership and possession of firearms, we will continue to use all efforts necessary to have civilian ownership recognized by the United Nations, and we will continue to oppose those proposals that do not recognize this right.

The Arms Trade Treaty to be negotiated in March of 2013 should clearly indicate that the small arms included are for military use and that civilian firearms are to be excluded.

The Program of Action as it evolves should also recognize the legitimate, legal use of firearms by civilians as well as their right to own and possess firearms within their national laws.

It is interesting to note that each and every member state of the United Nations is a legitimate importer of civilian firearms and ammunition. These imports are not for the military! These imports should not be subject to or included within an Arms Trade Treaty.

Civilian use of firearms is seen internationally in Olympic Games, in hunting around the world, in sport shooting and in recreational use.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, there is the human right of self-protection and self-defense and the need and use of firearms to fulfill that right. This right is indisputable and is documented throughout history.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman

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Statement from World Forum on Shooting Activities (WFSA)

UN General Assembly First Committee

October 29, 2012

Mr. Chairman, I am Herbert Keusgen, the President of the World Forum on Shooting Activities.   We represent the hundreds of millions of hunters, sport shooters and civilian firearms owners throughout the world.  The WFSA is an ECOSOC NGO and has participated in UN meetings relating to small arms and light weapons for fifteen years.

Today I would like to make three brief comments, reflecting the views the civilian firearms community, on the Programme of Action, the possible Arms Trade Treaty and ISACS.

On the Programme of Action, Mr. Chairman, we continue to remain disappointed that the POA has failed to recognize the legitimacy and utility of civilian firearms ownership. Mr. Chairman, there seems to be a continuing misconception on the part of the UN and supporters of the POA, that civilian firearms are a bad thing.  Sixty percent of the small arms in the world are legally owned by civilians. These arms are not a problem. The problem lies with inadequate control of military arms.

Mr. Chairman, let’s say something positive. At the last week’s UN meeting on the UN Firearms Protocol in Vienna there was an acknowledgment of the legitimacy of civilian firearms use. This was a positive step and we commend this action.

Mr. Chairman, in regard to a possible Arms Trade Treaty, we continue to be told that the intent of an ATT is only to control military small arms. Therefore, we request the UN to state this in such an ATT in clear and unmistakable language. For example, it could use the definition of SALW used by Germany, and I quote:

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), are weapons and weapon systems which were originally manufactured or which were rebuilt according to military standards and requirements for use as war matériel. 

This would clearly exclude civilian firearms from the scope of the ATT.

Mr. Chairman, the ATT has been extremely politicized in one particular jurisdiction. This is a question of perception, Mr. Chairman.  As long as the ATT is perceived, let me underline perceived,  as affecting  civilian firearms, it will not be accepted or ratified in that jurisdiction.  This situation can be changed by the specific exclusion of civilian firearms that we have suggested.

Mr. Chairman, let me briefly comment on International Small Arms Control Standards or ISACS.  We are extremely disappointed in the ISACS process. If the POA has had a bias against civilian firearms, ISACS has been almost overtly anti-civilian firearms. The ISACS process has failed to respond appropriately to the legitimate concerns and requirements of the civilian user community and the firearms manufacturers. This must change, Mr. Chairman.

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying that notwithstanding our criticisms today we remain willing to cooperate on all fronts and venues whether it be the POA, the Firearms Protocol, the ATT or ISACS. We can be a valuable ally to efforts that address the problems of misuse or a steadfast opponent of any effort that restrict the lawful use of civilian firearms.

For further information contact Thomas Mason at +1 503 998 0555 or tlmorusa@aol.com .

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United Nations General Assembly, 67th Session

First Committee

New York, 1 November, 2012

Statement by Richard Patterson, Managing Director

Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers’ Institute, Inc

Thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to speak today.  My name is Richard Patterson.  I’m the managing director of the Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers’ Institute–also known as SAAMI.  Since 1926 we have created the safety and reliability standards for the design, manufacture, transportation, storage and use of firearms, ammunition and components. We are an accredited standards-setting organization.  Whether you realize it or not, every country in this room benefits from our standards.  Firearms and ammunition that follow SAAMI standards are being used in every corner of the world to promote peace, enhance economic stability, responsibly manage wildlife populations, provide recreation, teach life-skills, promote the camaraderie of sporting competition, and protect lives.

The small arms issue is complex, since small arms are tools that can be used for the greater good of humanity, and misused by those who choose to commit acts of violence.  Because of this duality, uninformed decisions can cause more harm than good.

SAAMI has at its disposal many of the world’s leading ballisticians, structural engineers, chemists, statisticians, logistics experts, and metallurgists specializing in firearms and ammunition.  We are in the unique position of providing valuable technical, factual, and science-based input into the small arms discussion and debate.  We also have access to the real-world practical knowledge of the major manufacturers of firearms, ammunition and components, meaning we can add a practical perspective to the debate.

We welcome the opportunity to share our expertise and experience.  We would like to participate in any discussions resulting from the PoA call for a technical and industry working group and—for that matter—in any other discussions on this important issue.

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Statement From: The International Committee of Museums and Collections of Arms and Military History (ICOMAM)

2012/10/24

Mr. Chairman:

I am Ken Smith-Christmas, representing ICOMAM, The International Committee of Museums and Collections of Arms and Military History.  ICOMAM is an organization with approximately 260 institutional and individual members in some 50 countries, and includes such museums as the Royal Armouries in England, the Royal Dutch Army Museum, the Royal Belgian Army Museum, and the Smithsonian Institution. For the past fifty-five years, we have served as the advocate for museums around the world that specialize in arms and military history.  We are an international committee of ICOM, the International Council of Museums, which works closely with UNESCO.

Nearly every history museum on earth has firearms in its collections.  Most of these arms are antique, or, by their historical association, are considered to be curios.  Many of them are inoperable relics, due to their physical condition. Some are excavated, archaeological, material. The ability to acquire and exchange them is essential to the scientific, cultural, and economic functioning of our museums. We are concerned that the provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty will affect these types of firearms.  For instance, under proposals currently being reviewed, a museum would have to seek the permission of the exporting country, the importing country, and the transit countries to acquire and transport an antique arm or weapon, even for a temporary loan or a research project.

We submit that antique arms and museum weapons pose no threat to anyone. Rather, they are part of our common cultural heritage and current regulatory structures are adequate to control them.  Additionally, in today’s climate of constrained budgets, it is an unnecessary financial burden on museums and governments to require stringent controls over the antiques, curios, and relic arms commonly found in museums.

In short, we believe that there is simply no need for antique and museum arms and weapons to be included within the scope of an Arms Trade Treaty. We therefore request that they be exempted from the scope of any Treaty.

Thank you.

SAF blasts Obama support for UN Arms Trade Treaty day after election

Monday, November 12th, 2012

Original Story Via:  Human Events

By: Neil W. McCabe
11/11/2012

The leader of America’s oldest gun rights legal foundation Nov. 7 called out President Barack Obama for his support of the United Nations Small Arms and Light Weapons Treaty the day after the election.

“It’s obvious that our warnings over the past several months have been true,” said Alan Gottlieb, founder and executive vice president of the Second Amendment Foundation, based in Bellevue, Wash.

Less than 24 hours after winning re-election, the Obama’s administration joined with China, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and more than 150 other governments, in supporting renewed debate on the proposed United Nations arms trade treaty, confirming the worst fears of the American gun rights community,” said the founder of SAF, which was in 1974, and which has grown to more than 650,000 members and supporters and conducts many programs designed to better inform the public about the consequences of gun control.

“Just days ago as he campaigned for re-election,” he csaid. ”Barack Obama told his supporters that voting is the ‘best revenge.’ I guess now we know what he was talking about. The revenge he seeks is against American gun owners and their Second Amendment rights.”

“The election was called about 11 p.m. Tuesday and by 11 a.m. this morning, we got word that the United States was supporting this resolution. We have to be more vigilant in our efforts to stop this proposed treaty,” he said.

The vote came at the U.N. General Assembly’s meeting of the First Committee on Disarmament at the world organization’s headquarters in New York City.

According to a State Department webpage devoted to the Arms Trade Treaty, the Obama administration strongly supports the treaty potential.

“The ATT should include all advanced conventional weapons, including tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery systems, military aircraft, military helicopters, naval vessels, missiles, missile launchers, small arms and light weapons, and combat support equipment. It should also include parts, components, and/or technology to manufacture, modify, or repair the covered items,” the webpage said.

Julianne Versnel, the SAF operations director, who has been back and forth to the United Nations over this proposal, said the fight is not finished.

The measure will be considered for finalization in March, she said.

“We will continue to monitor this issue and oppose any effort to enforce a global gun control measure,” she said.

Amnesty International issued a statement Wednesday lauding passage of the resolution, saying the treaty will protect human rights, she said.

Suzanne Nossel, executive director of Amnesty International USA, said, “Today’s vote is step one toward a hugely meaningful human rights victory. We will be urging the United States and all other countries to keep today’s momentum going towards the final passage of the first arms trade treaty.”

Nossell said the 157 governments at the U.N. General Assembly’s First Committee on Disarmament in New York voting to finalize Arms Trade Treaty in March is a breakthrough.

“It’s the greatest show of support the treaty has ever received,” she said.

“Among the ‘big six; arms-exporting countries, only Russia abstained from voting,” she said. China joined France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the USA in supporting the resolution.

Gottlieb said Amnesty International does not appreciate that gun rights are enshrined in the Bill of Rights.

“The right of self-defense is a human right,” he said.

“In this country, the Second Amendment protects that right,” he said.

EDITORIAL: Gun ban back on Obama’s agenda – More flexible administration revives U.N. arms treaty

Friday, November 9th, 2012

Original Story Via: The Washington Times

That didn’t take long. Less than a day after President Obama’s re-election, the administration breathed new life into the United Nations‘ previously comatose treaty regulating guns.

Last July, the U.N. General Assembly began formal discussion of the Arms Trade Treaty, which seeks to establish “common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms.” Talks on the controversial agreement were put on indefinite hiatus after the United States requested an extension to the time allotted to negotiate the agreement. Gun rights supporters blasted the treaty as it inched toward approval, and many suspected U.S. procedural maneuvers were intended to delay the treaty so it wouldn’t become a topic of discussion during the election. It appears these suspicions were correct since “indefinite” turned out to mean until hours after Mr. Obama was re-elected.

The administration line is that the treaty applies only to firearms exports and poses no threat to domestic gun owners. “We seek a treaty that contributes to international security by fighting illicit arms trafficking and proliferation, protects the sovereign right of states to conduct legitimate arms trade, and meets the concerns that we have been articulating throughout,” an administration official said. “We will not accept any treaty that infringes on the constitutional rights of our citizens to bear arms.”

It is hard to take the White House response seriously. The treaty instructs countries to “take the necessary legislative and administrative measures, to adapt, as necessary, national laws and regulations to implement the obligations of this treaty.” The agreement’s language is so broad, vague and poorly defined it could be stretched in a variety of ways that would pose a threat to the Second Amendment. Treaty backers also want to insert provisions forcing ratifying states to promote a variety of fashionable left-wing causes including “sustainable development,” even though they have nothing to do with the arms trade.

Though the treaty is supposed to be about “gun exports,” its provisions can still be applied domestically. Activist judges adjudicating cases arising under the treaty and enabling legislation could see to that. The definition of international commerce could follow the same expansive logic liberal courts have used to redefine “interstate commerce.” Anything that indirectly or incidentally affects the trade in arms would fall under its control.

A ratified treaty, with constitutional authority, could be interpreted in a way that applies to any imported weapon or round of ammunition, those made with foreign components, those containing imported materials, those that might some day be exported, and those capable of being exported. If it affects the overall arms market, it could be said to be part of “international” trade, even if the item never leaves our shores. In practice this logic would give the government free rein to regulate all weapons, foreign and domestic. With the election out of the way, the White House can move swiftly to get the treaty through the U.N. General Assembly and up to the Senate by the summer of 2013. Elections have consequences.

The Washington Times

U.N. CELEBRATES OBAMA RE-ELECTION BY PUSHING GLOBAL GUN CONTROL

Wednesday, November 7th, 2012

Less than 24 hours after winning re-election, President Barack Obama’s administration joined with China, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and more than 150 other governments, in supporting renewed debate on the proposed United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, confirming the worst fears of the American gun rights community.

The vote came at the U.N. General Assembly’s meeting of the First Committee on Disarmament at the world organization’s headquarters in New York City.

“It’s obvious that our warnings over the past several months have been true,” said Alan Gottlieb, founder and executive vice president of the Second Amendment Foundation. “The election was called about 11 p.m. Tuesday and by 11 a.m. this morning, we got word that the United States was supporting this resolution. We have to be more vigilant in our efforts to stop this proposed treaty.”

SAF Operations Director Julianne Versnel, who has been back and forth to the United Nations over this proposal, said the fight is not finished. The measure will be considered for finalization in March 2013.

“We will continue to monitor this issue and oppose any effort to enforce a global gun control measure,” she stated.

Amnesty International issued a statement Wednesday lauding passage of the resolution, saying the treaty will protect human rights.

“The right of self-defense is a human right,” Gottlieb countered, “and in this country, the Second Amendment protects that right.

“Just days ago as he campaigned for re-election,” he concluded, “Barack Obama told his supporters that voting is the ‘best revenge.’ I guess now we know what he was talking about. The revenge he seeks is against American gun owners and their Second Amendment rights.”

UN ATT: REACHING FOR RESET?

Tuesday, November 6th, 2012

New Coalition Says Current Draft Arms Trade Treaty Would Be Worse For Humanity

By Jeff MORAN | Geneva

An informal coalition of prominent academics, researchers, and advocates in the fields of international human rights law and small arms control policy-making condemned the 26 July 2012 draft United Nations (UN) Arms Trade treaty (ATT) on 30 October. [1]

According to statements made, the draft ATT is absolutely unacceptable and adopting it without substantial changes would be worse for humanity than if there was no ATT at all.  They expressed their  position during a news briefing at the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, where they discussed the publication of “Academy Briefing #2: The Draft Arms Trade Treaty.” [2]

The formal official authors of the publication were Dr. Stuart Casey-Maslen, a Research Fellow at the Geneva Academy, and Ms. Sarah Parker, a Senior Researcher at the Small Arms Survey.  The authors coordinated with and received input from representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Saferworld, and Oxfam. [4]

This is a significant  development in humanitarian advocacy designed to influence the unfinished UN ATT negotiations process, which is expected to formally re-open where it left off and run for 10 days under consensus rules from 18-28 March 2013. [3]  The  condemnation may embolden states aligned with Mexico to kill consensus and to take the ATT negotiations outside the UN.  This would amount to hitting the reset button and clearing the way for a more controversial treaty to be adopted under  less rigorous two-thirds majority rules. [5]

Dr. Stuart Casey-Maslen was unable to be present for the news briefing due to a family emergency and so was unavailable for comment.  Dr. Casey-Maslen was a member of the Swiss delegation to the ATT negotiations.  He was also on the ICRC delegation to the Oslo Diplomatic Conference in 1997 that adopted the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, which was a treaty that was developed outside the UN system and championed mainly by non-governmental organizations.

Ms. Sarah Parker sat in Dr. Casey-Maslen’s place and has been a member of the Australian delegation during the UN ATT process.  Ms. Parker was joined by Mr. Gilles Giacca who is a researcher and Ph.D. candidate at the Geneva Academy.  The news briefing was led by Dr. Andrew Clapham, co-Director of the Geneva Academy and author of several books on international humanitarian law.

 

News Briefing Details

Dr. Clapham opened the news briefing, and then passed the floor to Mr. Gilles Giacca who spoke for about six minutes.  This was followed by Dr. Clapham again for about 15 minutes.  This left over 30 minutes for a lengthy question and answer session where nine questions were answered.  The briefing was attended by over 100 people.  One professional reporter self-identified and asked the first question at the end.

Mr. Gilles Giacca first provided some historical context and motivations for the ATT.  He then listed international instruments and declarations designed to increase controls over small arms and light weapons, to reduce arms related violence worldwide:

1.  UN Program of Action on Small Arms,

2.  UN Firearms Protocol,

3.  The UN International Tracing Instrument, and the

4.  Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development.

Then he discussed the main challenges for the negotiations of the ATT so far:

1.  Defining the scope of the weapons to be regulated by the ATT.

2.  Defining the criteria to be used to condition authorized international transfers of weapons subject to the ATT.

3.  Defining the monitoring, compliance, reporting and implementation mechanisms of the ATT, for such things as the provision of victim assistance.

4.  The US insisting on negotiating by consensus rules, and so creating the option for a single country to “spoil” the treaty.

5.  The large gap between two main camps: those who want a narrow scope treaty, and those who want a broad scope treaty.

After Mr. Giacca concluded, Dr. Andrew Clapham opened his comments by stating that the ATT should be an instrument “to prevent arms from fueling human rights violations or violating international humanitarian law.”  He went on to state “what’s at stake here, I think, is that the treaty has a number of flaws or loopholes in it.  And if it were going to be adopted in current form, arguably it could be worse than no treaty.”

Dr. Clapham said further that in various places the ATT appeared to set the bar lower than existing international standards, and that this would amount to a step backwards, or a “retrogression in international standards” as is stated in the Academy Briefing. [6]

He then detailed his main problems with the draft ATT, though he elaborated many problems as discussion developed into the question and answer period.  His short-hand for three main problems were: 1) the complicity problem, 2) definition of war crimes, and 3) the balancing problem.

1.  Complicity Problem.   This criticism focused on Article 3, paragraph 3 and specifically cited the text “A State Party shall not authorize a transfer of conventional weapons within the scope of this Treaty for the purposes of facilitating the commission of genocide, crime against humanity…” Here Dr. Clapham stated that the “for the purposes of facilitating” is too high a standard and is essentially not in line with international customary law.  He said there should be an awareness test or a knowledge test, but not a purpose test. [7]

2.  Definition of War Crimes.  This criticism focused on Article 3, paragraph 3.  In short he stated that limiting war crimes to “grave breaches” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions or serious violations of Common Article 3 of those Conventions would exclude most violations that are thought to be occurring in Syria, violations such as the disproportionate targeting of civilians. [8]

3.  The Balancing Problem.  This criticism focused on Article 4, paragraph 5.  His basic point was that the use of the term “overriding” implied a balancing of peace and security v. human rights violations.  He further stated that that if the “overriding” language was kept in the treaty, and if the common understanding by diplomats was that there should be a balancing of peace and security v. human rights violations, this would be “a step backwards” because “it takes away the idea that human rights are something absolute, that there can be no violations under any circumstances.”  He suggested using other words such as “substantial risk,” “clear risk,” or even “overwhelming risk.” [9]

Other issues Dr. Clapham addressed in passing were:

4.  The treaty scope (e.g. the exclusion of tear gas and rubber bullets for example).

5.  Ambiguity about the definition for ammunition, munitions.

6.  Ambiguity about the definition of trade (e.g. does it include state gifts and loans?)

 

Observations & Other Discussions

Most of the discussion was about loopholes and weak ATT language with respect to promoting human rights.  The news briefing seemed at times, however, to be a public lamentation with the United States essentially blamed first for insisting upon consensus rules at the outset of the negotiations process in 2009, and then spoiling the draft treaty by creating the “balancing problem” between human rights and state security. [10]

While Dr. Clapham acknowledged the ATT as a “trade” and “export” treaty at one point, his commentary was delivered as if the treaty was designed purely to serve as an instrument of global civil society improvement, one that is too important to be frustrated in any way by others concerned about national sovereignty, security, and business interests, and/or the principle of individual right to armed self-defense.

The speakers were clearly frustrated with the draft ATT, and the negotiations process to date.  It was not clear if this was indicative of  just a distaste for the messy multilateral reality of accommodating diverse state interests, an acquired disdain for those diplomats and delegations guided more by how the world is rather than how the world should be, or both.

Yet the mood was not entirely down.  The room became guardedly positive when talk turned to the taking the ATT negotiation process outside the UN, to “do it right” as Mr. Giacca said on the Geneva Academy ATT Legal Blog post that was projected onto the wall behind the stage during the news briefing. [11]  This discussion thread developed in response to a question about the probability of Mexico, for example, leading a push to take the ATT outside the UN.

In response to this question, Dr. Clapham reframed the ATT as a once in a lifetime opportunity to save humanity from rights abuses, and implied that he and others like Dr. Keith Krause  (the Founding Director of the Small Arms Survey, also seated in the audience) were hoping to get a good ATT done “on their watch.”

But Dr. Clapham acknowledged a certain level of fatigue may set in and that diplomats and some humanitarian groups might just settle for a lowest common denominator to get the ATT done.  He went on to state however that “there’s a good chance, that if people realize they are going to get something which is worse than nothing…and if the Mexican leadership…has the stomach for this, it could get taken outside the UN.”  He went on to say this would allow for an ATT text to be approved “with only a two-thirds  majority and we’d arguably get a much better text.” Sarah Parker, and Gilles Giacco also commented on this situation as well.

The discussion got pessimistic again when Dr. Krause actually took the floor to make comments about Article 4 and the national assessment provisions.  He essentially declared that the draft ATT, without fundamental changes, could result in a “pretty instrument that actually doesn’t change anything that actually happens in the world.”  The reasoning being that weapons transfers would be subject to national assessment without any meaningful way for non-governmental organizations and other states to legally challenge a State’s own assessment process and decisions to export/transfer arms abroad, and this, in his words, would be “tragic.”  Dr. Krause seemed to offer that another good reason to take the ATT outside the UN system would be for “limiting the scope of malicious interpretation” of the ATT by state parties.

Sarah Parker, who works for Mr. Krause at the Small Arms Survey, then explained how provisions for increased accountability and transparency on national assessment could be added through an implemented “ATT system” when the “political climate” was better, eventually, after countries become “more comfortable” with the ATT’s obligations.   She elaborated that a State’s own national assessment decisions could be made subject to legal challenges in international courts.

Dr. Clapham even suggested how reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch could eventually precipitate court-ordered injunctions halting government arms exports / transfers provided that campaigners and advocates first help bring about appropriate controlling national legislation.  Dr. Clapham and Ms. Parker were presumably referring to more politically open states only, and the United States especially.

At the end, Ms. Parker importantly clarified that the ATT is not about creating a new tier of illegal transfers.  Rather, “the ATT is introducing a new tier which is where [some] arms transfers are considered irresponsible, and therefore illegal.”

 

Looking Forward

Dr. Clapham, Mr. Giacca, Dr. Krause, and all seemed hopeful for an ATT negotiated outside the UN system (i.e. without consensus rules, with fewer countries required for an ATT to enter into force, with higher standards, broader scope, better text overall etc).  [12]  Ironically for them and like-minded partners at the ICRC, Oxfam, and Saferworld, realizing these hopes now seems best assured if nations don’t reach consensus at the UN ATT Conference in March.

Will humanitarian rights groups and sympathetic state delegations help move the UN ATT Conference talks forward by consensus, or will they act to kill consensus themselves?

Deliberately killing consensus will hit the ATT reset button and would be hypocritical at the very least, particularly since such groups were the first to accuse the United States and others of doing this in July. [13]  Regardless of who might kill consensus in March, doing so will certainly lead to further institutional division within the international system.  With Syria now in a full civil war, and the risks of major regional conflict accelerating, more division seems the last thing the world now needs.

 

Indexed Audio

The downloadable audio for this conference is just under 53 minutes and 7MB.   It is complete except for the first few minutes of introductions.  The only edits made to the audio file were to enhance voice and minimize noise.  This said, there are some points where noise may make it difficult to clearly understand speakers.  You can download it here.

00:00 – 05:47 | Presentation by Gilles Giacca
05:48 – 20:18 | Presentation by Dr. Andrew Clapham
20:19 – 21:04 | Question 1 and response (on the United States creating the “balancing problem”)
21:05 – 24:13 | Question 2 and response (on violence against women provisions)
24:14 – 26:41 | Question 3 and response (on implications for private military companies)
24:42 – 27:37 | Question 4 and response (on conflicts between an ATT and international law)
27:38 – 33:13 | Question 5 and responses (on taking the ATT outside the UN system)
33:14 – 34:25 | Question 6 and responses (on individual and business applicability)
34:26 – 36:15 | Question 7 and comment by Keith Krause (on national assessments)
36:16 – 39:09 | Dr. Clapham response to Keith Krause (on national assessments)
39:10 – 41:02 | Sarah Parker comments to Keith Krause (on national assessments)
41:03 – 42:08 | Dr. Clapham second response to Keith Krause (on national assessments)
42:09 – 44:43 | Question 8 and responses (on the definition of authorization)
44:44 – 52:06 | Question 9 and responses (on legitimating the arms trade and exporting to third parties)
52:07 – 52:51 | Dr. Clapham clarification about transfers to third parties, and close)

 

About The Author

Jeff Moran, a Principal at TSM Worldwide LLC, specializes in the international defense, security, and firearms industries.  Previously Mr. Moran was a strategic marketing leader for a multi-billion dollar unit of a public defense & aerospace company, a military diplomat, and a nationally ranked competitive rifle shooter.  He is currently studying international law of armed conflict with the Executive LL.M. Program of the Geneva Academy.  Earlier this year he completed an Executive Master in International Negotiation from the Graduate Institute of Geneva.   Mr. Moran also has an MBA from Emory University’s Goizueta Business School and a BSFS from Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.

 

End Notes

[1]  The first session of the UN ATT Conference was held from 3 -28 July and ended with no action on the final draft treaty dated 26 July 2012.  A .pdf version of this draft ATT is available here.

[2]  The Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights website is here.  According to the back of the briefing cover, the Geneva Academy “provides post-graduate teaching, conducts academic legal research, undertakes policy studies, and organizes training courses and expert meetings;” and “concentrates on the branches of international law applicable in times of armed conflict.”  A .pdf of the Academy Briefing is available in here.

[3] A draft resolution before the First Committee of the United Nations is available at here.

[4]  The stated authors of the briefing acknowledge collaboration from Roy Isbister, Claire Mortimer, and Nathalie Weizmann on the front inside cover of the Academy Briefing.  These individuals are well-known representatives of Saferworld, Oxfam, and the ICRC respectively.  While a disclaimer states the views expressed “do not necessarily reflect those of the project’s supporters or of anyone who provided input to, or commented on, an earlier draft,” previous public statements by these individuals  indicate strong concurrence with the briefing by these individuals and their respective employers.  You can learn more about the Small Arms Survey here.

[5]  Mexico is most likely to lead the effort to reset the ATT negotiations outside the United Nations based on its prior statements and actions during ATT negotiations process since 2009.  At the conclusion of the UN ATT Conference in July, they spoke on behalf of 90 countries signaling a clear willingness represent the interests of other like-minded states.  A .pdf of this statement is available here.

[6] “Academy Briefing No. 2: The Draft Arms Trade Treaty.”  Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights.  30 October 2012.  Page 31.

[7] Ibid., page 23.

[8] Ibid., page 23.

[9] Ibid., page 25.

[10]  Mr. Giacca made reference to the problem of consensus rules and the US  insistence on them in his remarks.  A .pdf of the press statement announcing the US support for the ATT negotiations with consensus rules is available here.  Dr. Clapham specifically identified the US as creating the balancing problem when answering the first question from the audience.  You can hear this starting at 20 minutes and 19 seconds in the audio file referenced above.

[11] A .pdf of the blog post presented during the news briefing is available here.

[12] Among the people making comments at the news briefing, Ms. Parker was alone in declaring her preference for a treaty by consensus through the UN system.

[13] Here are links to press releases from Reuters, Oxfam, Amnesty International, and Control Arms. Sources last accessed 5 November  2012.

First Published: 5 November 2012
Last Updated: 5 November 2012

Online republication and redistribution are authorized when this entire publication (including byline, hyper-links, and Indexed Audio, About the Author and End Note sections) and linkable URL  http://tsmworldwide.com/reaching-for-reset/ are included.

UPDATE: UN Arms Trade Treaty

Wednesday, October 24th, 2012

By Philip L. Watson

Julianne Versnel of IAPCAR and SAF last week at the UN Conference of Parties

Executive Director

The evolution of the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) from the “Firearms Protocol” and the “Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons” (PoA) for more than a decade continues despite the failure to reach agreement on the ATT this last July.

On October 15-19 the “Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime” was held in Vienna Austria. IAPCAR’s Julianne Versnel and Alan Gottlieb attended the meeting via the WFSA on behalf of the Second Amendment Foundation. In the past, the UN’s “Conference of Parties” has served as a bureaucratic and educational platform supporting the Firearms Protocol, the Programme of Action, and the ATT.

At this meeting the “illegal” trade in small arms used for sport and/or self-defense was lumped in with various forms of crime such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, terrorism, counterfeiting, and organized crime.

A resolution was passed to continue the working group’s study and recognizing the legitimacy of firearms with sporting uses.

Mexico was apparently vehement on not mentioning firearms in civilian possession. Rather, their preferred method of mentioning firearms replaces “civilian possession” with “lawful use.” This proposed verbiage would presumably give governments and the UN more authority to limit civilian use of firearms.

The Mexican delegation also hosted a side event titled “Arms Trade Treaty, Firearms Protocal and Small Arms Programme of Action: Three essential components of effective firearms control. What options for synergies?” The main stated goal of the meeting was to “establish synergies” among the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms, the Firearms Protocol, and the UN Arms Trade Treaty. During the meeting a representative from a different group advised against changing terms and contexts that had already been negotiated.

At the main meeting, a representative from Russia questioned the motives, funding sources, and accuracy of the so called “Small Arms Survey,” a yearly publication distributed by the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (GIIDS) and Cambridge Press. The 366 page tome supposedly focuses on “illicit trafficking of small arms;” however, the ‘survey’ frequently veers far off track highlighting domestic laws and issues unrelated to international affairs or the UN. The publication serves as a clear blueprint and source of skewed data for a political agenda against the civilian use of firearms.

In addition to the “Small Arms Survey,” GIIDS also frequently produces “Research Notes” and “Issue Briefs” for dissemination at UN meetings. These smaller, pithier handouts are distributed at meetings backing up the yearly ‘Survey’ to constantly reiterate their request for increased regulation on civilian arms.

The UN ATT is likely to resurface again. Overall, the goals of our opposition have not, and will not change. In the defense of the human right of self-defense, IAPCAR will continue to monitor these events closely.

 

How the 2012 UN Arms Trade Treaty Conference Really Died

Thursday, October 18th, 2012

(H/T Jeff Moran, TSM Worldwide)

By Jeff Moran | Geneva

Advocacy and diplomatic discussions started again last week with the opening day of the UN General Assembly First Committee meetings.[1]  These meetings end on 6 November 2012 (Election Day in the United States), and  follow-up the failed United Nations (UN) Conference in July to formally negotiate by consensus a legally binding Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).[2]

Contrary to prevailing reportage and opinion, the UN ATT Conference was less a failure in diplomacy, or a victory by the firearms industry and the National Rifle Association for that matter, than it was the result of abortive advocacy lead by the UK-based Control Arms campaign and its unrealistically expansive vision for a more extreme trade treaty than consensus could sustain.[3]

The Control Arms vision for the ATT encompasses 14 specific treaty issue areas under three categories: Scope, Transfer Criteria, and Implementation.  Scope issues areas include Ammunition, Brokering/Dealers, Other Conventional Weapons, and Small Arms/Light Weapons.  Transfer Criteria issue areas include Armed Violence, Corruption, Gender-based Violence, Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, and Socio-Economic Development.  Implementation issue areas include Final Provisions, Implementation, Verification, and Victim Assistance.

The Control Arms vision across these treaty issue areas can be found on their subsidiary armstreaty.org website.[4]  The details of their ATT vision are quoted below:

1.  Ammunition.  Including in the scope of the ATT all “ammunition, munitions, and explosives.”

2.  Brokering/Dealers.  Including in the scope of the ATT brokering and dealing.  “Brokering generally refers to arranging or mediating arms deals and buying or selling arms on one’s own account or for others, as well as organizing services such as transportation, insurance or financing related to arms transfers, and the actual provision of such services.”

3.  Other Conventional Weapons.  Including in the scope of the ATT “all conventional weapons, related components and production equipment, beyond Small Arms and Ammunition” which are “covered by the 7 categories in UN Register of Conventional Arms and of other conventional weapons, components and equipment.”

4.  Small Arms/Light Weapons.  Including in the scope of the ATT “conventional weapons that can be carried by an individual or a group of individuals (including revolvers, machine guns, hand-held grenade launchers; portable anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns and missile systems; and mortars of calibers less than 100 mm. etc).”

5.  Armed Violence.  Including as a parameter of the ATT “provisions to restrict transfers that could provoke, fuel or exacerbate armed conflict and armed violence.”

6.  Corruption.  Including as a parameter of the ATT “provisions to restrict transfers that could exacerbate or institutionalize ‘corruption’ or ‘corrupt practices’. In the context of arms transfers, corrupt practices include bribing of state officials with commissions and kickbacks provided by arms producers and traders to facilitate a transfer agreement.”

7.  Gender-based Violence.  Including as a parameter of the ATT   provisions to “restrict the transfer of arms where there is a substantial risk that the arms under consideration will be used to perpetuate or facilitate acts of gender-based violence, including sexual violence.”

8.  Human Rights.  Including as a parameter of the ATT “provisions to restrict transfers when there is substantial risk that the arms will be used in serious violations of international human rights law, including fueling persistent, grave or systematic violations or patterns of abuse.”

9.  International Humanitarian Law.  Including as a parameter of the ATT “provisions to restrict transfers when there is substantial risk of the arms being used in serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL). This assessment would include consideration of whether a recipient that is, or has been, engaged in an armed conflict has committed serious violations of IHL or has taken measures to prevent violations of IHL, including punishing those responsible.”

10.  Socio-Economic Development.  Including as a parameter of the ATT “provisions to restrict transfers that could hinder, undermine or adversely affect socio-economic development.”

11.  Final Provisions.  Including in the text of the ATT “effective implementation mechanisms of the Arms Trade Treaty, including criminalization of treaty violations and an Implementation Support Unit (ISU) to coordinate international cooperation.”

12.  Implementation.  Including in the text of the ATT final provisions and entry into force mechanisms. “Effective final provisions would not allow reservations that would be incompatible with the Treaty’s purpose. Effective entry into force mechanisms would not include a requirement for excessive number of ratifications, nor for specific states or groups of states to ratify the treaty, before it could enter into force.”

13.  Verification.  Including in the text of the ATT “effective verification mechanisms of the Arms Trade Treaty.  Effective verification includes meaningful and specific annual reporting, external referral for dispute resolution, annual meetings of states party (MSP) and five-yearly Treaty Review Conferences (RevCons), and the creation of an Implementation Support Unit (ISU) to assist with, collect and analyze reports.”

14.  Victim Assistance.  Including in the text of the ATT “the recognition of the rights of victims of armed violence and acknowledgment of States’ commitment to provide assistance to victims.”

Reaching consensus during the UN ATT Conference was certainly possible, and potentially a constructive endeavor for all nations from an interest point of view.  But consensus was not likely because a lot of countries thought aspects of the emerging ATT were potentially threatening to national sovereignty for example.[5]  Nonetheless, the popular narrative is that the United States killed the Conference when it asked for more time to consider the draft treaty on the final day of the Conference.[6]  This expedient and seemingly anti-American explanation doesn’t stand up to scrutiny, especially when you put the Conference into context and examine the armstreaty.org database about opposition to the ATT.

The relevant historical context for what happened at the Conference extends back to at least the creation of the International Action Network On Small Arms (IANSA) in 1999.  Important context also includes the recorded debate between the leaders of IANSA and the National Rifle Association in 2004 along with several formal rounds of preparatory negotiations since 2009 for example.   This is admittedly a lot of history for one to casually consider, but after surveying this period, and listening to diplomats based in Geneva, a pattern of overdone, unfocussed, and ultimately counterproductive advocacy emerges.  This appears to be due, at least in part, to self-inflicted wounds from years of overselling positions and distractive issue framing, which, in turn, appears to have damaged their credibility and cause.[7]  Ultimately, humanitarian groups, led by an unraveling Control Arms coalition, sabotaged consensus for an ATT by pushing diplomats too hard for far too much and provoked dispositive sovereignty concerns across the Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East in addition to the United States.[8]

Not only was there no consensus on the final draft ATT as a whole in those final days of the Conference, but there remains no consensus for any of the 14 treaty elements Control Arms continues to advocate for, and opposition to them is growing.  This can be evidenced in detail on armstreaty.org.[9]  While the data on armstreaty.org are not an official record of country delegation viewpoints during the final days of the ATT conference, they serve as a useful proxy indicating size, scope, and direction of opposition to the ATT as Control Arms envisions it.

Clearly, the most widely opposed ATT issue areas fall under the creation of transfer conditionality / restrictive criteria on the international transfers of arms.  The most objected-to transfer criteria remain those related to Socio-Economic Development and Human Rights.  Thirty-nine and 35 countries oppose these criteria respectively, the US not being among them.  The US opposed only three provisions cutting across treaty scope and implementation issue areas only.[10]

The accompanying table below is made from armstreaty.org data and evidences the above points.  It also conveys more important details about the lack of consensus for an ATT.  The table indicates, from a treaty content point of view, where opposition is greatest, the relative size of the opposition, and the direction of opposition since the Conference. [11]

In short, the table below helps show why the assertion that the US is mainly responsible for killing consensus at the UN ATT Conference is not only false, but absurd.  Here are nine take-aways:

1.  There are 195 total instances where a country opposes an aspect of the envisioned ATT (consensus requires zero instances or at least a willingness to no longer publicly oppose, and Control Arms attributes just  3 of these 195 to the US).

2.  There is no consensus for any of the provisions across the all three treaty issue area categories (Scope, Transfer Criteria, and Implementation).

3.  Total opposition to the Control Arms vision has actually grown in the months after the UN ATT Conference (by 12 net instances, or 7%).

4.  There is a two-way tie for issue areas experiencing the fastest opposition growth: Socio- Economic Development and International Humanitarian Law (both together account for 2/3 of the growth in total opposition).

5.  The most-opposed category of treaty issue area is Transfer Criteria (54% share of total opposition) and opposition has grown (by 11 instances, or 6%, since 29 August 2012).

6.  The most-opposed treaty issue area by country count is Socio-Economic Development (39 countries opposed).

7.  The most-opposed issue area by percentage of countries opposed (relative to total number of countries assessed) is Human Rights (33%).

8.  The least-opposed provision by country count relates to including the activities of arms Brokering/Dealing within the scope of the ATT (2 countries opposed).

9.  There is a three-way tie for the least opposed provisions by percentage of countries opposed (relative to total number of countries assessed): Brokering/Dealers, Armed Violence, and Final Provisions (all at 2% opposed).

 

Rightly understood, Control Arms’ own data help to correct the false narrative about why the UN ATT Conference failed to reach consensus this summer.  Such data clearly show that the prospects for consensus were grim at best, and are getting worse.  The data also suggest that even if the US enthusiastically embraced the final draft ATT, other countries would have probably worked together to prevent consensus anyway.

It is not a giant leap in logic to see that Cuba, Iran, or Venezuela (countries that each oppose many more treaty provisions than the US does) probably would have killed consensus themselves, especially if the United States indicated it was going to sign the treaty.  Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, for one, faced an election within months.  Being the consensus breaker would have surely boosted President Chavez’ domestic political standing, and perhaps his image as a regional guardian against outside meddling.

In conclusion, UN ATT Conference died from lack of consensus.  This death was due less to failed diplomacy, or pressure by the firearms industry and gun rights groups, than it was the result of many years of abortive advocacy lead by an unraveling UK-based Control Arms campaign.  Control Arms’  broad vision for the ATT was more extreme than consensus could sustain.  Ultimately, humanitarian groups sabotaged consensus for an ATT by pushing diplomats too hard for far too much and provoked dispositive sovereignty concerns across the Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East in addition to the United States.

Perhaps a more extreme version of the ATT will be born outside the UN altogether.  If this happens, it would likely share a destiny not unlike like the 1997 Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel landmines.  Ottawa was born outside the UN because an anti-personal mine ban did not get traction inside it.  Russia, China, and the United States have still not ratified or acceded to the treaty.  And while 33 other states have not ratified or acceded to the Ottawa Treaty either, supporters argue that the treaty is emerging as an international norm on its way to acquiring the force of international law over time.[12]

Most likely, within a year, the UK, the lead country responsible for putting the ATT on the UN agenda in 2006, will introduce the draft ATT to the UN General Assembly and seek signatures from countries willing to sign it as is.  Unfortunately, regardless of what course the ATT takes, moving forward with an ATT not based on consensus will only serve to divide the international community.  As the specter of major conflict looms larger over volatile regions of the world, more division is now the last thing the international community needs.

 

About The Author

Jeff Moran, a Principal at TSM Worldwide LLC, specializes in the international defense, security, and firearms industries.  Previously Mr. Moran was a strategic marketing leader for a multi-billion dollar unit of a public defense & aerospace company, a military diplomat, and a nationally ranked competitive rifle shooter.  He is currently studying international law of armed conflict with the Executive LL.M. Program of the Geneva Academy.  Earlier this year he completed an Executive Master in International Negotiation from the Graduate Institute of Geneva.   Mr. Moran also has an MBA from Emory University’s Goizueta Business School and a BSFS from Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service. 

 

End Notes

[1]  The First Committee “deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime.”  It meets in October each year.   See http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/ for more information about this.  Opening day official statements can be found at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/gadis3453.doc.htm. Oxfam International has a blog associated with this series of meetings at http://blogs.oxfam.org/en/blogs/12-10-12-fighting-arms-trade-treaty-un-general-assembly.  All links last accessed 15 October 2012.

[2]  The key deliverable from the UN ATT Conference was an unsigned final draft treaty dated 26 July 2012.  This draft is available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ATTPrepCom/Documents/PrepCom4%20 Documents/PrepCom%20Report_E_20120307.pdf.  Last accessed 14 October 2012.

[3]  The Control Arms Campaign is the flagship civil society campaign advocating for an ATT.  It started-up in 2003 as a powerful collaboration among the UK offices of Amnesty International, the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), and Oxfam International.  In addition to having been funded by a few governments, Control Arms has support from under a 100 mostly Western advocacy groups yet views itself as a “global civil society alliance.”  There are many different humanitarian groups and campaigns, but Control Arms is the biggest.  Another campaign, the Campaign Against the Arms Trade, is loud and vocal, but is not taken seriously by governments because it advocates for a total ban on the Arms Trade.

[4]  Armstreaty.org is the leading ATT negotiations tracking website created by the Control Arms campaign and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.  http://armstreaty.org/mapsstates.php.  Last accessed 15 October 2012.

[5]  Such views underpin many official views  found the May 2012 official UN document  “Compilation of Views on the Elements of an Arms Trade Treaty (A/CONF.217/2.” http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CONF.217/2.  Last accessed 15 October 2012.

[6]  Here are links to press releases from Reuters, Oxfam, Amnesty International, and Control Arms:  http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/27/us-arms-treaty-idUSBRE86Q1MW20120727http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressrelease/2012-07-28/battle-arms-trade-treaty-continues-governments-opt-delay-final-deahttp://amnesty.org/en/news/world-powers-delay-landmark-arms-trade-deal-2012-07-27, and http://www.controlarms.org/battle-continues. Sources last accessed 14 October 2012.

[7]  Author conducted interviews with numerous diplomats and country delegates in and around the Geneva-based UN disarmament community in 2012.  A consistent portrait painted by them was that Control Arms campaigners exhibited a profound lack of collective unity and focus, and that messaging was  redundant, superficial, grossly insufficient to help in a technical or practical sense, and largely amounted to a waste of time even for diplomats and delegates who were sympathetic to their cause.  Additionally, Control Arms Campaigners undermined their own efforts by insisting on adding controversial provisions to the treaty, such as Victim Assistance, which made consensus all the more unattainable.

[8]   Control Arms is described as “unraveling” because, by 2012, Control Arms had essentially disintegrated as a cohesive coalition.  This appears to be a key reason for a lack of focus in campaign execution.  The proximate cause for this appears to be a case of disintegration due to interpersonal problems and hubris among its leaders, and organizational self-interest.   Amnesty International essentially left Control Arms to pursue its own agenda in 2011.  This information was corroborated by interviews with several diplomats and an interview with a professional arms trade researcher with direct knowledge of the situation and people concerned, May 2012.

[9]  TSM Worldwide LLC conducted a comparative analysis of the website using snapshots taken 29 August and 14 October 2012.

[10]  The only Scope issue area the US objected to was the inclusion of ammunition in the treaty.  The implementation issue areas the US objects to are Final Provisions and Victim Assistance.  Source: armstreaty.org.  Last accessed 14 October 2012.

[11]  The graphic represents outright country opposition to given issue areas as gauged by Control Arms only.  The totals at the bottom of the table are counts of distinct instances of country / issue-area opposition and do not reflect the count of countries opposed to the ATT as a whole.

[12]  One group is Handicap International, sponsors of the Campaign to Ban Landmines and co-winner of the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize.  http://en.handicap-international.ca/Ottawa-treaty-good-news-and-bad-news_a186.html  Last accessed 1 October 2012.

 

First Published: 17 October 2012
Last Updated: 18 October 2012

Republication and redistribution are authorized when author Jeff Moran and linkable URL http://tsmworldwide.com/consensus-killed/ are cited.

UN’s “Outcome document” for the Programme of Action to Prevent Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

Friday, September 21st, 2012

Document can be seen at:  UN’s “Outcome document” for the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

Original Document Via:  United Nations Review Conference 2012 Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons

 

United Nations Launches First Small Arms Control “Standards”

Wednesday, September 12th, 2012

Original Story Via: TheDailyCaller

NEWTOWN, Conn. — In late August, an umbrella organization of 23 separate U.N. agencies known as the Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) adopted the first portion of International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS). The ISACS text is made up of 33 separate modules, some 800 pages in total. So far, eight modules have been adopted as the result of a process begun in the spring.

An Experts Reference Group (ERG), which included a small number of professionals with firearms experience, including Richard Patterson, managing director of the Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers Institute (SAAMI), provided constructive criticisms on the first draft text of these modules. A second draft, however, revealed that numerous issues identified by the ERG had not been addressed, a fundamental violation of the legitimate standard-setting process.

In response, SAAMI prepared a detailed minority report that Patterson submitted to the ISACS project coordinator covering a range of these issues.

“Sadly, SAAMI is forced to conclude that ISACS has and will continue to fail in the creation of clear and effective guidance because of breaches in standards-setting protocols, and dogmatic adherence to unsubstantiated assumptions, agendas and biases,” Patterson said in a March statement before a U.N. committee working on the matter.

In another statement delivered at an Aug. 29 U.N. conference at the U.N., Patterson described ISACS as “. . . nothing more than a platform for adoption and pseudo-legitimization of the ‘wish lists’ of special interest groups.”

“Advocates of gun control make two fundamental assumptions: First, that more guns will equal more violence and, second, that more gun control will equal less violence. Both of these assumptions are confounded by history and by facts. They are simply not true. Countries with high rates of gun ownership have low rates of violence and countries in which civilian ownership of guns is banned have high rates of violence. Ignoring these facts can cause harm by removing the means by which people protect themselves, their families and their communities — and thereby protect their rights to self-determination.”

About SAAMI
Founded in 1926 at the request of the U.S. Federal Government, SAAMI is an association of the nation’s leading manufacturers of sporting firearms, ammunition and components. It publishes voluntary industry standards, coordinates technical data and promotes safe and responsible firearm use. It handles both domestic and international technical and regulatory issues that affect safety and reliability of firearms, ammunition and components. For more information, visit www.saami.org.

Canada’s NFA to UN: ‘Self-defense is a natural right’

Thursday, August 30th, 2012

Original Story Via:  TheGunMag.com

Canada’s National Firearms Association was the only Canadian pro-firearms group represented during the non-governmental organization presentations at the Second Review Conference of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons.  (PoA)

According to NFA President Sheldon Clare, “It was important for the NFA to be present at this conference for four main reasons.  First, the PoA is alive and potentially dangerous – this was a well-attended conference and vigilance is critical.  Second, it was necessary for us to make sure that there was no attempt to make this the Arms Trade Treaty consolation round, or in any way broaden the scope of the PoA.  Third, we needed to make our concerns known about the aims of some to include firearms components and ammunition, and to make it clear that we are speaking out strongly in support of civilian rights of self-defense – the only Canadian organization to do so.   The fourth reason we were there was to use our strong voice to support our friends.”

According to Clare, “The government seems to be headed in the right direction.  I was pleased to hear the concise and clear presentation by Senior Policy Advisor Kim Joslin of the Canadian Delegation which was in strong support of firearms owners.  In particular, Canada supported the US position which opposes including any aspect of components or ammunition being included in the PoA.  Government representatives Habib Massoud and Steve Torino will be attending the second week of the conference.    It was clear to me in listening to the speeches from delegates that it will be difficult to achieve consensus on several aspects of the PoA‘s implementation plan in the two weeks allotted”.

The NFA and other World Forum (WFSA) members, presented to the UN Conference during the NGO session on Wednesday, August 29 and the text of the speech given by NFA President Sheldon Clare is reproduced below:

STATEMENT TO UNITED NATIONS ON PROGRAMME OF ACTION ON SMALL ARMSS and LIGHT WEAPONS

Madame President, I am Sheldon Clare, President of Canada’s National Firearms Association.

The NFA is Canada’s largest advocacy organization representing the rights of Canadian firearms owners.  Our members are concerned that UN attempts to regulate small arms and light weapons are misdirected and will have an unjustifiably harmful effect upon the ability of free people to have access to firearms and ammunition for perfectly legitimate purposes. The NFA rejects as false that civilian access to small arms is the problem.

Canada’s National Firearms Association (NFA) recommends that controls on small arms and light weapons be limited solely to major crew-served weapon systems possessed or sold by nation states – not individually operated firearms owned or desired to be owned by civilians, also called non-state actors. The rights and property of Canadians, and our firearms businesses engaged in the lawful trade in firearms and ammunition, including surplus firearms and ammunition, must not be subject to UN edict or control.  Quite simply, firearms ownership and use are matters of national sovereignty, civil freedoms, property rights, and are related to national culture.  Also, control of ammunition, including marking beyond caliber, date, and manufacturer would be excessive; it is unreasonable, unnecessary, and fiscally impossible to uniquely mark ammunition.

Small arms in civilian hands allow people to defend themselves from aggression. Self-defense is a natural right of all individuals. This is especially important in the event of unrest and disorder, or in case of state-mandated crimes against humanity. Civilian ownership of arms is an important factor in preventing and limiting the effect of government-encouraged murders such as what occurred in Srebrenica and Rwanda. Disarmed in Srebrenica by UN peacekeepers and in Rwanda by their own government, these people were helpless in the face of organized aggression, especially when in both cases the UN was powerless to provide protection. While governments need to act against terrorism, disarming civilians violates fundamental democratic principles.  Perhaps Governments should deal with unrest by addressing the economic situations, political differences, and human rights issues that contribute to people agitating for change rather than engaging in one size fits all solutions affecting the rights of free people to own and use firearms.
Thank you for your consideration Madame President.”

Clare concluded: “Other matters to be watchful of are the UN International Small Arms Control Standards, (see http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/) and what happens with the Arms Trade Treaty talks (ATT) which broke up without consensus in July.  There will need to be a vote at the General Assembly if it is to come back next year, which may not be possible due to the UN’s two year budgetary cycle.  Simply put, there may not be much support to reopen the ATT so soon in the face of no consensus. Nonetheless, strange things happen at the UN and the NFA has been present to protect the civil and property rights of Canadian Firearms Owners.”

UN hits and misses between the illegal arms trade and the right to bear arms

Thursday, August 30th, 2012

Original Story Via:  Russian Legal Information Agency

MOSCOW, August 30 – RAPSI, Ingrid Burke. The United Nations is currently hosting its second conference in as many months aimed at regulating illicit arms trafficking. July’s conference strived, albeit unsuccessfully, to reach consensus on a binding international treaty that would regulate the global arms trade as a whole. The conference currently underway aims only to review the progress made by UN member nations individually and the international community as a whole in terms of the implementation of an action plan adopted by consensus in 2001 in order to combat the illegal trade of small arms and light weapons.

Both conferences centered on documents- the first a working document that never earned its wings and the second a binding agreement. Both documents are rooted in concern over the illicit arms trade, but one reached consensus and has entered into force on national, regional, and global levels, and one provoked a heated public controversy that endured beyond the deadline for approval by consensus.

To get into the spirit of things, RAPSI has decided to compare and contrast the documents underlying and the controversies surrounding the two initiatives in an effort to better understand what caused the former to sink and the latter to swim.

The UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty

Between 2-27 July, representatives of all 193 member nations gathered at the UN headquarters in New York with the common goal of establishing: “a robust and legally binding arms trade treaty that will have a real impact on the lives of those millions of people suffering from the consequences of armed conflict, repression and armed violence,” in the words of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon. Negotiations deteriorated in the last few days of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) conference as competing national interests gave way to stubborn resistance.

A draft of the treaty released shortly before the conference deadline was harshly criticized both by right-to-bear-arms activists and by their human rights/disarmament counterparts. The former took issue with what they perceived to be an overly broad range of arms and activities sought to be regulated. The latter took issue with what they perceived to be an insufficiently comprehensive document that left numerous gaping loopholes.

The document included among the list of arms sought to be regulated: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers, and small arms and light weapons. This range of weapons has received criticism from both sides of the advocacy spectrum, for being both too broadly and too narrowly tailored.

The inclusion of small arms and light weapons came under fire by advocacy groups that support the right to bear arms. Speaking to this point, International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (IAPCAR) Executive Director Philip Watson explained to RAPSI during the conference, “We are appalled they deemed it appropriate to place civilian firearms used for self-defense in a treaty with tanks, bombs, and attack helicopters. It is dangerous to include civilian self-defense weapons in such an international treaty that could curtail legitimate use or trade of small civilian weapons.  Personal security and the defense of one’s home and family are values shared across international borders, regardless of an individual’s background or nationality.”

The opposite side of the spectrum was comprised of disarmament and human rights advocacy groups who argued that the list of arms and activities covered was too narrow. Toward this end, Amnesty International [AI] noted in a press release toward the end of the conference that, “Major loopholes in the draft text include ammunition not being subject to tight decision-making controls, an array of weapons, munitions and related equipment not being covered, as well as the treaty only applying to the international trade of conventional arms instead of all international transfers including gifts and aid.”

A similarly concerned Oxfam released a statement by head of its arms control unit Anna Macdonald around the same time urging that “[t]here are more holes in this draft treaty than in a leaky bucket and these must be urgently closed if we are going to stop weapons from flowing into the world`s worst conflict zones.”

As it became clear toward the end of the conference that hope was lost, some viewed the stalemate as the fault of the US. In a widely publicized move, 51 US senators pledged to vote against ratification of the treaty if it failed to protect the constitutional right of US citizens to bear arms. As US ratification of an international treaty requires the approval of two-thirds of the senate, these numbers were sufficient to ensure against US ratification of the bill.

The pledge came in the form of a letter addressed to the Obama administration. A press release issued shortly thereafter by Republican Senator Thad Cochran of Mississippi quoted a portion of the letter that urged the Obama administration to break the conference’s required consensus if doing so was necessary to protect the right of US citizens to bear arms. The relevant passage stated:  “As the treaty process continues, we strongly encourage your administration not only to uphold our country’s constitutional protections of civilian firearms ownership, but to ensure – if necessary, by breaking consensus at the July conference – that the treaty will explicitly recognize the legitimacy of lawful activities associated with firearms, including but not limited to the right of self-defense. As members of the United States Senate, we will oppose the ratification of any Arms Trade Treaty that falls short of this standard.”

Later that day, the US State Department (USDOS) issued a statement acknowledging both the failure of the conference to produce tangible results and the refusal of the US to move to accept the treaty in its ultimate form. USDOS spokesperson Victoria Nuland stated, “we do not support a vote in the UNGA on the current text. The illicit trafficking of conventional arms is an important national security concern for the United States. While we sought to conclude this month’s negotiations with a Treaty, more time is a reasonable request for such a complex and critical issue. The current text reflects considerable positive progress, but it needs further review and refinement.”

Some US-based right-to-bear-arms advocacy groups attributed the stalemate to their own grassroots efforts. The most well-known such group, the National Rifle Association (NRA) took personal credit for the failure of the conference to produce results, stating on its website Friday: “The Conference on the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty has broken down and will not report a draft treaty to the member nations… This is a big victory for American gun owners, and the NRA is being widely credited for killing the [conference.]”

The conference’s launch was drenched with optimism. Prior to the start of negotiations, many lauded the potential of the conference to make the world a safer place through the regulation of the international arms trade. Ban expressed optimism in the face of the daunting task that lay ahead, noting, “It is ambitious, but I believe it is achievable.” During his opening statement, Ban urged the necessity of the conference’s success: “Every day, we at the United Nations see the human toll of an absence of regulations or lax controls on the arms trade.  We see it in the suffering of civilian populations trapped by armed conflict or pervasive crime.  We see it in the killing and wounding of civilians — including children, the most vulnerable of all.  We see it in the massive displacement of people within and across borders.  We see it through grave violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law.”

As negotiations fizzled, he lamented, “The Conference’s inability to conclude its work on this much-awaited ATT, despite years of effort of Member States and civil society from many countries, is a setback.”
The Second UN Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

The conference currently underway has been scheduled to run from 27 August to 7 September. A list of member nations in attendance has not yet been released, but a UN official speaking to RAPSI Thursday confirmed that at least 75-80% of UN states are represented.

The document at issue is the politically binding “Programme of action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,” (POA) which was adopted by consensus in 2001.

From the start, the UN has made clear its intention to refrain during the course of the conference from restricting firearm ownership rights. A UN press statement explained, “The Review Conference only reviews progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action which was adopted in 2001 to combat the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons… It is not about banning firearms or any other type of small arms or prohibiting people from owning legal weapons.”

The release emphasized the conference’s disinterest in imposing lofty regulations, stating: “Each sovereign State determines its own laws and regulations for the manufacture, sale and possession of firearms by its citizens. The United Nations has no jurisdiction over such matters.”

After denying rumors that the conference would essentially serve as a component part of a broader UN conspiracy—in connection with the Arms Trade Treaty—to prohibit civilian gun ownership, the release reiterated the recent failure of the ATT to come into existence: “The Arms Trade Treaty does not yet exist. It was discussed throughout July 2012 and focused on setting common standards for how States could regulate the international trade of all types of conventional arms. No consensus was achieved on a draft Treaty text. “

This conspiracy theory denial points to a critical difference between the conferences and the documents at their core. The ATT sought to regulate the international trade of all types of conventional arms. The POA sought to eliminate the illicit trade of small arms. The goals of the former were extraordinarily lofty; those of the latter, quite narrow.

The POA was born the successful outcome of a conference similar to that which failed to produce the ATT. UN members came together with the goal of combatting, preventing, and eradicating the small arms trade in July 2001, and reached a consensus on how to do so: by targeted, limited means.

Regardless of where one stands on the right to bear arms, it is worth noting the different reactions elicited from the two texts with similar goals but diametrically opposed scopes.

It should be noted that the POA has been criticized by its own implementation support system for lacking key mechanisms to ensure its implementation. It is possible that the inclusion of such mechanisms would have created obstacles to its approval similar to those faced by the ATT.

SAF/IAPCAR DEFEND WOMAN’S RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE AT UNITED NATIONS

Wednesday, August 29th, 2012

Original Story Via:  TheGunMag.com

The Second Amendment Foundation today reminded the United Nations that “if women have the right to be protected against violence, then they have the right to protect themselves against violence.”

So spoke SAF’s Director of Operations Julianne Versnel, whose remarks to the U.N. Programme of Action conference were unlike anything many delegates had ever heard before.

The conference is seen as the first step toward rekindling discussions about an on-going process to continue development of a small arms and light weapons treaty, which earlier this summer collapsed when several nations opposed it.

Noting that she had reviewed what has already been written and said about the violence against women as it relates to the Programme of Action, Versnel emphasized that, “I am struck by what is not said.”

“If there is a basic sanctity of a woman’s person,” she observed, “if there is a right to not be a victim of sexual or personal violence, then that right involves the right to defend one’s self.”

Alan Gottlieb, Laura McDonald, Otis McDonald and Julianne Versnel at the 2011 Gun Rights Policy Conference in Chicago, Illinois.

Versnel stressed that any new global gun control initiatives must “do nothing to disarm women who legitimately and rightfully want to defend themselves.”

While international gun prohibitionists have been pushing a civilian disarmament agenda, Versnel’s warnings may open up a new and politically uncomfortable arena. It is impossible to dismiss female victims of violence as “male American gun nuts.”

“The drive for human rights is a force throughout the world,” Versnel stated, “and especially here at the U.N. A woman’s right to be free from violence is a fundamental human right. That fundamental right is to defend one’s self. The report of this conference should state that without reservation.”

The Second Amendment Foundation (www.saf.org) is the nation’s oldest and largest tax-exempt education, research, publishing and legal action group focusing on the Constitutional right and heritage to privately own and possess firearms. Founded in 1974, The Foundation has grown to more than 650,000 members and supporters and conducts many programs designed to better inform the public about the consequences of gun control. In addition to the landmark McDonald v. Chicago Supreme Court Case, SAF has previously funded successful firearms-related suits against the cities of Los Angeles; New Haven, CT; New Orleans; Chicago and San Francisco on behalf of American gun owners, a lawsuit against the cities suing gun makers and numerous amicus briefs holding the Second Amendment as an individual right.

Global gun control treaty may return in the fall at UN

Friday, August 24th, 2012

Original Story Via:  TheGunMag.com

by Dave Workman

Senior Editor

Following a stunning last-minute derailment of the United Nations’ highly-touted international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) negotiations, global gun control proponents are expected to bring the issue back again in the fall.

That was the forecast from Julianne Versnel with the Second Amendment Foundation and International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (IAPCAR). She was at the UN when the ATT meltdown occurred, as was Alan Gottlieb, chairman of the Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms. Both were instrumental in creating IAPCAR, which now has member organizations all over the globe.

The treaty talks essentially imploded in the final 24 hours when ATT proponents did not produce a final draft of their proposed treaty until late in the afternoon of the day prior to a scheduled vote. Another problem was that the document was printed only in English, leaving many delegates from non-English speaking nations in the lurch because they had no document to study.

The US delegation and other delegations simply did not have enough time to study the proposal, and there were problems with it even if they had.

The final draft came barely 48 hours after an initial document was circulated that met with tepid reactions from several delegations including North Korea and Iran. In a press release, Gottlieb called the proposed treaty, “a blatant attempt to negate the recent Second Amendment court victories we’ve had in the United States, and to get around Second Amendment protections.” A coalition of global gun control organizations has been pushing for the most extreme language and tenets in the proposed treaty, and now they are apparently back at the drawing board trying to come up with language that will be acceptable. That group includes International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), Oxfam International and Control Arms. The latter group was apparently responsible for a handout depicting their vision of the treaty provisions highlighted in Olympics-style rings, timed with the opening of the summer games in London.

Two of those items were “Arms and Bullets” and “Global Standards Over National Views.” The former alluded to privately owned firearms, and the latter was a veiled but direct threat to the Second Amendment, Gottlieb said.

Various gun rights organizations, including CCRKBA and the National Rifle Association, had been lobbying against this treaty for weeks. If the Obama administration signs it, the document must still be ratified by the US Senate, and after intense lobbying by the National Rifle Association, that doesn’t seem likely.

Now, with the national elections looming, President Barack Obama may be painting himself into an ever-tightening corner with American gun owners, if the treaty comes up again in October as anticipated.

Governments not people craft UN Arms Trade Treaty

Wednesday, August 8th, 2012

Original Story Via:  TheGunMag.com

By Joseph P. Tartaro

Executive Editor

Perhaps the United Nations should have a motto that reflects its focus on “government stability” and the balance of power between the people of the world and their respective governments.

I’d suggest the UN consider clearly stating, “The most despicable government we’ve ever known was pretty good.” If you need evidence beyond the fact that the lambs have been feeding at the same trough as the crocodiles all of these years, just look what the UN did as the much anticipated and dreaded conference on a binding Arms Trade Treat (ATT) began in July.

With the shadow of Syrian repression cast across most news media in the world and clouding the ATT talks, the UN turned to Iran to help negotiate a global arms treaty in a move that is drawing scorn and ridicule around the globe. But apparently not among the striped-pants diplomats meeting in New York City.

The appointment was made by members of the UN Conference on the ATT shortly after the month-long conference began in July. The committee to which Iran was appointed is tasked with coming up with a treaty regulating the international trade of conventional small arms and, proponents hope, ammunition.

“Right after a UN Security Council report found Iran guilty of illegally transferring guns and bombs to Syria, which is now murdering thousands of its own people, it defies logic, morality, and common sense for the UN to now elect this same regime to a global post in the regulation of arms transfers,” said Hillel Neuer, executive director of UN Watch, a non-governmental monitoring group based in Geneva.

“This is like choosing Bernie Madoff to police fraud on the stock market.

And the UN’s scandalous choice of Iran is exactly why we fear that Syria’s declared bid for a UN Human Rights Council seat is not impossible.” The 15-nation committee is led by Argentina, which serves as president, and includes the US, Iran, China, and Russia as nations that serve as vice presidents.

UN Watch called on UN Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon to condemn the decision to name Iran to the committee.

“He should remind the conference that the Security Council has imposed four rounds of sanctions on Iran for refusing to halt its prohibited nuclear program, and that Iran continues to defy the international community through illegal arms shipments to the murderous Assad regime,” Neuer said.

US officials played down the significance of the appointment.

“Obviously we oppose (Iran’s appointment), but it’s a symbolic position with little impact on a month-long negotiation that must be decided by consensus,” one senior State Department official told Fox News.

“It will ultimately face the approval of the United States regardless of which country holds one of 14 powerless vice president positions. At that point, we will be looking for an arms trade treaty that makes the legitimate global weapons trade safer by bringing the rest of the world’s arms trade regulations up to the high US standard.” However, two weeks into the deliberations on the ATT, there seems to be a wide divergence of position by different governments. There is no guarantee the negotiations now in progress will produce a treaty, let alone a good one. In February, preparatory talks on the ground rules for this month’s talks nearly collapsed due to procedural wrangling and other disagreements.

In the end, the US and other countries succeeded in ensuring the treaty must be approved unanimously, so any one country can effectively veto a deal.

In spite of Iran and Syria, there are still deep divisions on key issues to be tackled in the treaty negotiations, such as whether human rights should be a mandatory criterion for determining whether governments should permit weapons exports to specific countries.

China wants to exempt small arms, while several Middle East states oppose making compliance with human rights norms a mandatory criterion for allowing arms deliveries. Meanwhile, Canada wants to exclude civilian small arms and ammunition altogether.

Britain has joined France, Germany and Sweden in calling for a solid, effective and legally binding treaty.

According to Peter Brookes of the Heritage Foundation, a treaty would damage US foreign policy and prevent it helping friends such as Taiwan. But he noted the treaty was not yet a done deal.

“Diplomats will natter away about it all month over cappuccinos in Turtle Bay,” he wrote. “But the White House isn’t doing the country any favors by playing footsie with a UN effort to take aim at our liberties and disarm our foreign policy.” Meanwhile, many organizations opposed to the treaty have been allowed to speak at the UN, and more than 130 congressmen, led by Rep.

Mike Kelly (R-PA), signed a letter sent to President Barack Obama in early July expressing their opposition to a UN arms trade treaty if it violates US gun owner rights and sovereignty.

The letter includes specific demands— that the treaty leave out small arms and ammunition and recognize an individual’s right to self-defense.

The Obama administration has claimed that there are safeguards to their treaty approach, but the safeguard is insufficient for opponents of the US participation, not least because UN talks invariably involve compromise.

“The administration swears they have a whole bunch of red lines, and they will block consensus if anyone crosses them,” said a government relations consultant as senior associate with the Commonwealth Consulting Corporation.

“But the dynamics of international negotiations are that once you get 90% of what you seek, you say, ‘Maybe there is a way we can finesse the final 10%.’ ” A clause permitting arms transfers solely between UN member states would allow UN member China to object to US arms sales to Taiwan, a non-UN member that China considers to be a renegade province.

This would be highly problematic for the US at a time when Beijing is engaged in an unprecedented arms buildup.

Another fear is that Arab or other states critical of Israel may use any treaty language on human rights standards to argue against US arms transfers to the Israeli government—as they currently use the UN Human Rights Council to condemn Israel.

US gun lobby concern focus on the emphasis the treaty places on governmental— as opposed to individual— rights to guns, according to Wayne LaPierre, NRA executive vice president.

“They’re trying to impose a UN policy that gives guns to the governments— but the UN doesn’t in turn make moral judgments as to whether these governments are good or bad,” he said.

“If you’re the government, you get the guns, if you’re a civilian, you don’t.

This will just end up helping evil governments and tyrants.”

 

BREAKING NEWS: UN Arms Trade Treaty – Full Proposed Document

Tuesday, July 24th, 2012

PREAMBLE             

The States Parties to this Treaty.

  1. Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
  2. Recalling that the charter of the UN promotes the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources;
  3. Reaffirming the obligation of all State Parties to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, in accordance with the Charter of the UN;
  4. Underlining the need to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade of conventional arms and to prevent their diversion to illegal and unauthorized end use, such as terrorism and organized crime;
  5. Recognizing the legitimate political, security, economic and commercial rights and interests of States in the international trade of conventional arms;
  6. Reaffirming the sovereign right and responsibility of any State to regulate and control transfers of conventional arms that take place exclusively within its territory pursuant to its own legal or constitutional systems;
  7. Recognizing that development, human rights and peace and security, which are three pillars of the United Nations, are interlinked and mutually reinforcing.
  8. Recalling the United Nations Disarmament Commission guidelines on international arms transfers adopted by the General Assembly;
  9. Noting the contribution made by the 2001 UN Programme of Action to preventing combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, as well as the 2001 Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in Firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime;
  10. Recognizing the security, social, economic and humanitarian consequences of the illicit trade in and unregulated trade of conventional arms;
  11. Recognizing the challenges faced by victims of armed conflict and their need for adequate care, rehabilitation and social and economic inclusion;
  12. Bearing in mind that the women and children are particularly affected in situations of conflict and armed violence;
  13. Emphasizing that nothing in this treaty prevents States from exercising their right to adopt additional more rigorous measures consistent with the purpose of this Treaty;
  14. Recognizing the legitimate international trade and lawful private ownership and use of conventional arms exclusively for, inter alia, recreational, cultural, historical and sporting activities for States where such ownership and use are permitted or protected by law;
  15. Recognizing the active role that non-governmental organizations and civil society can play in furthering the goals and objectives of this Treaty; and

16. Emphasizing that regulation of the international trade in conventional arms should not

hamper international cooperation and legitimate trade in material, equipment and technology

for peaceful purposes;

Have agreed as follows:

Principles

Guided by the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, States Parties, In promoting the goals and objectives of this Treaty and implementing its provisions, shall act in accordance with the following principles:

  1. The inherent rights of all States to individual or collective self-defense;

2. Settlement of individual disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

3. The rights and obligations of States under applicable international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law;

4. The responsibility of all States, in accordance with their respective international obligations, to effectively regulate and control international transfer of conventional arms as well as the primary responsibility of all States to in establishing and implementing their respective national export control systems; and

5. The necessity to implement this Treaty consistently and effectively and in a universal, objective and non-discriminatory manner.

 

Article 1

Goals and Objectives

Cognizant of the need to prevent and combat the diversion of conventional arms into the illicit market r to unauthorized end users through the improvement of regulation on the international trade in conventional arms,

The goals and objectives of this Treaty are:

–          For States Parties to establish the highest possible common standards for regulating or improving regulation of the international trade in conventional arms;

–          To prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and their diversion to illegal and unauthorized end use;

In order to:

–          Contribute to international and regional peace, security and stability;

–          Avoid that the international trade in conventional arms contributes to human suffering;

–           Promote cooperation, transparency and responsibility of States Parties in the trade in conventional arms, thus building confidence among States Parties,

 

Article 2

–          A. Covered Items

–          1. This Treaty shall apply to all conventional arms within the following categories:

–          a. Battle Tanks

–          b. Armored combat vehicles

–          c. Large-caliber Artillery systems

–          d. Combat aircraft

–          e. Attack helicopters

–          f. Warships

–          g. Missiles and missile launchers

–          h. Small Arms and Light Weapons

–          2. Each State Party Shall establish and Maintain a national control system to regulate the export of munitions to the extent necessary to ensure that national controls on the export of the conventional arms covered by Paragraph a1 (a)-(h) are not circumvented by the export of munitions for those conventional arms.

–          3. Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export of parts and components to the extent necessary to ensure that national controls on the export of the conventional arms covered by Paragraph A1 are not circumvented by the export of parts and components of those items.

–          4. Each State Party shall establish or update, as appropriate, and maintain a national control list that shall include the items that fall within Paragraph 1 above, as defined on a national basis, based on relevant UN instruments at a minimum. Each State Party shall publish its control list to the extent permitted by national law.

–          B. Covered Activities

–          1. This Treaty shall apply to those activities of the international trade in conventional arms covered in paragraph a1 above, and set out in Articles 6-10, hereafter referred to as “transfer.”

–          2. This Treaty shall not apply to the international movement of conventional arms by a State Party or its agents for its armed forces or law enforcement authorities operating outside its national territories, provided they remain under the State Party’s ownership.

 

Article 3

Prohibited Transfers

  1. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms within the scope of this Treaty if the transfer would violate any obligation under any measure adopted by the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular arms embargoes.
  2. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms within the scope of this Treaty if the transfer would violate its relevant international obligations, under international agreements, to which it is a Party, in particular those relating to the international transfer of, or illicit trafficking in, conventional arms.
  3. A State Party shall not authorize a transfer of conventional arms within the scope of this Treaty for the purpose of facilitating the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes constituting grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, or serious violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention of 1949.

 

Article 4

National Assessment

  1. Each State Party, in considering whether to authorize an export of conventional arms within the scope of this Treaty, shall, prior to authorization and through national control systems, make an assessment specific to the circumstances of the transfer based on the following criteria:
  2. Whether the proposed export of conventional arms would:
    1. Be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law;
    2. Be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international human rights law;
    3. Contribute to peace and security;
    4. Be used to commit or facilitate an act constituting an offense under international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism or transnational organized crime, to which the transferring State is a Party;
  3. In making the assessment, the transferring State Party shall apply the criteria set out in Paragraph 2 consistently and in an objective and non-discriminatory manner and in accordance with the principles set out in this Treaty, taking into account relevant factors, including information provided by the importing State.

4. In assessing the risk pursuant to Paragraph 2, the transferring State Party may also take into consideration the establishment of risk mitigation measures including confidence-building measures and jointly developed programs by the exporting and importing State.

5. If in the view of the authorizing State Party, this assessment, which would include any actions that may be taken in accordance with Paragraph 4, constitutes a substantial risk, the State Party shall not authorize the transfer.

 

Article 5

Additional Obligations

  1. Each State Party, when authorizing an export, shall consider taking feasible measures, including joint actions with other States involved in the transfer, to avoid the transferred arms:
  2. being diverted to the illicit market;
  3. be used to commit or facilitate gender-based violence or violence against children;
  4. become subject to corrupt practices; or
  5. adversely impact the development of the recipient State.

 

Article 6

General Implementation

  1. Each State Party shall implement this Treaty in a consistent, objective and non-discriminatory manner in accordance with the goals and objectives of this Treaty;
  2. The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice previous or future obligations undertaken with regards to international instruments, provided that those obligations are consistent with the goals and objectives of this Treaty. This Treaty shall not be cited as grounds for voiding contractual obligations under defense cooperation agreements concluded by States Parties to this Treaty.
  3. Each State Party shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures necessary to implement the provisions of this Treaty and designate competent national authorities in order to have an effective, transparent and predictable national control system regulating the transfer of conventional arms;
  4. Each State Party shall establish one or more national contact points to exchange information on matters related to the implementation of this Treaty. A State Party shall notify the Implementation Support Unit (See Article 13) of its national contact point(s) and keep the information updated.
  5. State Parties involved in a transfer of conventional arms shall, in a manner consistent with the principles of this Treaty, take appropriate measures to prevent diversion to the illicit market or to unauthorized end-users.  All State Parties shall cooperate, as appropriate, with the exporting State to that end.
  6. . If a diversion is detected the State or States Parties that made the decision shall verify the State or States Parties that could be affected by such diversion, in particulate those State Parties that are involved in the transfer, without delay.
  7.  Each State Party shall take the appropriate measures, within national laws and regulations, to regulate transfers of conventional arms within the scope of the Treaty.

 

Article 7

Export

  1. Each State Party shall conduct risk assessments, as detailed in Articles 4 and 5, whether to grant authorizations for the transfer of conventional arms under the scope of this Treaty.  State Parties shall apply Articles 3-5 consistently, taking into account all relevant information, including the nature and potential use of the items to be transferred and the verified end-user in the country of final destination.
  2. Each State Party shall take measures to ensure all authorizations for the export of conventional arms under the scope of the Treaty are detailed and issued prior to the export.  Appropriate and relevant details of the authorization shall be made available to the importing, transit and transshipment State Parties, upon request.

 

Article 8

Import

  1. Importing State Parties shall take measures to ensure that appropriate and relevant information is provided, upon request, to the exporting State Party to assist the exporting State in its criteria assessment and to assist in verifying end users.
  2. State Parties shall put in place adequate measures that will allow them, where necessary, to monitor and control imports of items covered by the scope of the Treaty.  State Parties shall also adopt appropriate measures to prevent the diversion of imported items to unauthorized end users or to the illicit market.
  3. Importing State Parties may request, where necessary, information from the exporting State Party concerning potential authorizations.

 

Article 9

Brokering

  1. Each State Party shall take the appropriate measures, within national laws and regulations, to control brokering taking place under its jurisdiction for conventional arms within the scope of this Treaty.

 

Article 10

Transit and Transshipment

  1. Each State Party shall adopt appropriate legislative, administrative or other measures to monitor and control, where necessary and feasible, conventional arms covered by this Treaty that transit or transship through territory under its jurisdiction, consistent with international law with due regard for innocent passage and transit passage;
  2. Importing and exporting States Parties shall cooperate and exchange information, where feasible and upon request, to transit and transshipment States Parties, in order to mitigate the risk of discretion;

 

Article 11

Reporting, Record Keeping and Transparency

  1. Each State Party shall maintain records in accordance with its national laws and regardless of the items referred to in Article 2, Paragraph A, with regards to conventional arms authorization or exports, and where feasible  of those items transferred to their territory as the final destination, or that are authorized to transit or transship their territory, respectively.
  2. Such records may contain: quantity, value, model/type, authorized arms transfers, arms actually transferred, details of exporting State(s), recipient State(s), and end users as appropriate. Records shall be kept for a minimum of ten years, or consistent with other international commitments applicable to the State Party.
  3. States Parties may report to the Implementation Support Unit on an annual basis any actions taken to address the diversion of conventional arms to the illicit market.
  4. Each State Party shall, within the first year after entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party, provide an initial report to States Parties of relevant activities undertaken in order to implement this Treaty; including inter alia, domestic laws, regulations and administrative measures. States Parties shall report any new activities undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, when appropriate. Reports shall be distributed and made public by the Implementation Support Unit.
  5. Each State Party shall submit annually to the Implementation Support Unit by 31 May a report for the preceding calendar year concerning the authorization or actual transfer of items included in Article 2, Paragraph A1. Reports shall be distributed and made public by the Implementation Support Unit. The report submitted to the Implementation Support Unit may contain the same type of information submitted by the State Party to other relevant UN bodies, including the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Reports will be consistent with national security sensitivities or be commercially sensitive.

 

ARTICLE 12 

ENFORCEMENT

  1. Each State Party shall adopt national legislation or other appropriate national measures regulations and policies as may be necessary to implement the obligations of this Treaty.

 

ARTICLE 13

IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT UNIT

  1. This Treaty hereby establishes an Implementation Support Unit to assist States Parties in its implementation.
  2. The ISU shall consist of adequate staff, with necessary expertise to ensure the mandate entrusted to it can be effectively undertaken, with the core costs funded by States Parties.
  3. The implementation Support Unit, within a minimized structure and responsible to States Parties, shall undertake the responsibilities assigned to it in this Treaty, inter alia:
    1. Receive distribute reports, on behalf of the Depository, and make them publicly available;
    2. Maintain and Distribute regularly to States Parties the up-to-date list of national contact points;
    3. Facilitate the matching of offers and requests of assistance for Treaty implementation and promote international cooperation as requested;
    4. Facilitate the work of the Conference of States Parties, including making arrangements and providing the necessary service es for meetings under this Treaty; and
    5. Perform other duties as mandated by the Conference of States Parties.

 

ARTICLE 14

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

  1. States Parties shall designate national points of contact to act as a liaison on matters relating to the implementation of this Treaty.
  2. States Parties shall cooperate closely with one another, as appropriate, to enhance the implementation of this Treaty consistent with their respective security interests and legal and administrative systems.

States Parties are encouraged to facilitate international cooperation, including the exchange of information on matters of mutual interest regarding the implementation and application of this Treaty in accordance with their national legal system. Such voluntary exchange of information may include, inter alia, information on national implementation measures as well as information on specific exporters, importers and brokers and on any prosecutions brought domestically, consistent with commercial and proprietary protections and domestic laws, regulations and respective legal and administrative systems.

4.   Each State Party is encouraged to maintain consultations and to share information, as appropriate, to support the implementation of this Treaty, including through their national contact points.

5. States Parties shall cooperate to enforce the provisions of this Treaty and combat breaches of this Treaty, including sharing information regarding illicit activities and actors to assist national enforcement and to counter and prevent diversion. States Parties may also exchange information on lessons learned in relation to any aspect of this Treaty, to develop best practices to assist national implementation.

Article 15
International Assistance

  1. In fulfilling the obligation of this Treaty, States Parties may seek, inter alia, legal assistance, legislative assistance, technical assistance, institutional capacity building, material assistance or financial assistance. States, in a position to do so, shall provide such assistance. States Parties may contribute resources to a voluntary trust fund to assist requesting States Parties requiring such assistance to implement the Treaty.
  2. States Parties shall afford one another the widest measure of assistance, consistent with their respective legal and administrative systems, in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to the violations of the national measures implemented to comply with obligations under of the provisions of this Treaty.
  3. Each State Party may offer or receive assistance, inter alia, through the United Nations international, regional, subregional or national organizations, non-governmental organizations or on a bi-lateral basis. Such assistance may include technical, financial, material and other forms of assistance as needed, upon request.

Article 16
Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession

  1. This Treaty shall be open for signature on [date] at the United Nations Headquarters in New York by all States and regional integration organizations.
  2. This Treaty is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
  3. This Treaty shall be open for accession by any state and regional integration organization that has not signed the Treaty.

4. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

5. The Depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States and regional integration organizations of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and of the receipt of notices.

6. “Regional integration organization” shall mean an organization constituted by sovereign States of a given region, to which its Member States have transferred competence in respect of matters governed by this Treaty and which has been duly authorized, in accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to it.

7.  At the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, a regional integration organization shall declare the extent of its competence with respect to matters governed by this Treaty.  Such organizations shall also inform the Depositary of any relevant modifications in the extent of it competence.

8.  References to “State Parties” in the present Treaty shall apply to such organizations within the limits of their competence.

 

Article 17

Entry into Force

  1. This Treaty shall enter into force thirty days following the date of the deposit of the sixty-fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval with the Depositary.
  2. For any State or regional integration organization that deposits its instruments of accession subsequent to the entry into force of the Treaty, the Treaty shall enter into force thirty days following the date of deposit of its instruments of accession.
  3. For the purpose of Paragraph 1 and 2 above, any instrument deposited by a regional integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those deposited by Member States of that organization.

 

Article 18

Withdrawal and Duration

  1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
  2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties from this Convention.  It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties and to the Depositary.  The instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
  3. A state shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this treaty while it was a party to the Treaty, including any financial obligations, which may have accrued.

 

Article 19
Reservations

  1. Each State party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may formulate reservations unless the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of this Treaty.

 

Article 20
Amendments

  1. At any time after the Treaty’s entry into force, a State Party may propose an amendment to this Treaty.
  2. Any proposed amendment shall be submitted in writing to the Depository, which will then circulate the proposal to all States Parties, not less than 180 days before next meeting of the Conference of States Parties. The amendment shall be considered at the next Conference of States Parties if a majority of States Parties notify the Implementation Support Unit that they support further consideration of the proposal no later than 180 days after its circulation by the Depositary.
  3. Any amendment to this Treaty shall be adopted by consensus, or if consensus is not achieved, by two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Conference of States Parties. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment to all States Parties.
  4. A proposed amendment adopted in accordance with Paragraph 3 of this Article shall enter into force for all States Parties to the Treaty that have accepted it, upon deposit with the Depositary. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of accession.

 

Article 21
Conference of States Parties

  1. The Conference of States Parties shall be convened not later than once a year following the entry into force of this Treaty. The Conference of States Parties shall adopt rules of procedure and rules governing its activities, including the frequency of meetings and rules concerning payment of expenses incurred in carrying out those activities.

The Conference of States Parties shall:
a. Consider and adopt recommendations regarding the implementation of this Treaty, in particular the promotion of its universality; TR

b. Consider amendments to this Treaty;

c. Consider and decide the work and budget of the Implementation Support Unit;

d. Consider the establishment of any subsidiary bodies as may be necessary to improve the functioning of the Treaty;

e. Perform any other function consistent with this Treaty.

3. If circumstances merit, an exceptional meeting of the State Parties may be convened if required and resources allow.

 

Article 22
Dispute Settlement

  1. States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the interpretation or application of this Treaty.
  2. States Parties shall settle any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of this Treat though negotiations or other peaceful means of the Parties mutual choice.
  3. States Parties may pursue, by mutual consent, third party arbitration to settle any dispute between them, regarding issues concerning the implementation of this Treaty.

 

Article 23
Relations with States not party to this Treaty

  1. States Parties shall apply Articles 3-5 to all transfers of conventional arms within the scope of this Treaty to those not party to this Treaty.

 

Article 24
Relationship with other instruments

  1. States Parties shall have the right to enter into agreements on the trade in conventional arms with regards to the international trade in conventional arms, provided that those agreements are compatible with their obligations under this Treaty and do not undermine the objects and purposes of this Treaty.

 

Article 25
Depositary and Authentic Texts

  1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is the Depositary of this Treaty.
  2. The original text of this Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic.

 

 

IAPCAR Says “G’day, Mate” to Australian Gun Rights Group

Wednesday, May 16th, 2012

Original Story VIA:  Guns.com

The Firearm Owners Association of Australia (FOAA) has joined up with the International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (IAPCAR).

The more the merrier!

When talking guns rights, the thing that we Americans tend to discuss the most is the Second Amendment, and since the US Constitution really only applies to the US (of course) it’s not always clear how other countries handle gun rights. Well, all over the world people want to carry guns to protect their families against threats. Even if the flag they wave looks different, that basic desire will always be present.

The international force for gun rights has just gotten a little bit beefier now that our Aussie buddies have teamed up with IAPCAR. This new addition officially means that IAPCAR has representation from every single continent.

Philip Watson, the Executive Director of IAPCAR, was thrilled about the news, “IAPCAR’s steady growth over the past two years has been gratifying.” Chairman Alan Gottleib of the Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, which has been a central organization in IAPCAR, welcomed “our colleagues from Down Under.”

These increased numbers may give IAPCAR the added influence it needs to oppose the United Nations’ Arms Trade Treaty coming up this July.

With IAPCAR’s membership now encompassing 21 affiliated groups spread across 12 different nations, it’s only a mere 6.6 billion members away from being able to secure universal gun rights.