Posts Tagged ‘United Nations’

Gun Trade World Article: Arms Trade Treaty Under Scrutiny

Monday, November 11th, 2013

Feature story in November 2013 print edition of Gun Trade World.

Available online linked here.

Taking Stock of the UN Arms Trade Treaty

Tuesday, July 9th, 2013

The Arms Trade Treaty As Gateway Framework For National Small Arms Control And Disarmament

By Jeff Moran | Geneva

(c) Jeff Moran

Image: (c) Jeff Moran

On 20 June Ambassador Roberto Moritán (Argentina), the former President of the 2012 UN ATT Conference and Chairman of the pre-negotiations process, spoke as part of a public briefing on the ATT at the United Nations in Geneva titled “The Arms Trade Treaty: Past, Present, Future.”

Amb. Moritán explained the ATT should not be seen as a static treaty, like others within the traditional arms control and disarmament field.  Instead, he explained that the ATT is best understood as an ongoing process and a framework…dynamic and expandable with amendments and additional protocols perhaps.  Additional protocols were understood to mean distinct treaties negotiated in addition to the ATT.  An example of a disarmament treaty with additional protocols of would be the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

Expanding on this theme, Amb. Moritán stated the current “scope,” “parameters,” and “criteria” within the existing treaty “need additional negotiation.”  In particular, he said the scope of the treaty should be expanded over time in light of technological developments, and cited scientific achievements in robotics as one reason for this.  He concluded by stating “the ATT has to lead to negotiations in conventional weapons.  Negotiations of conventional weapons cannot continue to be a taboo in the United, Nations.”

If the ATT is to become a broader framework for ongoing negotiations on conventional arms control and disarmament, it is only a matter of time before the volume of the UN small arms control discussion turns up.  This was hinted at during the follow-on presentation by Sarah Parker of the Small Arms Survey, the UN’s go-to resource for small arms control research and policy development.

Ms. Parker presented a PowerPoint version of a report she published earlier this month called: “The Arms Trade Treaty: A Step Forward in Small Arms Control?”.  She explained in her report that while “the ATT has contributed several missing pieces to the framework of controls governing the international transfer of small arms,” it nonetheless has “provisions that are, in many cases, weaker than existing commitments on small arms transfers agreed more than a decade ago.”  The key takeway: the ATT needs more work with respect to controlling and documenting international small arms transfers at the very least.

But normative developments within the ATT and broader small arms process framework will not likely be limited to controlling and documenting international small arms transfers.  Given the history of the ATT negotiations and the small arms process, restrictions on transfers of small arms to “non-state actors” or “private actors” (diplomatic homonyms that often mean rebel groups, private corporations, or individuals) will probably reappear on the UN agenda through implementation and expansion of the ATT framework.  So might global restrictions in the form of national controls on civilian access or even outright prohibitions on civilian possession of certain types of small arms.

In this direction, a coalition of UN agencies and contracted small arms control advocates have been quietly developing a series International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) since 2008.  Some ISACs were released last year, but the project coordinator reports remaining ones are going to be released this year.  Privately, diplomats and ISACS advocates confirm that these will be “of use” and that many states hope a critical mass of these standards become the basis for future negotiations to amend the ATT.  Amendments to the ATT can be voted on six years after the instrument enters into force, and during meetings of States Parties only every third year thereafter.  Decisions on amendments will not be made by consensus, but through a three-fourths majority vote of States Parties in the room.

Two ISACS are thought to be of particular interest to those seeking to amend the ATT.  The first is ISACS number 03.20, “National Controls Over The International Transfer Of Small Arms And Light Weapons.”  Among other things, 03.20 has a provision that prohibits international transfers to private actors without “end-user certification.”  The second is ISACS number 03.30,“National Controls Over the Access of Civilians to Small Arms and Light Weapons.”  Among other things, 03.30 requires national registration of firearms and owners, prohibitions on civilian  possession of certain weapons Americans can already legally and legitimately possess with additional licensing, and even has language advocating for national home inspections of private gun collections for “safety compliance.”  This second standard was written by Dr. Ed Laurance, who is a former strategic planner for IANSA.  IANSA stands for the International Action Network on Small Arms, which, according to page 3 of its foundation document, is committed to “reducing the availability of weapons to civilians in all societies.”  (More information on draft versions of ISACS 03.30 and 03.20 and other ISACS involving national controls can be found here.)

If the ATT negotiations to date and the 112 signatories to the 2006 Geneva Declaration are any indicator, most if not a three-quarters majority of UN member states would endorse “private actors,” “end-user certification,” and “civilian access” appearing on the UN’s small arms control and disarmament agenda with the ATT.  In fact, Ms. Parker, along with her colleague Markus Wilson, even suggest in their small arms process guide for diplomats that a prohibition on transfers to private or non-state actors and prohibitions on civilian possession would have already become established, if not binding, international norms by now were it not for the singular opposition of the United States during the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which resulted in the politically binding Program of Action (PoA).

Of course, the ATT can and should do much good to help establish badly needed  import/export controls with respect to conventional weapons in States currently lacking them.  The ATT should also and rightly compel appropriate humanitarian criteria into exporting State decision making where such criteria are missing or weak.  But can anybody deny at this point that the ATT is also a giant milestone towards global small arms control and disarmament, toward “reducing the availability of weapons to civilians in all societies?”  The truth is that a legally binding ATT, among other things, can and most likely will be revised and expanded to substantially achieve all that the politically-binding PoA was hoped to achieve but hasn’t, and then some.

At bottom, if the US is already the “gold standard” in terms of export controls and already applies humanitarian criteria in international weapons transfers, why again is it so imperative the US sign the ATT?   Some key diplomats suggest the US signature is necessary to create a symbolic demonstration of communitarian international engagement, and that this would help encourage other key states to do the same.  But if the American payment terms for signing and ratifying the ATT include a balloon payment 6 years from entry into force ultimately requiring a roll-back of American civil arms rights and privileges, perhaps the US ought not sign the treaty after all.  Instead, perhaps the US and other states should focus less on international trade controls and focus more on addressing root causes of armed violence in the developing or fragile states most affected by it, namely, lack of rule of law, weak if not incompetent local governance, and corruption.  Even Sarah Parker has apparently, finally, admitted in the conclusion of her aforementioned report:

“Small arms related problems have less to do with inadequate international transfer controls and more to do with controlling small arms already within their territories.” 

Ms. Parker’s remark is supported by prior research making the stronger point that, in fact, for most countries around the globe, particularly for most developing or fragile states, a combination of deficient domestic regulation of legal firearms possession with theft, and loss or corrupt sale from official inventories is a more serious problem than illicit trafficking across borders.[*]  Though the timing of Ms. Parker’s apparent admission (after the conclusion of the ATT negotiations) may raise certain ethical questions to some, her acknowledgement is nonetheless welcomed by this author in the spirit of it being better late than never.

Note

[*] This author first called attention to the apparent overselling of the ATT’s benefits in this regard in 2012. See http://tsmworldwide.com/dishonest-humanitarianism/ at notes 17, 18, and 19, which address research invalidating the overhyped claim by many ATT proponents, including the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, that there was ever and still is a large problem of international trafficking of small arms.  Real scholarship shows, contrary to ATT advocacy campaigning message, that the problem of international trafficking of small arms is actually quite small, and isolated to specific troubled states or sub-regions.  Key source:  Owen Greene and Nicholas Marsh, eds. Small Arms, Crime and Conflict: Global Governance and the Threat of Armed Violence. Routledge: 2012. P. 90-91.

About The Author

Jeff Moran lives in Geneva, Switzerland and is a consultant specializing in the ethical and responsible development  of the international defense, security, and shooting sports industries at TSM Worldwide LLC.  Previously Mr. Moran was a strategic marketing leader for a multi-billion dollar business unit of a public defense & aerospace company and an American military diplomat.  He is currently studying weapons law within the Executive LL.M. Program of the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights.  Mr. Moran has an Executive Master in International Negotiations and Policymaking from the Graduate Institute of Geneva, an MBA from Emory University’s Goizueta Business School, and a BSFS from Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.

Distribution  Notices

© TSM Worldwide LLC.  Online republication and redistribution are authorized when this entire publication (including title, byline, images, notes, hyper-links, and distribution note) and linkable URL  http://tsmworldwide.com/taking-stock-of-the-arms-trade-treaty/ are included.  See other published items at http://tsmworldwide.com/category/published/

US State Dept. Press Release: “US Welcomes Opening of Arms Trade Treaty for Signature”

Monday, June 3rd, 2013

Press Statement

John Kerry
Secretary of State
Washington, DC
June 3, 2013

 

The United States welcomes the opening of the Arms Trade Treaty for signature, and we look forward to signing it as soon as the process of conforming the official translations is completed satisfactorily.

The Treaty is an important contribution to efforts to stem the illicit trade in conventional weapons, which fuels conflict, empowers violent extremists, and contributes to violations of human rights. The Treaty will require the parties to implement strict controls, of the kind the United States already has in place, on the international transfer of conventional arms to prevent their diversion and misuse and create greater international cooperation against black market arms merchants. The ATT will not undermine the legitimate international trade in conventional weapons, interfere with national sovereignty, or infringe on the rights of American citizens, including our Second Amendment rights.

We commend the Presidents of the two UN negotiating conferences – Roberto Garcia Moritan of Argentina and Peter Woolcott of Australia –for their leadership in bringing this agreement to fruition. We also congratulate all the states that helped achieve an effective, implementable Treaty that will reduce the risk that international transfers of conventional arms will be used to carry out the world’s worst crimes.

The Real Truth About Gun Homicides

Monday, May 20th, 2013

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) global map of homicide rate shows lower rates in countries with higher gun ownership.

 

Source UNODC

Source UNODC

Brazilian Group Movimento Viva Brasil Joins IAPCAR Coalition

Friday, May 10th, 2013

The International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (IAPCAR) announced today that Brazilian gun rights group Movimento Viva Brasil has joined the international coalition of 25 groups in 16 different countries dedicated to the preservation and defense of civilian firearms rights.logo_mvb_200_200

“Our international alliance of like-minded civilian arms rights groups has a strong representation in Brazil now,” IAPCAR’s Executive Director Philip Watson said. “Movimento Viva Brasil brings another voice to the movement for civilian arms rights.”

Movimento Viva Brasil was involved in the coalition that defeated the nation-wide gun control referendum in 2005 with 64% of the voters casting their ballot against the measure.

Bene Barbosa, president of Movimento Viva Brasil, stated that their organization wants to help “visualize the true and utter failure of the gun-control measures enforced in Brazil, as well as contribute to the strengthening of a worldwide effort to protect civilian gun-rights.”

IAPCAR co-founder Julianne Versnel praised IAPCAR’s newest group for their accomplishments and hard work. “Their record speaks for itself. They’ve been effective and unwavering in defending the rights of Brazilians to defend themselves.”

As a representative to the United Nations, Versnel, who is also the Second Amendment Foundation’s Director of Operations, submitted testimony to the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) meeting in March objecting to the exclusion of civilian arms rights from the ATT. “Nothing that is in an Arms Trade Treaty should affect a woman’s right to defend herself,” Versnel told the delegates.

The IAPCAR gun rights coalition is focused on opposition to the ATT, which has passed the UN General Assembly and will be available for countries to sign on June 3. The ATT does not acknowledge or protect civilian arms rights or recognize the right to self-defense in its enforceable language.v 

Movimento Viva Brazil may be accessed on the Internet via: (www.mvb.org.br/)

The International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (www.iapcar.com) is the only worldwide political action group focusing on the human right to keep and bear arms. Founded in 2010, IAPCAR has grown to 25 major gun-rights organizations and conducts campaigns designed to inform the public and promote the right of self-defense and gun-ownership.

IAPCAR comment on UN ATT approval

Tuesday, April 2nd, 2013

The International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (IAPCAR) expressed concern about the passage of the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (UN ATT) after its approval on April 2, 2013 in the UN General Assembly. This is not the path that the ATT should have taken. The Treaty had not been able to reach consensus, where all parties agreed, and it was hurried to the General Assembly. There were 154 votes in favor, 3 against and 23 abstentions.

Philip Watson, IAPCAR’s executive director, stated, “An ATT without any provision protecting civilian use of firearms for the purpose of self-defense is unacceptable. While the preamble makes vague reference to civilian arms, there is nothing acknowledging the right in the operative language of the treaty.”

IAPCAR co-founder Julianne Versnel addressed the global body at the ATT conference on March 27 along with other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) and defended the use of firearms in self-defense. “Almost half of the handguns in the US are owned by women. They are used daily for self-defense. I fully endorse, as should every person in this room, the idea that women must have the means to defend themselves. Nothing that is in an Arms Trade Treaty should affect a woman’s right to defend herself,” she told the delegates.

Pro-civilian rights supporters, collectors, industry and other participated in the process; however, were given less than half the time allotted to the self-titled ‘arms control’ groups in testimony to the global body.

The ATT will be open for signature on June 3 and will enter into force 90 days after the 50th signatory ratifies it.

The International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (http://iapcar.org/) is the only worldwide political action group focusing on the human right to keep and bear arms. Founded in 2010, IAPCAR has grown to 24 major gun-rights organizations and conducts operations designed to inform the public and promote the right of self-defense and gun-ownership.

NSSF Objects to U.S. Government Abandoning Position that U.N. Treaty Must be based on International “Consensus”

Monday, April 1st, 2013

Via:  National Shooting Sports Foundation (NSSF)

The National Shooting Sports Foundation today strongly objected to the last-minute reversal of the U.S. government position regarding the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty. In the closing hours of negotiations on Thursday, March 28, the government abandoned its previous insistence that the treaty be approved only through achieving “consensus” of all the member states. Requiring consensus had been the United States position going back to earlier administrations.

At the end of the session, a U.S. government spokesperson told reporters “It’s important to the United States and the defense of our interests to insist on consensus. But every state in this process has always been conscious of the fact that if consensus is not reached in this process, that there are other ways to adopt this treaty, including via a vote of the General Assembly.” The spokesperson went on to say that the United States would vote “yes” on the treaty in the General Assembly, regardless of the positions of other member states. By abandoning the requirement for consensus the United States is assuring passage of the treaty by the United Nations.

“This abrupt about-face on the long-standing United States requirement for ‘consensus’ illustrates that the Obama Administration wants a sweeping U.N. arms control treaty,” said Lawrence Keane, NSSF senior vice president and general counsel. “We are troubled by the timing of the Obama Administration’s decision to abandon consensus on the eve of the Senate debate on pending gun control measures. The United Nations treaty would have a broad impact on the U.S. firearms industry and its base of consumers in the U.S.”

Industry analysts have identified three major areas of concern with the treaty text. The treaty clearly covers trade in civilian firearms, not just military arms and equipment. It will have a major impact on the importation of firearms to the United States, which is a substantial source for the consumer market. And it will impose new regulations on the “transit” of firearms, the term defined so broadly that it would cover all everything from container ships stopping at ports to individuals who are traveling internationally with a single firearm for hunting or other sporting purposes.

“We hope that the Members of the U.S. Senate are closely watching the White House abandon its principles and promises in the rush to ramrod this flawed treaty into effect. Not only will they later be asked to ratify this attack on our constitution and sovereignty, but they will also be lavished with new promises from the administration in its drive to push a broad gun control agenda through the U.S. Senate when it returns from recess. They would be right to question those promises strongly,” concluded Keane.

Proposed arms treaty shows UN is its own worst enemy

Wednesday, March 27th, 2013

Original Article Via:  Dave Workman, Seattle Gun Rights Examiner

The final draft of the proposed United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is out, and it contains language that may be incendiary to gun rights activists in the United States, with references to maintaining “national control systems” for small arms and ammunition.

From the proposed treaty on Page 4: “Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export of ammunition/munitions fired, launched or delivered by the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), and shall apply the provisions of Article 6 and Article 7 prior to authorizing the export of such ammunition/munitions.”

Bellevue’s Alan Gottlieb, executive vice president of the Second Amendment Foundation, has been vocally critical of the ATT process and is concerned about “vagueness” in the current language. SAF’s Julianne Versnel was at the UN last week to testify about unintended consequences of international gun control measures.

From the proposed treaty on Page 5: “Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system, including a national control list, in order to implement the provisions of this Treaty.” Versnel suggested this may be one of the “core problems” of the proposed treaty, but it might take a determination from someone skilled in diplomatic speech to figure it out.

On Page 9 of the document, there is an entire section on record keeping that just might be enough to cause many people on Capitol Hill to follow the lead shown by Republican Senators Rand Paul, Mike Lee and Ted Cruz, discussed by this column that might prevent the U.S. from signing on.

Record keeping:

1. Each State Party shall maintain national records, pursuant to its national laws and regulations, of its issuance of export authorizations or its actual exports of the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

2. Each State Party is encouraged to maintain records of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) that are transferred to its territory as the final destination or that are authorized to transit or trans-ship territory under its jurisdiction.

3. Each State Party is encouraged to include in those records: the quantity, value, model/type, authorized international transfers of conventional arms covered under Article
2 (1), conventional arms actually transferred, details of exporting State(s), importing State(s), transit and trans-shipment State(s), and end users, as appropriate.

4. Records shall be kept for a minimum of ten years.

But does all of this treaty language really mean what a lot of people will think it means: The UN dictating some sort of national gun registry, at least on imported firearms? Because of the way this document is written, even if some UN spokesperson says “No,” there will be a legion of gun rights advocates who say “Yes,” and they will have compelling, if not convincing arguments.

The draft documents do include some caveats in the Preamble, including:

Reaffirming the sovereign right of any State to regulate and control conventional arms
exclusively within its territory, pursuant to its own legal or constitutional system,

Emphasizing that nothing in this Treaty prevents States from maintaining and adopting additional effective measures to further the object and purpose of this Treaty,

Mindful of the legitimate trade and lawful ownership, and use of certain conventional
arms for recreational, cultural, historical, and sporting activities, where such trade, ownership and use are permitted or protected by law…

But the Preamble is just that. It’s apparently not part of any binding language.

The authors of this document will be largely to blame for any misunderstanding, and they have opened themselves up to criticism that the language seems deliberately foggy and far too steeped in diplomatic semantics. That translates to being something less than “plain English.” Since the Obama administration has indicated a willingness to sign onto such a treaty, the Senate just might reject it out of hand, but before that happens, somebody will have to translate it for them.

UN Arms Trade Treaty Final Draft

Wednesday, March 27th, 2013

Document Via:

UN.org/Disarmament

http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/docs/ATT_text_%28As_adopted_by_the_GA%29-E.pdf

PRESIDENT’S NON PAPER, 27 MARCH 2013

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United Nations Final Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty

New York, 18-28 March 2013

Draft decision

Submitted by the President of the Final Conference

The Final United Nations Conference of the Arms Trade Treaty,

Adopts the Arms Trade Treaty, the text of which is annexed to the present decision.

Annex

The Arms Trade Treaty

Preamble

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations which seeks to promote the

establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for

armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,

Underlining the need to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms

and to prevent their diversion to the illicit market, or for unauthorized end use and end users,

including in the commission of terrorist acts,

Recognizing the legitimate political, security, economic and commercial interests of

States in the international trade in conventional arms,

Reaffirming the sovereign right of any State to regulate and control conventional arms

exclusively within its territory, pursuant to its own legal or constitutional system,

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Acknowledging that peace and security, development and human rights, are pillars of

the United Nations system and foundations for collective security and recognizing that

development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing,

Recalling the United Nations Disarmament Commission Guidelines for international

arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36H of 6 December 1991,

Noting the contribution made by the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent,

Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects,

as well as the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their

Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention

against Transnational Organized Crime, and the International Instrument to Enable States to

Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons,

Recognizing the security, social, economic and humanitarian consequences of the

illicit and unregulated trade in conventional arms,

Bearing in mind that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast

majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict and armed violence,

Recognizing also the challenges faced by victims of armed conflict and their need for

adequate care, rehabilitation and social and economic inclusion,

Emphasizing that nothing in this Treaty prevents States from maintaining and

adopting additional effective measures to further the object and purpose of this Treaty,

Mindful of the legitimate trade and lawful ownership, and use of certain conventional

arms for recreational, cultural, historical, and sporting activities, where such trade, ownership

and use are permitted or protected by law,

Mindful also of the role regional organizations can play in assisting States Parties,

upon request, in implementing this Treaty,

Recognizing the voluntary and active role that civil society, including nongovernmental

organizations, and industry, can play in raising awareness of the object and

purpose of this Treaty, and in supporting its implementation,

Acknowledging that regulation of the international trade in conventional arms and

preventing their diversion, should not hamper international cooperation and legitimate trade

in materiel, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing the desirability of achieving universal adherence to this Treaty,

Determined to act in accordance with the following principles;

Principles

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– The inherent right of all States to individual or collective self-defense as recognized

in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;

– The settlement of international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that

international peace and security and justice, are not endangered in accordance with Article 2

(3) of the Charter of the United Nations;

– Refraining in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the

territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent

with the purposes of the United Nations in accordance with Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the

United Nations;

– Non-intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of

any State in accordance with Article 2 (7) of the Charter of the United Nations;

– Respecting and ensuring respect for international humanitarian law in accordance

with, inter alia, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and respecting and ensuring respect for

human rights, in accordance with, inter alia, the Charter of the United Nations and the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

– The responsibility of all States, in accordance with their respective international

obligations, to effectively regulate the international trade in conventional arms, and to

prevent their diversion, as well as the primary responsibility of all States in establishing and

implementing their respective national control systems;

– The respect for the legitimate interests of States to acquire conventional arms to

exercise their right to self-defense and for peacekeeping operations; and to produce, export,

import and transfer conventional arms;

– Implementing this Treaty in a consistent, objective and non-discriminatory manner,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Object and Purpose

The object of this Treaty is to:

– Establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or

improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms;

– Prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their

diversion;

for the purpose of:

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– Contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability;

– Reducing human suffering;

– Promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in

the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among

States Parties.

Article 2

Scope

1. This Treaty shall apply to all conventional arms within the following categories:

(a) Battle tanks;

(b) Armoured combat vehicles;

(c) Large-calibre artillery systems;

(d) Combat aircraft;

(e) Attack helicopters;

(f) Warships;

(g) Missiles and missile launchers; and

(h) Small arms and light weapons.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, the activities of the international trade comprise export,

import, transit, trans-shipment and brokering, hereafter referred to as “transfer”.

3. This Treaty shall not apply to the international movement of conventional arms by, or on

behalf of, a State Party for its use provided that the conventional arms remain under that

State Party’s ownership.

Article 3

Ammunition/Munitions

Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export

of ammunition/munitions fired, launched or delivered by the conventional arms covered

under Article 2 (1), and shall apply the provisions of Article 6 and Article 7 prior to

authorizing the export of such ammunition/munitions.

Article 4

Parts and Components

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Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export

of parts and components where the export is in a form that provides the capability to

assemble the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Each State Party shall apply the

provisions of Article 6 and Article 7 prior to authorizing the export of such parts and

components.

Article 5

General Implementation

1. Each State Party shall implement this Treaty in a consistent, objective and nondiscriminatory

manner, bearing in mind the principles referred to in this Treaty.

2. Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system, including a

national control list, in order to implement the provisions of this Treaty.

3. Each State Party is encouraged to apply the provisions of this Treaty to the broadest range

of conventional arms. National definitions of any of the categories covered in Article 2

(1) (a-g) shall not cover less than the descriptions used in the United Nations Register of

Conventional Arms at the time of entry into force of this Treaty. For the category covered

in Article 2 (1) (h), national definitions shall not cover less than the descriptions used in

relevant United Nations instruments at the time of entry into force of this Treaty.

4. Each State Party, pursuant to its national laws, shall provide its national control list to the

Secretariat, which shall make it available to other States Parties. States Parties are

encouraged to make their control lists publicly available.

5. Each State Party shall take measures necessary to implement the provisions of this Treaty

and shall designate competent national authorities in order to have an effective and

transparent national control system regulating the transfer of conventional arms covered

under Article 2 (1) and of items covered in Article 3 and Article 4.

6. Each State Party shall designate one or more national points of contact to exchange

information on matters related to the implementation of this Treaty. A State Party shall

notify the Secretariat, established under Article 18, of its national point(s) of contact and

keep the information updated.

Article 6

Prohibitions

1. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article

2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if the transfer would violate its

obligations under measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council acting under

Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular arms embargoes.

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2. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article

2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if the transfer would violate its

relevant international obligations under international agreements to which it is a Party, in

particular those relating to the transfer of, or illicit trafficking in, conventional arms.

3. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article

2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if it has knowledge at the time of

authorization that the arms or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes

against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed

against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes as defined by

international agreements to which it is a Party.

Article 7

Export and Export Assessment

1. If the export is not prohibited under Article 6, each exporting State Party, prior to

authorization of the export of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items

covered under Article 3 or Article 4, under its jurisdiction and pursuant to its national

control system, shall, in an objective and non-discriminatory manner, taking into account

relevant factors, including information provided by the importing State in accordance

with Article 8 (1), assess the potential that the conventional arms or items:

a) would contribute to or undermine peace and security;

b) could be used to:

i. commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law;

ii. commit or facilitate a serious violation of international human rights law;

iii. commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions

or protocols relating to terrorism to which the exporting State is a Party; or

iv. commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions

or protocols relating to transnational organized crime to which the exporting State

is a Party.

2. The exporting State Party shall also consider whether there are measures that could be

undertaken to mitigate risks identified in (a) or (b) in paragraph 1, such as confidencebuilding

measures or jointly developed and agreed programmes by the exporting and

importing States.

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3. If, after conducting this assessment and considering available mitigating measures, the

exporting State Party determines that there is an overriding risk of any of the negative

consequences in paragraph 1, the exporting State Party shall not authorize the export.

4. The exporting State Party, in making this assessment, shall take into account the risk of

the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of the items covered under Article 3

or Article 4, being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender based violence or

serious acts of violence against women and children.

5. Each exporting State Party shall take measures to ensure that all authorizations for the

export of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article

3 or Article 4, are detailed and issued prior to the export.

6. Each exporting State Party shall make available appropriate information about the

authorization in question, upon request, to the importing State Party and to the transit or

trans-shipment States Parties, subject to its national laws, practices or policies.

7. If, after an authorization has been granted, an exporting State Party becomes aware of

new relevant information, it is encouraged to reassess the authorization after

consultations, if appropriate, with the importing State.

Article 8

Import

1. Each importing State Party shall take measures to ensure that appropriate and relevant

information is provided, upon request, pursuant to its national laws, to the exporting State

Party, to assist the exporting State Party in conducting its national export assessment

under Article 7. Such measures may include end use or end user documentation.

2. Each importing State Party shall take measures that will allow it to regulate, where

necessary, imports under its jurisdiction of conventional arms covered under Article 2

(1). Such measures may include import systems.

3. Each importing State Party may request information from the exporting State Party

concerning any pending or actual export authorizations where the importing State Party is

the country of final destination.

Article 9

Transit or trans-shipment

Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to regulate, where necessary and feasible,

the transit or trans-shipment under its jurisdiction of conventional arms covered under Article

2 (1) through its territory in accordance with relevant international law.

8

Article 10

Brokering

Each State Party shall take measures, pursuant to its national laws, to regulate brokering

taking place under its jurisdiction for conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Such

measures may include requiring brokers to register or obtain written authorization before

engaging in brokering.

Article 11

Diversion

1. Each State Party involved in the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1)

shall take measures to prevent their diversion.

2. The exporting State Party shall seek to prevent the diversion of the transfer of

conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) through its national control system,

established in accordance with Article 5 (2), by assessing the risk of diversion of the

export and considering the establishment of mitigation measures such as confidencebuilding

measures or jointly developed and agreed programmes by the exporting and

importing States. Other prevention measures may include, where appropriate: examining

parties involved in the export, requiring additional documentation, certificates,

assurances, not authorizing the export or other appropriate measures.

3. Importing, transit, trans-shipment and exporting States Parties shall cooperate and

exchange information, pursuant to their national laws, where appropriate and feasible, in

order to mitigate the risk of diversion of the transfer of conventional arms covered under

Article 2 (1).

4. If a State Party detects a diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article

2 (1), the State Party shall take appropriate measures, pursuant to its national laws and in

accordance with international law, to address such diversion. Such measures may include,

alerting potentially affected State Parties, examining diverted shipments of such

conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), and taking follow-up measures through

investigation and law enforcement.

5. In order to better comprehend and prevent the diversion of transferred conventional arms

covered under Article 2 (1), State Parties are encouraged to share relevant information

with one another on effective measures to address diversion. Such information may

include information on illicit activities including corruption, international trafficking

routes, illicit brokers, sources of illicit supply, methods of concealment, common points

of dispatch, or destinations used by organized groups engaged in diversion.

9

6. States Parties are encouraged to report to other State Parties, through the Secretariat, on

measures taken in addressing the diversion of transferred conventional arms covered

under Article 2 (1).

Article 12

Record keeping

1. Each State Party shall maintain national records, pursuant to its national laws and

regulations, of its issuance of export authorizations or its actual exports of the

conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

2. Each State Party is encouraged to maintain records of conventional arms covered under

Article 2 (1) that are transferred to its territory as the final destination or that are

authorized to transit or trans-ship territory under its jurisdiction.

3. Each State Party is encouraged to include in those records: the quantity, value,

model/type, authorized international transfers of conventional arms covered under Article

2 (1), conventional arms actually transferred, details of exporting State(s), importing

State(s), transit and trans-shipment State(s), and end users, as appropriate.

4. Records shall be kept for a minimum of ten years.

Article 13

Reporting

1. Each State Party shall, within the first year after entry into force of this Treaty for that

State Party, in accordance with Article 22, provide an initial report to the Secretariat of

measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, including national laws, national

control lists and other regulations and administrative measures. Each State Party shall

report to the Secretariat on any new measures undertaken in order to implement this

Treaty, when appropriate. Reports shall be made available, and distributed to States

Parties by the Secretariat.

2. States Parties are encouraged to report to other States Parties, through the Secretariat,

information on measures taken that have been proven effective in addressing the

diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

3. Each State Party shall submit annually to the Secretariat by 31 May a report for the

preceding calendar year concerning authorized or actual exports and imports of

conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Reports shall be made available, and

distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat. The report submitted to the Secretariat

may contain the same information submitted by the State Party to relevant United Nations

10

frameworks, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Reports may

exclude commercially sensitive or national security information.

Article 14

Enforcement

Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to enforce national laws and regulations that

implement the provisions of this Treaty.

Article 15

International Cooperation

1. States Parties shall cooperate with each other, consistent with their respective security

interests and national laws, to effectively implement this Treaty.

2. States Parties are encouraged to facilitate international cooperation, including exchanging

information on matters of mutual interest regarding the implementation and application of

this Treaty pursuant to their respective security interests and national laws.

3. States Parties are encouraged to consult on matters of mutual interest and to share

information, as appropriate, to support the implementation of this Treaty.

4. States Parties are encouraged to cooperate, pursuant to their national laws, in order to

assist national implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, including through sharing

information regarding illicit activities and actors and in order to prevent and eradicate

diversion of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

5. States Parties shall, where jointly agreed and consistent with their national laws, afford

one another the widest measure of assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial

proceedings in relation to violations of national measures established pursuant to this

Treaty.

6. States Parties are encouraged to take national measures and to cooperate with each other

to prevent the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) becoming subject

to corrupt practices.

7. States Parties are encouraged to exchange experience and information on lessons learned

in relation to any aspect of this Treaty.

Article 16

International Assistance

1. In implementing this Treaty, each State Party may seek assistance including legal or

legislative assistance, institutional capacity building, and technical, material or financial

11

assistance. Such assistance may include stockpile management, disarmament,

demobilization and reintegration programmes, model legislation, and effective practices

for implementation. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide such assistance,

upon request.

2. Each State Party may request, offer or receive assistance through, inter alia, the United

Nations, international, regional, subregional or national organizations, non-governmental

organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

3. A voluntary trust fund shall be established by States Parties to assist requesting States

Parties requiring international assistance to implement this Treaty. Each State Party is

encouraged to contribute resources to the fund.

Article 17

Conference of States Parties

1. A Conference of States Parties shall be convened by the provisional Secretariat,

established under Article 18, no later than one year following the entry into force of this

Treaty and thereafter at such other times as may be decided by the Conference of States

Parties.

2. The Conference of States Parties shall adopt by consensus its rules of procedure at its first

session.

3. The Conference of States Parties shall adopt financial rules for itself as well as governing

the funding of any subsidiary bodies it may establish as well as financial provisions

governing the functioning of the Secretariat. At each ordinary session, it shall adopt a

budget for the financial period until the next ordinary session.

4. The Conference of States Parties shall:

(a) Review the implementation of this Treaty, including developments in the field of

conventional arms

(b) Consider and adopt recommendations regarding the implementation and operation of this

Treaty, in particular the promotion of its universality;

(c) Consider amendments to this Treaty in accordance with Article 20;

(d) Consider issues arising from the interpretation of this Treaty;

(e) Consider and decide the tasks and budget of the Secretariat;

(f) Consider the establishment of any subsidiary bodies as may be necessary to improve the

functioning of this Treaty; and

(g) Perform any other function consistent with this Treaty.

12

5. Extraordinary meetings of the Conference of States Parties shall be held at such other

times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference of States Parties, or at the written

request of any State Party provided that this request is supported by at least two thirds of

the States Parties.

Article 18

Secretariat

1. This Treaty hereby establishes a Secretariat to assist States Parties in the effective

implementation of this Treaty. Pending the first meeting of the Conference of States

Parties, a provisional Secretariat will be responsible for the administrative functions

covered under this Treaty.

2. The Secretariat shall be adequately staffed. Staff shall have the necessary expertise to

ensure that the Secretariat can effectively undertake the responsibilities described in

paragraph 3.

3. The Secretariat shall be responsible to States Parties. Within a minimized structure, the

Secretariat shall undertake the following responsibilities:

(a) Receive, make available and distribute the reports as mandated by this

Treaty;

(b) Maintain and make available to States Parties the list of national points of

contact;

(c) Facilitate the matching of offers of and requests for assistance for Treaty

implementation and promote international cooperation as requested;

(d) Facilitate the work of the Conference of States Parties, including making

arrangements and providing the necessary services for meetings under this

Treaty; and

(e) Perform other duties as decided by the Conferences of States Parties.

Article 19

Dispute Settlement

1. States Parties shall consult and, by mutual consent, cooperate to pursue settlement of any

dispute that may arise between them with regard to the interpretation or application of

this Treaty including through negotiations, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement or

other peaceful means.

2. States Parties may pursue, by mutual consent, arbitration to settle any dispute between

them, regarding issues concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty.

13

Article 20

Amendments

1. Six years after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose an

amendment to this Treaty. Thereafter, proposed amendments may only be considered by

the Conference of States Parties every three years.

2. Any proposal to amend this Treaty shall be submitted in writing to the Secretariat, which

shall circulate the proposal to all States Parties, not less than 180 days before the next

meeting of the Conference of States Parties at which amendments may be considered

pursuant to paragraph 1. The amendment shall be considered at the next Conference of

States Parties at which amendments may be considered pursuant to paragraph 1 if, no

later than 120 days after its circulation by the Secretariat, a majority of States Parties

notify the Secretariat that they support consideration of the proposal.

3. The States Parties shall make every effort to achieve consensus on each amendment. If

all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment

shall, as a last resort, be adopted by a three-quarters majority vote of the States Parties

present and voting at the meeting of the Conference of States Parties. For the purposes of

this Article, States Parties present and voting means States Parties present and casting an

affirmative or negative vote. The Depositary shall communicate any adopted amendment

to all States Parties.

4. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 shall enter into force for each

State Party that has deposited its instrument of acceptance for that amendment, ninety

days following the date of deposit with the Depositary of the instruments of acceptance

by a majority of the number of States Parties at the time of the adoption of the

amendment. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party ninety days

following the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance for that amendment.

Article 21

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature at the United Nations Headquarters in New York

by all States from the Third Day of the Sixth Month of 2013 until its entry into force.

2. This Treaty is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by each signatory State.

3. Following its entry into force, this Treaty shall be open for accession by any State that

has not signed the Treaty.

4. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with

the Depositary.

14

Article 22

Entry into Force

1. This Treaty shall enter into force ninety days following the date of the deposit of the

fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval with the Depositary.

2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or

accession subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, this Treaty shall enter into

force for that State ninety days following the date of deposit of its instrument of

ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 23

Provisional application

Any State may at the time of signature or the deposit of instrument of its ratification,

acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally Article 6 and

Article 7 pending its entry into force.

Article 24

Duration and Withdrawal

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw

from this Treaty. It shall give notification of such withdrawal to the Depositary, which

shall notify all other States Parties. The notification of withdrawal may include an

explanation of the reasons for its withdrawal. The notice of withdrawal shall take effect

ninety days after the receipt of the notification of withdrawal by the Depositary, unless

the notification of withdrawal specifies a later date.

3. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising

from this Treaty while it was a Party to this Treaty, including any financial obligations

that it may have accrued.

Article 25

Reservations

1. At the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, each State may

formulate reservations, unless the reservations are incompatible with the object and

purpose of this Treaty.

15

2. A State Party may withdraw its reservation at any time by notification to this effect

addressed to the Depositary.

Article 26

Relationship with other international agreements

1. The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States

Parties with regard to existing or future international agreements, to which they are

parties, where those obligations are consistent with this Treaty.

2. This Treaty shall not be cited as grounds for voiding defense cooperation agreements

concluded between States Parties to this Treaty.

Article 27

Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Treaty.

Article 28

Authentic Texts

The original text of this Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and

Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the

United Nations.

DONE AT NEW YORK, this twenty-eighth day of March, two thousand and thirteen

http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/docs/Presidents_Non_Paper_of_27_March_2013_%28ATT_Final_Conference%29.pdf

 

U.N. global gun control effort begins anew

Wednesday, March 20th, 2013

Via Dave Workman, Seattle Gun Rights Examiner

New talks about an old subject – international gun control – begin today at the United Nations in New York, and sure to be involved at some point is the Bellevue-based International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (IAPCAR), founded with the cornerstone involvement of gun rights advocates Alan Gottlieb and Julianne Versnel.

IAPCAR Executive Director Phil Watson keeps an office at Gottlieb’s Liberty Park complex. Attorney Mark Barnes is IAPCAR’s managing director with an office in Washington, D.C.

In addition, the National Rifle Association is keenly interested in these talks. Indeed, U.S. gun rights organizations have every reason for alarm, in the wake of a statement published Friday by the Washington Post from Amnesty International’s Michelle A. Ringuette.

“The NRA claim that there is such a thing as ‘civilian weapons’ and that these can and need to be treated differently from military weapons under the Arms Trade Treaty is — to put it politely — the gun lobby’s creativity on full display,” Ringuette insisted, according to the newspaper. “There is no such distinction. To try to create one would create a loophole that would render the treaty inoperative, as anyone could claim that he or she was in the business of trading ‘civilian weapons.’ ”

This suggests that global gun banners equate rifles and shotguns with tanks and surface-to-air missiles. For example, during last Thursday’s Senate Judiciary debate on her gun ban legislation, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) defended her efforts to ban “just a few guns” and leave others alone by arguing, “Is this not enough for the people of the United States? Do they need a bazooka?”

Raising further alarms is the fact that within hours of confirming his re-election in November. President Barack Obama had joined a handful of other nations to rekindle the U.N.’s long-running effort to adopt an international gun control treaty. Gottlieb, who heads the Second Amendment Foundation, raised alarms about this last Nov. 7.

Amnesty International is part of an international gun control group called IANSA (International Action Network on Small Arms). That group also includes the Brady Campaign for the Prevention of Gun Violence, and the Law Center for Smart Gun Laws (LCSGL).

It could be that the deck has been carefully stacked by the U.N. According to Fox News, last week, IANSA co-hosted – with the UN – a “series of meetings” with representatives from 48 African nations to push global gun control. The session was held in Addis Ababa, Ethopia.

Gottlieb was in Europe recently attending a meeting of the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting, and he takes the threat of global gun control seriously. That the U.N. is hosting these talks on American soil, in a building that has a statute out front of a Colt Python with its barrel twisted into a knot is a not-so-subtle insult to the Second Amendment and American firearms owners.

Gun rights leaders are warning American gun owners that this is not the time to become complacent, or to be entirely focused on state-level gun control measures, or bills passed out of the Senate Judiciary Committee last week, including Sen. Dianne Feinstein’s effort to renew and make permanent a ban on so-called “assault rifles” and ammunition magazines.

That all of this is occurring at the same time – barely two months into Obama’s second term – does not seem coincidental to some activists, who are now saying “We warned you.”

SAF blasts Obama support for UN Arms Trade Treaty day after election

Monday, November 12th, 2012

Original Story Via:  Human Events

By: Neil W. McCabe
11/11/2012

The leader of America’s oldest gun rights legal foundation Nov. 7 called out President Barack Obama for his support of the United Nations Small Arms and Light Weapons Treaty the day after the election.

“It’s obvious that our warnings over the past several months have been true,” said Alan Gottlieb, founder and executive vice president of the Second Amendment Foundation, based in Bellevue, Wash.

Less than 24 hours after winning re-election, the Obama’s administration joined with China, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and more than 150 other governments, in supporting renewed debate on the proposed United Nations arms trade treaty, confirming the worst fears of the American gun rights community,” said the founder of SAF, which was in 1974, and which has grown to more than 650,000 members and supporters and conducts many programs designed to better inform the public about the consequences of gun control.

“Just days ago as he campaigned for re-election,” he csaid. ”Barack Obama told his supporters that voting is the ‘best revenge.’ I guess now we know what he was talking about. The revenge he seeks is against American gun owners and their Second Amendment rights.”

“The election was called about 11 p.m. Tuesday and by 11 a.m. this morning, we got word that the United States was supporting this resolution. We have to be more vigilant in our efforts to stop this proposed treaty,” he said.

The vote came at the U.N. General Assembly’s meeting of the First Committee on Disarmament at the world organization’s headquarters in New York City.

According to a State Department webpage devoted to the Arms Trade Treaty, the Obama administration strongly supports the treaty potential.

“The ATT should include all advanced conventional weapons, including tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery systems, military aircraft, military helicopters, naval vessels, missiles, missile launchers, small arms and light weapons, and combat support equipment. It should also include parts, components, and/or technology to manufacture, modify, or repair the covered items,” the webpage said.

Julianne Versnel, the SAF operations director, who has been back and forth to the United Nations over this proposal, said the fight is not finished.

The measure will be considered for finalization in March, she said.

“We will continue to monitor this issue and oppose any effort to enforce a global gun control measure,” she said.

Amnesty International issued a statement Wednesday lauding passage of the resolution, saying the treaty will protect human rights, she said.

Suzanne Nossel, executive director of Amnesty International USA, said, “Today’s vote is step one toward a hugely meaningful human rights victory. We will be urging the United States and all other countries to keep today’s momentum going towards the final passage of the first arms trade treaty.”

Nossell said the 157 governments at the U.N. General Assembly’s First Committee on Disarmament in New York voting to finalize Arms Trade Treaty in March is a breakthrough.

“It’s the greatest show of support the treaty has ever received,” she said.

“Among the ‘big six; arms-exporting countries, only Russia abstained from voting,” she said. China joined France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the USA in supporting the resolution.

Gottlieb said Amnesty International does not appreciate that gun rights are enshrined in the Bill of Rights.

“The right of self-defense is a human right,” he said.

“In this country, the Second Amendment protects that right,” he said.

Canada’s NFA to UN: ‘Self-defense is a natural right’

Thursday, August 30th, 2012

Original Story Via:  TheGunMag.com

Canada’s National Firearms Association was the only Canadian pro-firearms group represented during the non-governmental organization presentations at the Second Review Conference of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons.  (PoA)

According to NFA President Sheldon Clare, “It was important for the NFA to be present at this conference for four main reasons.  First, the PoA is alive and potentially dangerous – this was a well-attended conference and vigilance is critical.  Second, it was necessary for us to make sure that there was no attempt to make this the Arms Trade Treaty consolation round, or in any way broaden the scope of the PoA.  Third, we needed to make our concerns known about the aims of some to include firearms components and ammunition, and to make it clear that we are speaking out strongly in support of civilian rights of self-defense – the only Canadian organization to do so.   The fourth reason we were there was to use our strong voice to support our friends.”

According to Clare, “The government seems to be headed in the right direction.  I was pleased to hear the concise and clear presentation by Senior Policy Advisor Kim Joslin of the Canadian Delegation which was in strong support of firearms owners.  In particular, Canada supported the US position which opposes including any aspect of components or ammunition being included in the PoA.  Government representatives Habib Massoud and Steve Torino will be attending the second week of the conference.    It was clear to me in listening to the speeches from delegates that it will be difficult to achieve consensus on several aspects of the PoA‘s implementation plan in the two weeks allotted”.

The NFA and other World Forum (WFSA) members, presented to the UN Conference during the NGO session on Wednesday, August 29 and the text of the speech given by NFA President Sheldon Clare is reproduced below:

STATEMENT TO UNITED NATIONS ON PROGRAMME OF ACTION ON SMALL ARMSS and LIGHT WEAPONS

Madame President, I am Sheldon Clare, President of Canada’s National Firearms Association.

The NFA is Canada’s largest advocacy organization representing the rights of Canadian firearms owners.  Our members are concerned that UN attempts to regulate small arms and light weapons are misdirected and will have an unjustifiably harmful effect upon the ability of free people to have access to firearms and ammunition for perfectly legitimate purposes. The NFA rejects as false that civilian access to small arms is the problem.

Canada’s National Firearms Association (NFA) recommends that controls on small arms and light weapons be limited solely to major crew-served weapon systems possessed or sold by nation states – not individually operated firearms owned or desired to be owned by civilians, also called non-state actors. The rights and property of Canadians, and our firearms businesses engaged in the lawful trade in firearms and ammunition, including surplus firearms and ammunition, must not be subject to UN edict or control.  Quite simply, firearms ownership and use are matters of national sovereignty, civil freedoms, property rights, and are related to national culture.  Also, control of ammunition, including marking beyond caliber, date, and manufacturer would be excessive; it is unreasonable, unnecessary, and fiscally impossible to uniquely mark ammunition.

Small arms in civilian hands allow people to defend themselves from aggression. Self-defense is a natural right of all individuals. This is especially important in the event of unrest and disorder, or in case of state-mandated crimes against humanity. Civilian ownership of arms is an important factor in preventing and limiting the effect of government-encouraged murders such as what occurred in Srebrenica and Rwanda. Disarmed in Srebrenica by UN peacekeepers and in Rwanda by their own government, these people were helpless in the face of organized aggression, especially when in both cases the UN was powerless to provide protection. While governments need to act against terrorism, disarming civilians violates fundamental democratic principles.  Perhaps Governments should deal with unrest by addressing the economic situations, political differences, and human rights issues that contribute to people agitating for change rather than engaging in one size fits all solutions affecting the rights of free people to own and use firearms.
Thank you for your consideration Madame President.”

Clare concluded: “Other matters to be watchful of are the UN International Small Arms Control Standards, (see http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/) and what happens with the Arms Trade Treaty talks (ATT) which broke up without consensus in July.  There will need to be a vote at the General Assembly if it is to come back next year, which may not be possible due to the UN’s two year budgetary cycle.  Simply put, there may not be much support to reopen the ATT so soon in the face of no consensus. Nonetheless, strange things happen at the UN and the NFA has been present to protect the civil and property rights of Canadian Firearms Owners.”

UN hits and misses between the illegal arms trade and the right to bear arms

Thursday, August 30th, 2012

Original Story Via:  Russian Legal Information Agency

MOSCOW, August 30 – RAPSI, Ingrid Burke. The United Nations is currently hosting its second conference in as many months aimed at regulating illicit arms trafficking. July’s conference strived, albeit unsuccessfully, to reach consensus on a binding international treaty that would regulate the global arms trade as a whole. The conference currently underway aims only to review the progress made by UN member nations individually and the international community as a whole in terms of the implementation of an action plan adopted by consensus in 2001 in order to combat the illegal trade of small arms and light weapons.

Both conferences centered on documents- the first a working document that never earned its wings and the second a binding agreement. Both documents are rooted in concern over the illicit arms trade, but one reached consensus and has entered into force on national, regional, and global levels, and one provoked a heated public controversy that endured beyond the deadline for approval by consensus.

To get into the spirit of things, RAPSI has decided to compare and contrast the documents underlying and the controversies surrounding the two initiatives in an effort to better understand what caused the former to sink and the latter to swim.

The UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty

Between 2-27 July, representatives of all 193 member nations gathered at the UN headquarters in New York with the common goal of establishing: “a robust and legally binding arms trade treaty that will have a real impact on the lives of those millions of people suffering from the consequences of armed conflict, repression and armed violence,” in the words of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon. Negotiations deteriorated in the last few days of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) conference as competing national interests gave way to stubborn resistance.

A draft of the treaty released shortly before the conference deadline was harshly criticized both by right-to-bear-arms activists and by their human rights/disarmament counterparts. The former took issue with what they perceived to be an overly broad range of arms and activities sought to be regulated. The latter took issue with what they perceived to be an insufficiently comprehensive document that left numerous gaping loopholes.

The document included among the list of arms sought to be regulated: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers, and small arms and light weapons. This range of weapons has received criticism from both sides of the advocacy spectrum, for being both too broadly and too narrowly tailored.

The inclusion of small arms and light weapons came under fire by advocacy groups that support the right to bear arms. Speaking to this point, International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (IAPCAR) Executive Director Philip Watson explained to RAPSI during the conference, “We are appalled they deemed it appropriate to place civilian firearms used for self-defense in a treaty with tanks, bombs, and attack helicopters. It is dangerous to include civilian self-defense weapons in such an international treaty that could curtail legitimate use or trade of small civilian weapons.  Personal security and the defense of one’s home and family are values shared across international borders, regardless of an individual’s background or nationality.”

The opposite side of the spectrum was comprised of disarmament and human rights advocacy groups who argued that the list of arms and activities covered was too narrow. Toward this end, Amnesty International [AI] noted in a press release toward the end of the conference that, “Major loopholes in the draft text include ammunition not being subject to tight decision-making controls, an array of weapons, munitions and related equipment not being covered, as well as the treaty only applying to the international trade of conventional arms instead of all international transfers including gifts and aid.”

A similarly concerned Oxfam released a statement by head of its arms control unit Anna Macdonald around the same time urging that “[t]here are more holes in this draft treaty than in a leaky bucket and these must be urgently closed if we are going to stop weapons from flowing into the world`s worst conflict zones.”

As it became clear toward the end of the conference that hope was lost, some viewed the stalemate as the fault of the US. In a widely publicized move, 51 US senators pledged to vote against ratification of the treaty if it failed to protect the constitutional right of US citizens to bear arms. As US ratification of an international treaty requires the approval of two-thirds of the senate, these numbers were sufficient to ensure against US ratification of the bill.

The pledge came in the form of a letter addressed to the Obama administration. A press release issued shortly thereafter by Republican Senator Thad Cochran of Mississippi quoted a portion of the letter that urged the Obama administration to break the conference’s required consensus if doing so was necessary to protect the right of US citizens to bear arms. The relevant passage stated:  “As the treaty process continues, we strongly encourage your administration not only to uphold our country’s constitutional protections of civilian firearms ownership, but to ensure – if necessary, by breaking consensus at the July conference – that the treaty will explicitly recognize the legitimacy of lawful activities associated with firearms, including but not limited to the right of self-defense. As members of the United States Senate, we will oppose the ratification of any Arms Trade Treaty that falls short of this standard.”

Later that day, the US State Department (USDOS) issued a statement acknowledging both the failure of the conference to produce tangible results and the refusal of the US to move to accept the treaty in its ultimate form. USDOS spokesperson Victoria Nuland stated, “we do not support a vote in the UNGA on the current text. The illicit trafficking of conventional arms is an important national security concern for the United States. While we sought to conclude this month’s negotiations with a Treaty, more time is a reasonable request for such a complex and critical issue. The current text reflects considerable positive progress, but it needs further review and refinement.”

Some US-based right-to-bear-arms advocacy groups attributed the stalemate to their own grassroots efforts. The most well-known such group, the National Rifle Association (NRA) took personal credit for the failure of the conference to produce results, stating on its website Friday: “The Conference on the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty has broken down and will not report a draft treaty to the member nations… This is a big victory for American gun owners, and the NRA is being widely credited for killing the [conference.]”

The conference’s launch was drenched with optimism. Prior to the start of negotiations, many lauded the potential of the conference to make the world a safer place through the regulation of the international arms trade. Ban expressed optimism in the face of the daunting task that lay ahead, noting, “It is ambitious, but I believe it is achievable.” During his opening statement, Ban urged the necessity of the conference’s success: “Every day, we at the United Nations see the human toll of an absence of regulations or lax controls on the arms trade.  We see it in the suffering of civilian populations trapped by armed conflict or pervasive crime.  We see it in the killing and wounding of civilians — including children, the most vulnerable of all.  We see it in the massive displacement of people within and across borders.  We see it through grave violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law.”

As negotiations fizzled, he lamented, “The Conference’s inability to conclude its work on this much-awaited ATT, despite years of effort of Member States and civil society from many countries, is a setback.”
The Second UN Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

The conference currently underway has been scheduled to run from 27 August to 7 September. A list of member nations in attendance has not yet been released, but a UN official speaking to RAPSI Thursday confirmed that at least 75-80% of UN states are represented.

The document at issue is the politically binding “Programme of action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects,” (POA) which was adopted by consensus in 2001.

From the start, the UN has made clear its intention to refrain during the course of the conference from restricting firearm ownership rights. A UN press statement explained, “The Review Conference only reviews progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action which was adopted in 2001 to combat the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons… It is not about banning firearms or any other type of small arms or prohibiting people from owning legal weapons.”

The release emphasized the conference’s disinterest in imposing lofty regulations, stating: “Each sovereign State determines its own laws and regulations for the manufacture, sale and possession of firearms by its citizens. The United Nations has no jurisdiction over such matters.”

After denying rumors that the conference would essentially serve as a component part of a broader UN conspiracy—in connection with the Arms Trade Treaty—to prohibit civilian gun ownership, the release reiterated the recent failure of the ATT to come into existence: “The Arms Trade Treaty does not yet exist. It was discussed throughout July 2012 and focused on setting common standards for how States could regulate the international trade of all types of conventional arms. No consensus was achieved on a draft Treaty text. “

This conspiracy theory denial points to a critical difference between the conferences and the documents at their core. The ATT sought to regulate the international trade of all types of conventional arms. The POA sought to eliminate the illicit trade of small arms. The goals of the former were extraordinarily lofty; those of the latter, quite narrow.

The POA was born the successful outcome of a conference similar to that which failed to produce the ATT. UN members came together with the goal of combatting, preventing, and eradicating the small arms trade in July 2001, and reached a consensus on how to do so: by targeted, limited means.

Regardless of where one stands on the right to bear arms, it is worth noting the different reactions elicited from the two texts with similar goals but diametrically opposed scopes.

It should be noted that the POA has been criticized by its own implementation support system for lacking key mechanisms to ensure its implementation. It is possible that the inclusion of such mechanisms would have created obstacles to its approval similar to those faced by the ATT.

SAF/IAPCAR DEFEND WOMAN’S RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE AT UNITED NATIONS

Wednesday, August 29th, 2012

Original Story Via:  TheGunMag.com

The Second Amendment Foundation today reminded the United Nations that “if women have the right to be protected against violence, then they have the right to protect themselves against violence.”

So spoke SAF’s Director of Operations Julianne Versnel, whose remarks to the U.N. Programme of Action conference were unlike anything many delegates had ever heard before.

The conference is seen as the first step toward rekindling discussions about an on-going process to continue development of a small arms and light weapons treaty, which earlier this summer collapsed when several nations opposed it.

Noting that she had reviewed what has already been written and said about the violence against women as it relates to the Programme of Action, Versnel emphasized that, “I am struck by what is not said.”

“If there is a basic sanctity of a woman’s person,” she observed, “if there is a right to not be a victim of sexual or personal violence, then that right involves the right to defend one’s self.”

Alan Gottlieb, Laura McDonald, Otis McDonald and Julianne Versnel at the 2011 Gun Rights Policy Conference in Chicago, Illinois.

Versnel stressed that any new global gun control initiatives must “do nothing to disarm women who legitimately and rightfully want to defend themselves.”

While international gun prohibitionists have been pushing a civilian disarmament agenda, Versnel’s warnings may open up a new and politically uncomfortable arena. It is impossible to dismiss female victims of violence as “male American gun nuts.”

“The drive for human rights is a force throughout the world,” Versnel stated, “and especially here at the U.N. A woman’s right to be free from violence is a fundamental human right. That fundamental right is to defend one’s self. The report of this conference should state that without reservation.”

The Second Amendment Foundation (www.saf.org) is the nation’s oldest and largest tax-exempt education, research, publishing and legal action group focusing on the Constitutional right and heritage to privately own and possess firearms. Founded in 1974, The Foundation has grown to more than 650,000 members and supporters and conducts many programs designed to better inform the public about the consequences of gun control. In addition to the landmark McDonald v. Chicago Supreme Court Case, SAF has previously funded successful firearms-related suits against the cities of Los Angeles; New Haven, CT; New Orleans; Chicago and San Francisco on behalf of American gun owners, a lawsuit against the cities suing gun makers and numerous amicus briefs holding the Second Amendment as an individual right.

UN Arms Trade Treaty: A threat to the 2nd amendment?

Monday, August 27th, 2012

Original Story Via:  Chron.com

Negotiations at a United Nations conference over a proposed Arms Trade Treaty, which would regulate conventional arms sales across borders, ended in July without a report. The talks will likely resume, however, and many are concerned about the treaty’s implications for the Second Amendment. The concern is justified, given the treaty’s goal is weapons control. Its terms are vague and could be used to launch efforts to attack the constitutional right to bear arms.

Foreign treaties are signed by the president and ratification is approved or rejected by the U.S. Senate, thereby bypassing the House of Representatives. The current administration has stated on more than one occasion it believes Congress is an impediment to its policies; thus, attempting gun control by foreign treaty may be considered the path of least resistance, particularly if the treaty specifics do not come to light prior to approval. Once passed, vague treaty terms could be more restrictively defined.

How did we get here? The United Nations process started in 2001. In 2006, the U.N. General Assembly requested opinions on an arms treaty, and the results were published in a 2007 report by the Secretary-General. This was followed by a 2008 report and the establishment of an open-ended working group. In 2009 the General Assembly resolved to convene a conference on the Arms Trade Treaty in 2012 “to elaborate a legally binding instrument on the highest possible common international standards for the transfer of conventional arms.”

The initial U.N. conference on the treaty was held July 2-27, 2012. A Review Conference will be held Aug. 27 to Sept. 7, 2012. The supporting resolutions and documents for these conferences reference a “Programme of Action,” but not the points of action themselves. Thus, the original document is critical, and by referencing only the “Programme of Action” the full implications of the treaty language have not been central to the public debate.

The initial goals of the “Programme of Action” were set out in 2001, and subsequent meetings have been held to propose measures to be taken to trace, monitor and control small arms (see page 7 of the hyperlinked document, which is also page 13 of 29 in the pdf file). Among other things, the Programme of Action resolves to “prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects” by “strengthening or developing agreed norms and measures at the global, national and regional levels … placing particular emphasis on the regions of the world where conflicts come to an end and where serious problems with the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons have to be dealt with urgently.”

Potential concerns about the process and the language might include:

  1. References to “regions of the world … [with] serious problems with the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms” and the focus on “porous borders” in more recent U.N. documents, lead many to the conclusion the U.S.-Mexico border is a focus of the treaty. Mexico is part of the leadership of the treaty conference.
  2. The treaty resolution is to control the “illicit” trade. That leaves “illicit” open for interpretation, and it is not clear what party or parties will set the interpretation. If the U.N. passed a resolution that the manufacture or ownership of any type of gun (or ammunition) was illegal, then all small weapons could be “illicit.”
  3. If gun (or ammunition) ownership is illicit, the treaty could conceivably justify an international effort to put in place “adequate laws” in the United States as deemed acceptable to the U.N.
  4. If gun ownership was illicit, the treaty would require criminal penalties.
  5. Similar issues arise with the interpretation of “stockpiling.” Could the term be defined as a single weapon? More than three bullets?
  6. The treaty encourages moratoria on weapons.
  7. Treaty implementation encourages the use of regulations and administrative procedures to accomplish the goal, again bypassing the full Congress.

Experience has taught that an idea or policy can be approved or passed, only to have the idea and concept redefined to implement an entirely different outcome that never would have passed the vote in the first place. This U.N. treaty raises the concern that the U.S. may sign away its sovereignty on the gun ownership issue.

One might wonder what this Arms Trade Treaty would look like when implemented. The answer hinges on the interpretation of specific terms mentioned above, such as “illicit” and “stockpiling,” as well as “adequate laws, regulations and procedures,” “legal” and  “destabilizing accumulation.” For one possible outcome, one needs to look no farther than Venezuela. On June 1, 2012, a new Venezuelan gun control law promoted by the administration of President Hugo Chavez went into effect that makes the sale and manufacture of weapons and ammunition illegal and requires all weapons to be registered. Only the military, police and security personnel are permitted to purchase a firearm or ammunition. It is interesting to note that Venezuela’s close ally, Iran, is on the leadership committee for the Arms Trade Treaty.

With mistrust surrounding the recent Fast and Furious scandal, the federal government’s efforts to provide U.S. citizen gun information to foreign governments through eTrace, and a belief Obama administration officials would like to see greater gun control, it is no wonder there is serious concern about the U.N. Arms Control Treaty. The treaty appears to be yet another tactic “under the radar” aimed at the Second Amendment.

As early as last summer, 13 U.S. Senators sent a letter to the president reflecting this concern. On July 26, 2012, a bipartisan group of 51 U. S. Senators sent another letter to President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton threatening to oppose the treaty if it did not protect America’s constitutional right to bear arms. When the Arms Trade Treaty conference group announced on July 27, 2012, that it had failed to come to an agreement, it cited the changing U.S. position the day before as issue. One could therefore assume the Arms Trade Treaty was a U.S.-led effort that could neither stand without the current administration’s participation, nor without language that might infringe on the American right to bear arms.

Have efforts for gun control slowed?  No. As a separate move toward gun regulation, a Senate amendment was submitted on July 25, 2012, the day before 51 Senators sent a letter to Obama regarding the Arms Trade Treaty. The amendment was submitted for attachment to the Cyber Security Act (S.B. 3414) and would make it illegal to transfer or possess large capacity feeding devices such as gun magazines, belts, feed stripes and drums of more than 10 rounds of ammunition with the exception of .22 caliber rim fire ammunition. As reported in the Congressional Record for July 25, 2012, the amendment has been tabled for the time being.

What will likely happen in current months? A variety of tactics may be at work. U.N. committee members are discussing efforts to bring the proposed report and treaty before the U.N. General Assembly in September.  Mexican representatives have been quoted as saying there will certainly be a treaty in 2012. Western diplomats believe the negotiations will be revived after the election. The State Department has stated the U.S. would support a second round of negotiations next year. Then there may also be continued efforts to attach amendments to legislation that otherwise is deemed vital to the nation.

Joan Neuhaus Schaan is the fellow in homeland security and terrorism at the Baker Institute, and the coordinator of the Texas Security Forum, and serves on the advisory board of the Transborder International Police Association. She has served as the executive director of the Houston-Harris County Regional Homeland Security Advisory Council and on the board of Crime Stoppers of Houston, Inc.

Global gun control treaty may return in the fall at UN

Friday, August 24th, 2012

Original Story Via:  TheGunMag.com

by Dave Workman

Senior Editor

Following a stunning last-minute derailment of the United Nations’ highly-touted international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) negotiations, global gun control proponents are expected to bring the issue back again in the fall.

That was the forecast from Julianne Versnel with the Second Amendment Foundation and International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (IAPCAR). She was at the UN when the ATT meltdown occurred, as was Alan Gottlieb, chairman of the Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms. Both were instrumental in creating IAPCAR, which now has member organizations all over the globe.

The treaty talks essentially imploded in the final 24 hours when ATT proponents did not produce a final draft of their proposed treaty until late in the afternoon of the day prior to a scheduled vote. Another problem was that the document was printed only in English, leaving many delegates from non-English speaking nations in the lurch because they had no document to study.

The US delegation and other delegations simply did not have enough time to study the proposal, and there were problems with it even if they had.

The final draft came barely 48 hours after an initial document was circulated that met with tepid reactions from several delegations including North Korea and Iran. In a press release, Gottlieb called the proposed treaty, “a blatant attempt to negate the recent Second Amendment court victories we’ve had in the United States, and to get around Second Amendment protections.” A coalition of global gun control organizations has been pushing for the most extreme language and tenets in the proposed treaty, and now they are apparently back at the drawing board trying to come up with language that will be acceptable. That group includes International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), Oxfam International and Control Arms. The latter group was apparently responsible for a handout depicting their vision of the treaty provisions highlighted in Olympics-style rings, timed with the opening of the summer games in London.

Two of those items were “Arms and Bullets” and “Global Standards Over National Views.” The former alluded to privately owned firearms, and the latter was a veiled but direct threat to the Second Amendment, Gottlieb said.

Various gun rights organizations, including CCRKBA and the National Rifle Association, had been lobbying against this treaty for weeks. If the Obama administration signs it, the document must still be ratified by the US Senate, and after intense lobbying by the National Rifle Association, that doesn’t seem likely.

Now, with the national elections looming, President Barack Obama may be painting himself into an ever-tightening corner with American gun owners, if the treaty comes up again in October as anticipated.

Governments not people craft UN Arms Trade Treaty

Wednesday, August 8th, 2012

Original Story Via:  TheGunMag.com

By Joseph P. Tartaro

Executive Editor

Perhaps the United Nations should have a motto that reflects its focus on “government stability” and the balance of power between the people of the world and their respective governments.

I’d suggest the UN consider clearly stating, “The most despicable government we’ve ever known was pretty good.” If you need evidence beyond the fact that the lambs have been feeding at the same trough as the crocodiles all of these years, just look what the UN did as the much anticipated and dreaded conference on a binding Arms Trade Treat (ATT) began in July.

With the shadow of Syrian repression cast across most news media in the world and clouding the ATT talks, the UN turned to Iran to help negotiate a global arms treaty in a move that is drawing scorn and ridicule around the globe. But apparently not among the striped-pants diplomats meeting in New York City.

The appointment was made by members of the UN Conference on the ATT shortly after the month-long conference began in July. The committee to which Iran was appointed is tasked with coming up with a treaty regulating the international trade of conventional small arms and, proponents hope, ammunition.

“Right after a UN Security Council report found Iran guilty of illegally transferring guns and bombs to Syria, which is now murdering thousands of its own people, it defies logic, morality, and common sense for the UN to now elect this same regime to a global post in the regulation of arms transfers,” said Hillel Neuer, executive director of UN Watch, a non-governmental monitoring group based in Geneva.

“This is like choosing Bernie Madoff to police fraud on the stock market.

And the UN’s scandalous choice of Iran is exactly why we fear that Syria’s declared bid for a UN Human Rights Council seat is not impossible.” The 15-nation committee is led by Argentina, which serves as president, and includes the US, Iran, China, and Russia as nations that serve as vice presidents.

UN Watch called on UN Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon to condemn the decision to name Iran to the committee.

“He should remind the conference that the Security Council has imposed four rounds of sanctions on Iran for refusing to halt its prohibited nuclear program, and that Iran continues to defy the international community through illegal arms shipments to the murderous Assad regime,” Neuer said.

US officials played down the significance of the appointment.

“Obviously we oppose (Iran’s appointment), but it’s a symbolic position with little impact on a month-long negotiation that must be decided by consensus,” one senior State Department official told Fox News.

“It will ultimately face the approval of the United States regardless of which country holds one of 14 powerless vice president positions. At that point, we will be looking for an arms trade treaty that makes the legitimate global weapons trade safer by bringing the rest of the world’s arms trade regulations up to the high US standard.” However, two weeks into the deliberations on the ATT, there seems to be a wide divergence of position by different governments. There is no guarantee the negotiations now in progress will produce a treaty, let alone a good one. In February, preparatory talks on the ground rules for this month’s talks nearly collapsed due to procedural wrangling and other disagreements.

In the end, the US and other countries succeeded in ensuring the treaty must be approved unanimously, so any one country can effectively veto a deal.

In spite of Iran and Syria, there are still deep divisions on key issues to be tackled in the treaty negotiations, such as whether human rights should be a mandatory criterion for determining whether governments should permit weapons exports to specific countries.

China wants to exempt small arms, while several Middle East states oppose making compliance with human rights norms a mandatory criterion for allowing arms deliveries. Meanwhile, Canada wants to exclude civilian small arms and ammunition altogether.

Britain has joined France, Germany and Sweden in calling for a solid, effective and legally binding treaty.

According to Peter Brookes of the Heritage Foundation, a treaty would damage US foreign policy and prevent it helping friends such as Taiwan. But he noted the treaty was not yet a done deal.

“Diplomats will natter away about it all month over cappuccinos in Turtle Bay,” he wrote. “But the White House isn’t doing the country any favors by playing footsie with a UN effort to take aim at our liberties and disarm our foreign policy.” Meanwhile, many organizations opposed to the treaty have been allowed to speak at the UN, and more than 130 congressmen, led by Rep.

Mike Kelly (R-PA), signed a letter sent to President Barack Obama in early July expressing their opposition to a UN arms trade treaty if it violates US gun owner rights and sovereignty.

The letter includes specific demands— that the treaty leave out small arms and ammunition and recognize an individual’s right to self-defense.

The Obama administration has claimed that there are safeguards to their treaty approach, but the safeguard is insufficient for opponents of the US participation, not least because UN talks invariably involve compromise.

“The administration swears they have a whole bunch of red lines, and they will block consensus if anyone crosses them,” said a government relations consultant as senior associate with the Commonwealth Consulting Corporation.

“But the dynamics of international negotiations are that once you get 90% of what you seek, you say, ‘Maybe there is a way we can finesse the final 10%.’ ” A clause permitting arms transfers solely between UN member states would allow UN member China to object to US arms sales to Taiwan, a non-UN member that China considers to be a renegade province.

This would be highly problematic for the US at a time when Beijing is engaged in an unprecedented arms buildup.

Another fear is that Arab or other states critical of Israel may use any treaty language on human rights standards to argue against US arms transfers to the Israeli government—as they currently use the UN Human Rights Council to condemn Israel.

US gun lobby concern focus on the emphasis the treaty places on governmental— as opposed to individual— rights to guns, according to Wayne LaPierre, NRA executive vice president.

“They’re trying to impose a UN policy that gives guns to the governments— but the UN doesn’t in turn make moral judgments as to whether these governments are good or bad,” he said.

“If you’re the government, you get the guns, if you’re a civilian, you don’t.

This will just end up helping evil governments and tyrants.”

 

HARD COPY: UN Arms Trade Treaty Final Draft

Thursday, July 26th, 2012

UN Arms Trade Treaty Final Text

 

The draft of the Arms Trade Treaty

 

 

Submitted by the President of the Conference

 

 

Preamble

 

The States Parties to this Treaty,

 

Guided by the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

 

Recalling that the Charter of the United Nations promotes the establishment and maintenance of international

peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources;

 

Underlining the need to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade of conventional arms and to prevent their diversion to the illicit market and for unauthorized end use;

 

Recognizing the legitimate political, security, economic and commercial rights and interests of States in the international trade of conventional arms;

 

Reaffirming the sovereign right and responsibility of any State to regulate and control transfers of conventional arms that take place exclusively within its territory, pursuant to its own legal or constitutional systems;

 

Recognizing that development, human rights and peace and security, which are three pillars of the United

Nations, are interlinked and mutually reinforcing;

 

Recalling the United Nations Disarmament Commission guidelines on international arms transfers adopted by the

General Assembly;

 

Noting the contribution made by the 2001 UN Programme of Action to preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, as well as the 2001 Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in Firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime;

 

Recognizing the security, social, economic and humanitarian consequences of the illicit trade in and unregulated trade of conventional arms;

 

Recognizing also the challenges faced by victims of armed conflict and their need for adequate care, rehabilitation and social and economic inclusion;

 

Bearing in mind that women and children are particularly affected in situations of conflict and armed violence;

 

Emphasizing that nothing in this Treaty prevents States from exercising their right to adopt additional and more rigorous measures consistent with the purpose of this Treaty;

 

Taking note of the legitimate trade and use of certain conventional arms, inter alia, for recreational, cultural, historical, and sporting activities and lawful ownership where such ownership and use are permitted and protected by law;

 

Recognizing the active role that non-governmental organizations and civil society can play in furthering the object and purpose of this Treaty; and

 

Acknowledging that regulation of the international trade in conventional arms should not hamper international cooperation and legitimate trade in materiel, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.

 

Principles

 

Guided by the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, States Parties, in promoting the object and purpose of this Treaty and implementing its provisions, shall act in accordance with the following principles:

 

1.  The inherent right of all States to individual or collective self-defence;

 

2.  The settlement of international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

 

3.  To refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the Un ited Nations;

 

4.  Non-intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State;

 

5.  The duty to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law and to respect and ensure human rights;

 

6.  The responsibility of all States, in accordance with their respective international obligations, to effectively regulate and control international transfers of conventional arms, as well as the primary responsibility of all States in establishing and implementing their respective nation al export control systems;

 

7.  States Parties should respect the legitimate interests of States to acquire conventional weapons for legitimate self-defence and peacekeeping operations and to produce, export, import and transfer conventional arms; and

 

8.  The necessity to implement this Treaty consistently and effectively and in a universal, objective and non – discriminatory manner.

 

Have agreed as follows:

 

Article 1

Goals and Objectives

 

The goals and objectives of the Treaty are:

 

a.    For States Parties to establish the highest possible common standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms; and

 

b.    To prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and their diversion to the illicit market or for unauthorized end use;

 

in order to:

 

c.     contribute to international and regional peace, security and stability;

 

 

d.    Prevent the international trade in conventional arms from contributing to human suffering; and

 

e.     Promote cooperation, transparency and responsibility of States Parties in the trade in conventional arms, thus building confidence among States Parties.

 

 

Article 2

Scope

 

A.   Covered Items

 

1.     This Treaty shall apply to all conventional arms within the following categories at a minimum:

 

a.    Battle Tanks;

b.   Armoured combat vehicles;

c.     Large-calibre Artillery systems;

d.   Combat aircraft;

e.     Attack helicopters;

f.     Warships;

g.   Missiles and missile launchers; and h.   Small Arms and Light Weapons

 

2.    Each State Party shall establish or update, as appropriate, and maintain a national control list that shall include the items that fall within paragraph 1 of this article, as defined on a national basis and, at a minimum, based on relevant United Nations instruments. Each State Party shall publish its control list to the extent permitted by national law.

 

B.         Covered Activities

 

3.    This Treaty shall apply to those activities of the international trade in conventional arms set out in articles 5, 6, 7,

8 and 9, hereafter referred to as “transfer,” for the conventional arms covered under the scope of this Treaty.

 

4.    This Treaty shall not apply to the international movement of conventional arms by a State Party or its agents for its armed forces or law enforcement authorities operating outside its national territories, provided the conventional arms remain under the State Party’s ownership.

 

Article 3

Prohibited Transfers

 

 

1.    A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms if the transfer would violate its obligations under measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular arms embargoes.

 

2.     A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms within the scope of this Treaty if the transfer would violate its relevant international obligations, under international agreements to which it is a Party, in particular those relating to the  international transfer of, or illicit trafficking in, conventional arms.

 

 

3.     A State Party shall not authorize a transfer of conventional arms within the scope of this Treaty for the purpose of facilitating the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes constituting grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, or serious violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

 

Article 4

National Assessment

 

1.    In considering whether to authorize an export of conventional arms within the scope of this Treaty, each State Party shall assess whether the proposed export would contribute to or undermine peace and security.

 

2.    Prior to authorization and pursuant to its national control system, the State Party shall assess whether the proposed export of conventional arms could:

 

a.    be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law;

 

b.   be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international human rights law; or

 

c.     be used to commit or facilitate an act constituting an offense under international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism to which the transferring State is a Party.

 

3.    In making the assessment, the exporting State Party shall apply the criteria set out in paragraph 2 of this article consistently, and in an objective and non-discriminatory manner, taking into account relevant factors, including information provided by the importing State.

 

4.    In assessing the criteria set out in paragraph 2 of this article, the exporting State Party may also take into consideration the establishment of risk mitigation measures, including confidence-building measures and jointly developed programmes by the exporting and importing States.

 

5.                       If, after conducting the assessment called for in paragraph 1 and 2 of this article, and after considering the mitigation measures provided for in paragraph 4 of this article, the State Party finds that there is an overriding risk of any of the consequences under paragraph 2 of this article, the State Party shall not authorize the export.

 

6.                       Each State Party, when considering a proposed export of conventional arms under the scope of this Treaty, shall consider taking feasible measures, including joint actions with other States involved in the transfer, to avoid the arms:

 

a.    being diverted to the illicit market or for unauthorized end use;

 

b.       being used to commit or facilitate gender-based violence or violence against children;

 

c.       being used for transnational organized crime;

 

d.       becoming subject to corrupt practices; or

 

e.       adversely impacting the development of the importing State.

 

Article 5

General Implementation

 

1.    Each State Party shall implement this Treaty in a consistent, objective and non -discriminatory manner, in accordance with the goals and objectives of this Treaty.

 

2.    The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken with regard to other instruments. This Treaty shall not be cited as grounds for voiding contractual obligations under defence cooperation agreements concluded by States Parties to this Treaty.

 

3.    Each State Party shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures necessary to implement the provisions of this Treaty and shall designate competent national authorities in order to have an effective and transparent national control system regulating the international transfer of conventional arms.

 

4.    Each State Party shall designate one or more national points of contact to exchange information on matters

related to the implementation of this Treaty. A State Party shall notify the secretariat, established under article 12, of its national point(s) of contact and keep the information updated.

 

5.    States Parties involved in an international transfer of conventional arms shall, in a manner consistent with this

Treaty, take appropriate measures to prevent diversion to the illicit market or for unauthorized end use.

 

6.    If a diversion is detected, the State or States Parties that made the detection may notify the State or States Parties that could be affected by such diversion, to the extent permitted in their national laws, in particular those States Parties that are involved in the transfer or may be affected, without delay.

 

Article 6

Export

 

1.    Each exporting State Party shall conduct national assessments, as detailed in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of article

4 and taking into account the considerations as detailed in paragraph 6 of article 4, whether to authorize the export of conventional arms under the scope of this Treaty under its jurisdiction. Each State Party shall apply articles 3 and 4, taking into account all relevant information.

 

2.    Each State Party shall take measures to ensure all authorizations for the export of conventional arms under the scope of this Treaty are detailed and issued prior to the export. Appropriate information about the export in question shall, upon request, be made available to the importing, transit and transshipment State Parties, in accordance with national laws.

 

3.    If, after an authorization has been granted, a State Party becomes aware of new relevant information that causes it to reassess that there is an overriding risk of any of the consequences of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of article 4, the State Party may suspend or revoke the authorization.

 

4.    Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export of ammunition for conventional arms under the scope of this Treaty, and shall apply article 3, and paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 o f article 4 prior to authorizing any export of ammunition.

 

5.    Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export of parts and components, to the extent necessary, for the conventional arms under the scope of this Treaty, and apply article 3 and paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of article 4 prior to authorizing any export of those parts and components.

 

 

Article 7

Import

 

1.    Each importing State Party shall take measures to ensure that appropriate and relevant information is provided, upon request, in accordance with its national laws, to the exporting State Party to assist the exporting State Party in its national assessment.

 

2.    Each importing State Party shall put in place adequate measures that will allow them to regulate, where necessary, imports of conventional arms under the scope of this Treaty. Each importing State Party shall also adopt appropriate measures to prevent the diversion of imported conventional arms under the scope of this Treaty to the illicit market or for unauthorized end use.

 

3.    Each importing State Party may request information from the exporting State Party concerning any pending authorizations where the importing State Party is the country of final destination.

 

Article 8

Brokering

 

Each State Party shall take the appropriate measures, within its national laws, to regulate brokering taking place under its jurisdiction for conventional arms under the scope of this Treaty. Such controls may require brokers to register or obtain written authorization before engaging in brokering transactions.

 

Article 9

Transit and Transshipment

 

1.    Each State Party shall adopt appropriate legislative, administrative or other measures to regulate, where necessary and feasible, conventional arms covered by this Treaty that transit or transship through its territory.

 

2.    Importing and exporting States Parties shall cooperate and exchange information, where feasible and upon request, to transit and transshipment States Parties, in order to mitigate the risk of diversion.

 

Article 10

Reporting and Record-Keeping

 

1.    Each State Party shall maintain national records, in accordance with its national laws and regulations, of the export authorizations or actual exports of the conventional arms under the scope of this Treaty and, where feasible, details of those conventional arms transferred to their territory as the final destination or that are authorized to transit or transship territory under its jurisdiction.

 

2.    Such records may contain, inter alia, quantity, value, model/type, authorized international transfers of conventional arms under the scope of this Treaty, conventional arms actually transferred, details of exporting State(s), importing State(s), transit and transshipment State(s) and end users, as appropriate. Records shall be kept for a minimum of ten years, or longer if required by other international obligations applicable to the State Party.

 

3.    Each State Party may report to the secretariat, when appropriate, any actions taken to address the diversion of conventional arms to the illicit market or for unauthorized end use.

 

 

4.    Each State Party shall, within the first year after entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party, provide an initial report to the secretariat of relevant activities undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, including national laws, regulations and administrative measures. States Parties shall report on

any new activities undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, when appropriate. Reports shall be made available and distributed to States Parties by the secretariat.

 

5.    Each State Party shall submit annually to the secretariat by 1 July a report for the preceding calendar year concerning the authorization or actual transfer of conventional arms under the scope of this Treaty. Reports shall be made available and distributed to States Parties by the secretariat. The report submitted to the secretariat may contain the same information submitted by the State Party to relevant United Nations frameworks, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Reports may exclude commercially sensitive or national security information

 

 

Article 11

Enforcement

 

Each State Party shall adopt appropriate national measures and policies as may be necessary to enforce national laws and regulations and implement the provisions of this Treaty.

 

Article 12

Secretariat

 

1.    This Treaty hereby establishes a secretariat to assist States Parties in the effective implementation of this Treaty.

 

2.    The secretariat shall be adequately staffed. Staff shall have the necessary expertise to ensure the secretariat can effectively undertake the responsibilities described in paragraph 3 of this article.

 

3.    The secretariat shall be responsible to States Parties. Within a minimized structure, the secretariat shall undertake the following responsibilities:

 

a.    Receive, make available and distribute the reports as mandated in this Treaty;

 

b.    Maintain and distribute regularly to States Parties the list of national points of contact;

 

c.     Facilitate the matching of offers of and requests for assistance for Treat y implementation and promote international cooperation as requested;

 

d.    Facilitate the work of the Conference of States Parties, including making arrangements and providing the necessary services for meetings under this Treaty; and

 

e.     Perform other duties as mandated by this Treaty.

 

 

Article 13

International Cooperation

 

1.    States Parties shall cooperate, as appropriate, to enhance the implementation of this Treaty, consistent with their respective security interests and national laws.

 

2.    Each State Party is encouraged to facilitate international cooperation, including the exchange of information on matters of mutual interest regarding the implementation and application of this Treaty in accordance with its respective security interests and national legal system.

 

3.    Each State Party is encouraged to consult on matters of mutual interest and to share information, as appropriate, to support the implementation of this Treaty.

 

4.    Each State Party may cooperate, as appropriate, in order to enforce the provisions of this Treat y, including sharing information regarding illicit activities and actors to assist national enforcement and to counter, prevent and combat diversion to the illicit market or for unauthorized end use, in accordance with national laws. States Parties may also exchange experience and information on lessons learned in relation to any aspect of this Treaty, to assist national implementation.

 

Article 14

International Assistance

 

1.    In implementing this Treaty, each State Party may seek, inter alia, legal or legislative assistance, institutional capacity building, and technical, material or financial assistance. Each State Party in a position to do so shall, upon request, provide such assistance.

 

2.    Each State Party may request, offer or receive assistance, inter alia, through the United Nations, international, regional, subregional or national organizations, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

 

3.    States Parties may also contribute resources to a voluntary trust fund to assist requesting States Par ties requiring such assistance to implement the Treaty. The voluntary trust fund shall be administered by the secretariat under the supervision of States Parties.

 

 

Article 15

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession

 

1.    This Treaty shall be open for signature at the United Nations Headquarters in New York by all States and shall remain open for signature until its entry into force.

 

2.    This Treaty is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by each signatory State.

 

3.    This Treaty shall be open for accession by any State that has not signed the Treaty.

 

4.    The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the depositary.

 

Article 16

Entry into Force

 

1.    This Treaty shall enter into force ninety days following the date of the deposit of the sixty-fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the depositary.

 

2.    For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, the Treaty shall enter into force for that State ninety days following the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

 

 

Article 17

Provisional application

 

Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally articles 3 and 4 of this Treaty pending its entry into force for that State.

 

Article 18

Duration and Withdrawal

 

1.    This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

 

2.    Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty.

It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the depositary, which shall notify all other States Parties. The instrument of withdrawal shall include an explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal. The

instrument of withdrawal shall take effect ninety days after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the depositary, unless the instrument of withdrawal specifies a later date.

 

3.    A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this Treaty while it was a party to the Treaty, including any financial obligations that may have accrued.

 

Article 19

Reservations

 

1.    Each State Party may formulate reservations, u nless the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of this Treaty.

 

2.    Reservations may be withdrawn at any time.

 

Article 20

Amendments

 

1.    At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, a State Party may propose an amendment to this

Treaty.

 

2.    An y proposed amendment shall be submitted in writing to the secretariat, which shall then circulate the proposal to all States Parties, not less than 180 days before the next meeting of the Conference of States Parties. The amendment shall be considered at the next Conference of States Parties if a majority of States Parties notify the secretariat that they support further consideration of the proposal, no later than

120 days after its circulation by the secretariat.

 

3.    An y amendment to this Treaty shallbe adopted by consensus of those States Parties present at the Conference of States Parties. The depositary shall communicate any adopted amendment to all States Parties.

 

4.    A proposed amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article shal l enter into force for all States Parties to the Treaty, upon deposit with the depositary of the instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties at the time of the adoption of the amendment. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

 

 

Article 21

Conference of States Parties

 

1.    A Conference of States Parties shall be convened no later than one year following the entry into force of this Treaty. The  Conference of  States  Parties shall  adopt  rules  of  procedure and  rules  governing its activities,  including  frequency  of  meetings  and  rules  concerning  payment  of  expenses  incurred  in carrying out those activities.

 

2.      The Conference of States Parties shall:

 

a.    Consider and adopt recommendations regarding the implementation and operation of this Treaty, in particular the promotion of its universality;

 

b.    Consider amendments to this Treaty;

 

c.     Consider and decide the tasks and budget of the secretariat;

 

 

d.    Consider the establishment of any subsidiary bodies as may be necessary to improve the functioning of the Treaty; and

 

e.     Perform any other function consistent with this Treaty.

 

3.  If circumstances merit, an exceptional meeting of States Parties may be convened if required and resources allow.

 

Article 22

Dispute Settlement

 

1. States Parties shall consult and cooperate to settle any dispute that may arise between them with regard to the interpretation or application of this Treaty.

 

2. States Parties shall settle any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of this

Treaty through negotiations, mediation, conciliation or other peaceful means of the Party’s mutual choice.

 

3. States Parties may pursue, by mutual consent, arbitration to settle any dispute between them, regarding issues concerning the implementation of this Treaty.

 

Article 23

Relations with States not party to this Treaty

 

States Parties shall apply articles 3 and 4 to all exports of conventional arms within the scope of this Treaty to

States not party to this Treaty.

 

Article 24

Relationship with other instruments

 

States Parties shall have the right to enter into agreements in relation to the international trade in conventional arms, provided that those agreements are compatible with their obligations und er this Treaty and do not undermine the object and purpose of this Treaty.

 

Article 25

Authentic Texts and Depositary

 

 

The original text of this Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

International gun banners pulling out all stops at UN

Thursday, July 26th, 2012

Original Story Via: TheGunMag.comUN Olympics Gun Control Flyer

By Dave Workman

Senior Editor

The gloves have come off at the United Nations as negotiations over the proposed global Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) are moving toward a climax, and two leading gun rights advocates on the scene are convinced treaty proponents want to include small arms and ammunition in the document, and slip around the Second Amendment.

Alan Gottlieb, founder and executive vice president of the Second Amendment Foundation, told TGM that, “Some movement in our direction is anticipated, but it will not be enough to make a difference. These would be minor modifications to placate us, but they will not be enough to address the concerns of American gun owners.”

“This is a blatant attempt to negate the recent Second Amendment court victories we’ve had in the United States, and to get around Second Amendment protections,” he asserted.

His wife, Julianne Versnel, said the ATT “is, in essence, an attempt by the rest of the world to impose their view of civilian firearms ownership on us, and negate the Second Amendment.”

They are at the UN representing the Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, the Second Amendment Foundation and the International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (IAPCAR). Both helped create IAPCAR, which now has member organizations around the world.

A coalition of global gun control organizations is pushing for the most extreme language and tenets in the treaty, which is supposed to be signed this week. That group includes International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) and Oxfam International and Control Arms. The latter group is apparently responsible for a handout depicting their vision of the treaty provisions highlighted in Olympics-style rings.

Ominously, two of those items are “Arms and Bullets” and “Global Standards Over National Views.” The former alludes to privately owned firearms, and the latter is a veiled but direct threat to the Second Amendment, Gottlieb said.

Various gun rights organizations have been lobbying against this treaty for weeks. If the Obama administration signs it, the document must still be ratified by the U.S. Senate, and after intense lobbying by the National Rifle Association, that doesn’t seem likely.

But with less than four months to go before the national elections, Barack Obama is painting himself into an ever-tightening corner with American gun owners. That represents a significant and influential voting bloc, and a global gun control treaty could easily push many undecided voters into the Romney camp.

NFA Warns of Problems With UN Arms Trade Treaty

Wednesday, July 25th, 2012

NFA Warns of problems with UN Arms Trade Treaty

25 July 2012

A near final draft and the closing days of the UN Arms Trade Treaty talks could spell trouble for Canadian interests.  There is tremendous pressure to conclude a deal by July 27 and if the latest draft is any indication, the deal will not be a good one for Canadians.

“The draft treaty still affects civilian ownership of firearms and could cause trouble for Canadians travelling with firearms,” according to Sheldon Clare, President of Canada’s National Firearms Association who was present for part of the talks. “Even more significantly though, are clauses which would establish an expensive and intrusive Implementation Support Unit, a body which would be engaged in keeping firearms trade records.  The ISU would be a likely conduit for providing money to unscrupulous regimes from UN coffers partially funded by Canadian taxpayers.  That is certainly not something that Canadians want or need.”

Clare continued, “One of the most potentially dangerous clauses is the proposed amending formula which under Article 20 introduces a two-thirds majority requirement to amend the ATT.  Such a clause is a direct threat to national sovereignty in that it removes the traditional need for consensus in UN decision making.  It could easily lead to despots and dictators making amendments that would be binding on Europe and North America.  When combined with Article 23 which would mean that even countries that don’t sign it are subject to it, we have a clear step towards a dangerous system of world governance that would harm the interests of Canada and individual Canadians.“

“In addition, there are aspects of the draft treaty that could prevent Canada from providing aid to its needy allies, especially if such aid conflicted with the aims of countries opposed to Canadian values.  The recent draft of the Arms Trade Treaty is bad for Canada and Canadians, and our government should not sign it,” stated Mr. Clare.  “While governments need to act against terrorism, perhaps better ways to deal with unrest would be to address the economic situations, political differences, and human rights issues that contribute to people agitating for change.”

“A global ATT would only be in the interests of those who would seek economic advantage by limiting market opportunity and of regimes who would use such a treaty to disarm their citizens in order to rule through fear.”

In addition to its participation at the UN with the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities, Canada’s National Firearms Association is a founding member of The International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (IAPCAR) which includes many national and international organizations promoting civilian ownership of firearms.  At over 62,000 members, Canada’s National Firearms Association is this country’s largest advocacy organization promoting the rights and freedoms of all responsible firearm owners and users.

For more information contact:

Blair Hagen, Executive VP Communications, 604-753-8682 Blair@nfa.ca

Sheldon Clare, President, 250-981-1841 Sheldon@nfa.ca

Canada’s NFA toll-free number – 1-877-818-0393

NFA Website: www.nfa.ca

The Arms Trade Treaty – Falling Apart?

Monday, July 23rd, 2012

Original Story Via:  AmmoLand.com

By Paul Gallant, Sherry Gallant, Alan Chwick, & Joanne D. Eisen

Manasquan, NJ –-(Ammoland.com)- With only a week left for treaty negotiations, one might surmise from the multitude of complaints of its proponents that the Treaty, as it is being drafted, is destined to fail because it is becoming too weak.

But no matter how “strong” its language, it will fail very simply because it’s a foolish idea, concocted with fantasies that cannot work.

Deepayan Basu Ray,of anti-gun group Oxfam, stated: “Under no circumstances should countries agree to a watered down Treaty that fails to control the arms trade and failsto reduce human suffering.”

And here we thought all along that the objective of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was to control the illegal arms trade, not to control the actions of tyrants (an impossible goal)!

Attempting to press home a sense of urgency, Anna MacDonald, Head of the Arms Control Campaign at (anti-gun) Oxfam, stated: “The negotiations are running at least a week behind schedule. The clock is ticking now and we need to see a greater sense of urgency from delegates, who must agree a strong treaty text [sic]. The world is watching, and people across the globe are demanding a treaty that will tighten up controls on the arms trade and close the loop holes that allow the illicit and irresponsible part of the trade to flourish. There is not a moment to lose.”

The arguments and complaints being bandied about by Treaty proponents are abundant.

For example,the July 19 issue of the Arms Trade Treaty Monitor states:

On Wednesday morning, the Chair of Main Committee I released a new draft text on the goals and objectives of the arms trade treaty (ATT). The most glaring change to the text was the removal of language stating that preventing violations of international humanitarian and human rights law is an objective of the treaty. Leaving this out will have serious repercussions for the negotiation of other sections of the treaty and for the treaty’s implementation. It is an abso­lute necessity that this be corrected [sic].

The revised language, written by the Chair of the Main Committee I, states that “The goals of the treaty are….in order to…. ensure that the international trade in conventional arms does not contribute or facilitate human suffering….” This is upsetting to the Treaty’s advocates because “Without an explicit reference to gender-based violence, international humanitarian law (IHL), and international human rights law (IHRL), the treaty is in substantial danger of failing to meet its original purpose.

The Treaty’s proponents further complain about language that is watered down:

Achieving the fundamental goals of the ATT also means the treaty will need strong, clear, and effective implementation mechanisms. Unfortunately, the draft text on implementation does not yet meet this requirement. It suggests notification of export authorizations to relevant transit and transshipment states would be voluntary when it should be mandatory. It indicates that contractual obligations to sell arms would supersede the ATT when clearly the ATT should take precedence. It suggests actions states “may” take on brokering, when such actions should be mandatory.In general, it is vague on binding language. If adopted as written, the implementation section would undermine the treaty’s objectives [emphasis ours].

There are practical reasons for these complaints. The Treaty’s proponents need to pressure those countries that expect to be on the receiving end of generous financial gifts, and which are expected to increase their capacity to comply with the Treaty’s obligations. They also need to keep their supporters eager for the next “iterations”(revisions) to come.

The only benefits to us of a weaker treaty is that it will take longer to implement —and longer to fail— giving us the time we need to ride out the destructive waves of futile and foolish attempts to control the actions of evil-doers, and to destroy legal civilian firearm ownership.

We certainly should not be depending on U.S. politicians to safeguard our right to self-protection, as they have not done so in the past. We cannot depend on our national firearm organizations, as they are only as strong as we make them. (With an estimated 70-80 milliongun-owners in the U.S., how many support the various national firearm organizations??)

We need time to prepare for a new century of attempts to break the strength of civilian sovereignty, and a rash of new weapon-control laws attempting to bring us into compliance with “global norms,” luring us with the hint of paradise on earth.

About the authors:
Dr. Paul Gallant and Dr. Joanne D. Eisen practice optometry and dentistry,respectively, on Long Island, NY, and have collaborated on firearm politics forthe past 20 years. They have also collaborated with David B. Kopel since 2000, and are Senior Fellows at the Independence Institute, where Kopel is Research Director. Most recently, Gallant and Eisen have also written with Alan J.Chwick. Sherry Gallant has been instrumental in the editing of virtually all ofthe authors’ writings, and is immensely knowledgeable in the area of firearm politics; she actively co-authored this article.

Almost all of the co-authored writings of Gallant, Eisen, Kopel and Chwick can be found at www.gallanteisen.incnf.org, which contains more detailed information about their biographies and writing, and contains hyperlinks to manyof their articles. Their recent series focusing on the Arms Trade Treaty can be found primarily at www.gwg.incnf.org

26 NEW CO-SPONSORS TO 2A PROTECTION ACT IS ‘GOOD NEWS,’ SAYS CCRKBA

Thursday, July 19th, 2012

Original Story Via:  TheGunMag.com

Twenty-six more members of Congress have signed on as co-sponsors to the Second Amendment Protection Act, the Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms announced today.

“This is good news,” said CCRKBA Chairman Alan M. Gottlieb. “With a vote looming on the proposed United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, this sends a clear message to the Obama administration that the president will face real trouble if he or Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signs any document that threatens our constitutionally-protected individual right to keep and bear arms.”

Sponsored by Illinois Republican Congressman Joe Walsh, H.R. 3594 was written with help from CCRKBA staff, Gottlieb noted.  It now has 60 co-sponsors, and has been referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. CCRKBA has been urging members and supporters to contact Congress and demand action on this bill.

“The U.N. is scheduled to vote on the proposed treaty next week,” Gottlieb said. “Right now they are pushing to include small arms and ammunition, and because the Devil is always in the details, when they finally hammer out a document that the Obama administration has already indicated it will sign, this could be extremely bad for American gun owners.

“Fortunately, Congressman Walsh had the foresight to understand this,” he continued, “so he introduced this legislation to protect Second Amendment sovereignty. We want the United Nations gun grabbers, and the Obama administration to understand that they are treading in perilous waters if they adopt a treaty that even remotely threatens the firearms freedoms of our citizens.

“We are coming down to the wire on this treaty,” Gottlieb stated. “Our constitutional rights far outweigh the administration’s desire to push its ‘citizen-of-the-world’ philosophy down the throats of American gun owners. We want to see action on the Second Amendment Protection Act, and with 26 new co-sponsors, we are one step closer to achieving that goal.”

With more than 650,000 members and supporters nationwide, the Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms is one of the nation’s premier gun rights organizations. As a non-profit organization, the Citizens Committee is dedicated to preserving firearms freedoms through active lobbying of elected officials and facilitating grass-roots organization of gun rights activists in local communities throughout the United States. The Citizens Committee can be reached by phone at (425) 454-4911, on the Internet at www.ccrkba.org or by email to InformationRequest@ccrkba.org

The U.N. Speaks: The Arms Trade Treaty Will Affect “Legally Owned Weapons”

Friday, June 22nd, 2012

Original Story VIA:  The Heritage Foundation

Ted R. Bromund, Ph.D.

Yesterday, the U.N. released its press kit for the July conference that will finalize the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The most interesting item in the kit is a lengthy paper by the U.N.’s Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) program titled “The Impact of Poorly Regulated Arms Transfers on the Work of the UN.”

This paper perpetuates the belief, on which much of the ATT is based, that the big problem the world faces is a lack of agreed standards on arms transfers. That’s wrong: The big problem the world faces in this regard is that many U.N. member states are dictatorships, supporters of terrorists, or simply incapable of controlling their own borders.

But the paper makes it clear that the job of the U.N.—as the U.N. itself sees it—is to make the case for a very broad treaty. As CASA puts it, “Advocacy efforts should be developed…through relevant reports and op-eds, messages, and statements at relevant meetings and to the press.” So watch out for U.S. taxpayer-funded funded U.N. propaganda in a newspaper near you.

But in spite of its desperate efforts to rebut Second Amendment concerns, the U.N. can’t stop stepping on its own shoelaces. After proclaiming that the ATT “does not aim to impede or interfere with the lawful ownership and use of weapons,” the CASA paper goes on to say that “United Nations agencies have come across many situations in which various types of conventional weapons have been…misused by lawful owners” and that the “arms trade must therefore be regulated in ways that would…minimize the risk of misuse of legally owned weapons.”

How, exactly, would the ATT do that if it doesn’t “impede” or “interfere” with lawful ownership? The U.N. would have a lot more credibility on the ATT if it didn’t imply so regularly that the problem is as much lawful ownership as it is the international arms trade.

Of course, CASA isn’t just concerned with lawful ownership; it’s also campaigning against “community attitudes” that “contribute to the powerful cultural conditioning that equates masculinity with owning and using a gun, and regards gun misuse by men as acceptable.”

All this just goes to show that the U.N. regards gun ownership—even under national constitutional protection and for lawful activities—as a cultural failure that it needs to redress and that it has no patience at all with the idea that self-defense is an inherent right.

And that is exactly why the concerns that Senator Jerry Moran (R–KS) expressed at Heritage on Tuesday are so important—and why his criteria to ensure that the ATT does not infringe on Second Amendment rights are so valuable.