Archive for March, 2013

Proposed arms treaty shows UN is its own worst enemy

Wednesday, March 27th, 2013

Original Article Via:  Dave Workman, Seattle Gun Rights Examiner

The final draft of the proposed United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is out, and it contains language that may be incendiary to gun rights activists in the United States, with references to maintaining “national control systems” for small arms and ammunition.

From the proposed treaty on Page 4: “Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export of ammunition/munitions fired, launched or delivered by the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), and shall apply the provisions of Article 6 and Article 7 prior to authorizing the export of such ammunition/munitions.”

Bellevue’s Alan Gottlieb, executive vice president of the Second Amendment Foundation, has been vocally critical of the ATT process and is concerned about “vagueness” in the current language. SAF’s Julianne Versnel was at the UN last week to testify about unintended consequences of international gun control measures.

From the proposed treaty on Page 5: “Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system, including a national control list, in order to implement the provisions of this Treaty.” Versnel suggested this may be one of the “core problems” of the proposed treaty, but it might take a determination from someone skilled in diplomatic speech to figure it out.

On Page 9 of the document, there is an entire section on record keeping that just might be enough to cause many people on Capitol Hill to follow the lead shown by Republican Senators Rand Paul, Mike Lee and Ted Cruz, discussed by this column that might prevent the U.S. from signing on.

Record keeping:

1. Each State Party shall maintain national records, pursuant to its national laws and regulations, of its issuance of export authorizations or its actual exports of the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

2. Each State Party is encouraged to maintain records of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) that are transferred to its territory as the final destination or that are authorized to transit or trans-ship territory under its jurisdiction.

3. Each State Party is encouraged to include in those records: the quantity, value, model/type, authorized international transfers of conventional arms covered under Article
2 (1), conventional arms actually transferred, details of exporting State(s), importing State(s), transit and trans-shipment State(s), and end users, as appropriate.

4. Records shall be kept for a minimum of ten years.

But does all of this treaty language really mean what a lot of people will think it means: The UN dictating some sort of national gun registry, at least on imported firearms? Because of the way this document is written, even if some UN spokesperson says “No,” there will be a legion of gun rights advocates who say “Yes,” and they will have compelling, if not convincing arguments.

The draft documents do include some caveats in the Preamble, including:

Reaffirming the sovereign right of any State to regulate and control conventional arms
exclusively within its territory, pursuant to its own legal or constitutional system,

Emphasizing that nothing in this Treaty prevents States from maintaining and adopting additional effective measures to further the object and purpose of this Treaty,

Mindful of the legitimate trade and lawful ownership, and use of certain conventional
arms for recreational, cultural, historical, and sporting activities, where such trade, ownership and use are permitted or protected by law…

But the Preamble is just that. It’s apparently not part of any binding language.

The authors of this document will be largely to blame for any misunderstanding, and they have opened themselves up to criticism that the language seems deliberately foggy and far too steeped in diplomatic semantics. That translates to being something less than “plain English.” Since the Obama administration has indicated a willingness to sign onto such a treaty, the Senate just might reject it out of hand, but before that happens, somebody will have to translate it for them.

UN Arms Trade Treaty Final Draft

Wednesday, March 27th, 2013

Document Via:

UN.org/Disarmament

http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/docs/ATT_text_%28As_adopted_by_the_GA%29-E.pdf

PRESIDENT’S NON PAPER, 27 MARCH 2013

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United Nations Final Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty

New York, 18-28 March 2013

Draft decision

Submitted by the President of the Final Conference

The Final United Nations Conference of the Arms Trade Treaty,

Adopts the Arms Trade Treaty, the text of which is annexed to the present decision.

Annex

The Arms Trade Treaty

Preamble

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations which seeks to promote the

establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for

armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,

Underlining the need to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms

and to prevent their diversion to the illicit market, or for unauthorized end use and end users,

including in the commission of terrorist acts,

Recognizing the legitimate political, security, economic and commercial interests of

States in the international trade in conventional arms,

Reaffirming the sovereign right of any State to regulate and control conventional arms

exclusively within its territory, pursuant to its own legal or constitutional system,

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Acknowledging that peace and security, development and human rights, are pillars of

the United Nations system and foundations for collective security and recognizing that

development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing,

Recalling the United Nations Disarmament Commission Guidelines for international

arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36H of 6 December 1991,

Noting the contribution made by the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent,

Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects,

as well as the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their

Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention

against Transnational Organized Crime, and the International Instrument to Enable States to

Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons,

Recognizing the security, social, economic and humanitarian consequences of the

illicit and unregulated trade in conventional arms,

Bearing in mind that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast

majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict and armed violence,

Recognizing also the challenges faced by victims of armed conflict and their need for

adequate care, rehabilitation and social and economic inclusion,

Emphasizing that nothing in this Treaty prevents States from maintaining and

adopting additional effective measures to further the object and purpose of this Treaty,

Mindful of the legitimate trade and lawful ownership, and use of certain conventional

arms for recreational, cultural, historical, and sporting activities, where such trade, ownership

and use are permitted or protected by law,

Mindful also of the role regional organizations can play in assisting States Parties,

upon request, in implementing this Treaty,

Recognizing the voluntary and active role that civil society, including nongovernmental

organizations, and industry, can play in raising awareness of the object and

purpose of this Treaty, and in supporting its implementation,

Acknowledging that regulation of the international trade in conventional arms and

preventing their diversion, should not hamper international cooperation and legitimate trade

in materiel, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing the desirability of achieving universal adherence to this Treaty,

Determined to act in accordance with the following principles;

Principles

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– The inherent right of all States to individual or collective self-defense as recognized

in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;

– The settlement of international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that

international peace and security and justice, are not endangered in accordance with Article 2

(3) of the Charter of the United Nations;

– Refraining in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the

territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent

with the purposes of the United Nations in accordance with Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the

United Nations;

– Non-intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of

any State in accordance with Article 2 (7) of the Charter of the United Nations;

– Respecting and ensuring respect for international humanitarian law in accordance

with, inter alia, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and respecting and ensuring respect for

human rights, in accordance with, inter alia, the Charter of the United Nations and the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

– The responsibility of all States, in accordance with their respective international

obligations, to effectively regulate the international trade in conventional arms, and to

prevent their diversion, as well as the primary responsibility of all States in establishing and

implementing their respective national control systems;

– The respect for the legitimate interests of States to acquire conventional arms to

exercise their right to self-defense and for peacekeeping operations; and to produce, export,

import and transfer conventional arms;

– Implementing this Treaty in a consistent, objective and non-discriminatory manner,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Object and Purpose

The object of this Treaty is to:

– Establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or

improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms;

– Prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their

diversion;

for the purpose of:

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– Contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability;

– Reducing human suffering;

– Promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in

the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among

States Parties.

Article 2

Scope

1. This Treaty shall apply to all conventional arms within the following categories:

(a) Battle tanks;

(b) Armoured combat vehicles;

(c) Large-calibre artillery systems;

(d) Combat aircraft;

(e) Attack helicopters;

(f) Warships;

(g) Missiles and missile launchers; and

(h) Small arms and light weapons.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, the activities of the international trade comprise export,

import, transit, trans-shipment and brokering, hereafter referred to as “transfer”.

3. This Treaty shall not apply to the international movement of conventional arms by, or on

behalf of, a State Party for its use provided that the conventional arms remain under that

State Party’s ownership.

Article 3

Ammunition/Munitions

Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export

of ammunition/munitions fired, launched or delivered by the conventional arms covered

under Article 2 (1), and shall apply the provisions of Article 6 and Article 7 prior to

authorizing the export of such ammunition/munitions.

Article 4

Parts and Components

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Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export

of parts and components where the export is in a form that provides the capability to

assemble the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Each State Party shall apply the

provisions of Article 6 and Article 7 prior to authorizing the export of such parts and

components.

Article 5

General Implementation

1. Each State Party shall implement this Treaty in a consistent, objective and nondiscriminatory

manner, bearing in mind the principles referred to in this Treaty.

2. Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system, including a

national control list, in order to implement the provisions of this Treaty.

3. Each State Party is encouraged to apply the provisions of this Treaty to the broadest range

of conventional arms. National definitions of any of the categories covered in Article 2

(1) (a-g) shall not cover less than the descriptions used in the United Nations Register of

Conventional Arms at the time of entry into force of this Treaty. For the category covered

in Article 2 (1) (h), national definitions shall not cover less than the descriptions used in

relevant United Nations instruments at the time of entry into force of this Treaty.

4. Each State Party, pursuant to its national laws, shall provide its national control list to the

Secretariat, which shall make it available to other States Parties. States Parties are

encouraged to make their control lists publicly available.

5. Each State Party shall take measures necessary to implement the provisions of this Treaty

and shall designate competent national authorities in order to have an effective and

transparent national control system regulating the transfer of conventional arms covered

under Article 2 (1) and of items covered in Article 3 and Article 4.

6. Each State Party shall designate one or more national points of contact to exchange

information on matters related to the implementation of this Treaty. A State Party shall

notify the Secretariat, established under Article 18, of its national point(s) of contact and

keep the information updated.

Article 6

Prohibitions

1. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article

2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if the transfer would violate its

obligations under measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council acting under

Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular arms embargoes.

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2. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article

2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if the transfer would violate its

relevant international obligations under international agreements to which it is a Party, in

particular those relating to the transfer of, or illicit trafficking in, conventional arms.

3. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article

2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if it has knowledge at the time of

authorization that the arms or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes

against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed

against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes as defined by

international agreements to which it is a Party.

Article 7

Export and Export Assessment

1. If the export is not prohibited under Article 6, each exporting State Party, prior to

authorization of the export of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items

covered under Article 3 or Article 4, under its jurisdiction and pursuant to its national

control system, shall, in an objective and non-discriminatory manner, taking into account

relevant factors, including information provided by the importing State in accordance

with Article 8 (1), assess the potential that the conventional arms or items:

a) would contribute to or undermine peace and security;

b) could be used to:

i. commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law;

ii. commit or facilitate a serious violation of international human rights law;

iii. commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions

or protocols relating to terrorism to which the exporting State is a Party; or

iv. commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions

or protocols relating to transnational organized crime to which the exporting State

is a Party.

2. The exporting State Party shall also consider whether there are measures that could be

undertaken to mitigate risks identified in (a) or (b) in paragraph 1, such as confidencebuilding

measures or jointly developed and agreed programmes by the exporting and

importing States.

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3. If, after conducting this assessment and considering available mitigating measures, the

exporting State Party determines that there is an overriding risk of any of the negative

consequences in paragraph 1, the exporting State Party shall not authorize the export.

4. The exporting State Party, in making this assessment, shall take into account the risk of

the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of the items covered under Article 3

or Article 4, being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender based violence or

serious acts of violence against women and children.

5. Each exporting State Party shall take measures to ensure that all authorizations for the

export of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article

3 or Article 4, are detailed and issued prior to the export.

6. Each exporting State Party shall make available appropriate information about the

authorization in question, upon request, to the importing State Party and to the transit or

trans-shipment States Parties, subject to its national laws, practices or policies.

7. If, after an authorization has been granted, an exporting State Party becomes aware of

new relevant information, it is encouraged to reassess the authorization after

consultations, if appropriate, with the importing State.

Article 8

Import

1. Each importing State Party shall take measures to ensure that appropriate and relevant

information is provided, upon request, pursuant to its national laws, to the exporting State

Party, to assist the exporting State Party in conducting its national export assessment

under Article 7. Such measures may include end use or end user documentation.

2. Each importing State Party shall take measures that will allow it to regulate, where

necessary, imports under its jurisdiction of conventional arms covered under Article 2

(1). Such measures may include import systems.

3. Each importing State Party may request information from the exporting State Party

concerning any pending or actual export authorizations where the importing State Party is

the country of final destination.

Article 9

Transit or trans-shipment

Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to regulate, where necessary and feasible,

the transit or trans-shipment under its jurisdiction of conventional arms covered under Article

2 (1) through its territory in accordance with relevant international law.

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Article 10

Brokering

Each State Party shall take measures, pursuant to its national laws, to regulate brokering

taking place under its jurisdiction for conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Such

measures may include requiring brokers to register or obtain written authorization before

engaging in brokering.

Article 11

Diversion

1. Each State Party involved in the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1)

shall take measures to prevent their diversion.

2. The exporting State Party shall seek to prevent the diversion of the transfer of

conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) through its national control system,

established in accordance with Article 5 (2), by assessing the risk of diversion of the

export and considering the establishment of mitigation measures such as confidencebuilding

measures or jointly developed and agreed programmes by the exporting and

importing States. Other prevention measures may include, where appropriate: examining

parties involved in the export, requiring additional documentation, certificates,

assurances, not authorizing the export or other appropriate measures.

3. Importing, transit, trans-shipment and exporting States Parties shall cooperate and

exchange information, pursuant to their national laws, where appropriate and feasible, in

order to mitigate the risk of diversion of the transfer of conventional arms covered under

Article 2 (1).

4. If a State Party detects a diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article

2 (1), the State Party shall take appropriate measures, pursuant to its national laws and in

accordance with international law, to address such diversion. Such measures may include,

alerting potentially affected State Parties, examining diverted shipments of such

conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), and taking follow-up measures through

investigation and law enforcement.

5. In order to better comprehend and prevent the diversion of transferred conventional arms

covered under Article 2 (1), State Parties are encouraged to share relevant information

with one another on effective measures to address diversion. Such information may

include information on illicit activities including corruption, international trafficking

routes, illicit brokers, sources of illicit supply, methods of concealment, common points

of dispatch, or destinations used by organized groups engaged in diversion.

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6. States Parties are encouraged to report to other State Parties, through the Secretariat, on

measures taken in addressing the diversion of transferred conventional arms covered

under Article 2 (1).

Article 12

Record keeping

1. Each State Party shall maintain national records, pursuant to its national laws and

regulations, of its issuance of export authorizations or its actual exports of the

conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

2. Each State Party is encouraged to maintain records of conventional arms covered under

Article 2 (1) that are transferred to its territory as the final destination or that are

authorized to transit or trans-ship territory under its jurisdiction.

3. Each State Party is encouraged to include in those records: the quantity, value,

model/type, authorized international transfers of conventional arms covered under Article

2 (1), conventional arms actually transferred, details of exporting State(s), importing

State(s), transit and trans-shipment State(s), and end users, as appropriate.

4. Records shall be kept for a minimum of ten years.

Article 13

Reporting

1. Each State Party shall, within the first year after entry into force of this Treaty for that

State Party, in accordance with Article 22, provide an initial report to the Secretariat of

measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, including national laws, national

control lists and other regulations and administrative measures. Each State Party shall

report to the Secretariat on any new measures undertaken in order to implement this

Treaty, when appropriate. Reports shall be made available, and distributed to States

Parties by the Secretariat.

2. States Parties are encouraged to report to other States Parties, through the Secretariat,

information on measures taken that have been proven effective in addressing the

diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

3. Each State Party shall submit annually to the Secretariat by 31 May a report for the

preceding calendar year concerning authorized or actual exports and imports of

conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Reports shall be made available, and

distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat. The report submitted to the Secretariat

may contain the same information submitted by the State Party to relevant United Nations

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frameworks, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Reports may

exclude commercially sensitive or national security information.

Article 14

Enforcement

Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to enforce national laws and regulations that

implement the provisions of this Treaty.

Article 15

International Cooperation

1. States Parties shall cooperate with each other, consistent with their respective security

interests and national laws, to effectively implement this Treaty.

2. States Parties are encouraged to facilitate international cooperation, including exchanging

information on matters of mutual interest regarding the implementation and application of

this Treaty pursuant to their respective security interests and national laws.

3. States Parties are encouraged to consult on matters of mutual interest and to share

information, as appropriate, to support the implementation of this Treaty.

4. States Parties are encouraged to cooperate, pursuant to their national laws, in order to

assist national implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, including through sharing

information regarding illicit activities and actors and in order to prevent and eradicate

diversion of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

5. States Parties shall, where jointly agreed and consistent with their national laws, afford

one another the widest measure of assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial

proceedings in relation to violations of national measures established pursuant to this

Treaty.

6. States Parties are encouraged to take national measures and to cooperate with each other

to prevent the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) becoming subject

to corrupt practices.

7. States Parties are encouraged to exchange experience and information on lessons learned

in relation to any aspect of this Treaty.

Article 16

International Assistance

1. In implementing this Treaty, each State Party may seek assistance including legal or

legislative assistance, institutional capacity building, and technical, material or financial

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assistance. Such assistance may include stockpile management, disarmament,

demobilization and reintegration programmes, model legislation, and effective practices

for implementation. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide such assistance,

upon request.

2. Each State Party may request, offer or receive assistance through, inter alia, the United

Nations, international, regional, subregional or national organizations, non-governmental

organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

3. A voluntary trust fund shall be established by States Parties to assist requesting States

Parties requiring international assistance to implement this Treaty. Each State Party is

encouraged to contribute resources to the fund.

Article 17

Conference of States Parties

1. A Conference of States Parties shall be convened by the provisional Secretariat,

established under Article 18, no later than one year following the entry into force of this

Treaty and thereafter at such other times as may be decided by the Conference of States

Parties.

2. The Conference of States Parties shall adopt by consensus its rules of procedure at its first

session.

3. The Conference of States Parties shall adopt financial rules for itself as well as governing

the funding of any subsidiary bodies it may establish as well as financial provisions

governing the functioning of the Secretariat. At each ordinary session, it shall adopt a

budget for the financial period until the next ordinary session.

4. The Conference of States Parties shall:

(a) Review the implementation of this Treaty, including developments in the field of

conventional arms

(b) Consider and adopt recommendations regarding the implementation and operation of this

Treaty, in particular the promotion of its universality;

(c) Consider amendments to this Treaty in accordance with Article 20;

(d) Consider issues arising from the interpretation of this Treaty;

(e) Consider and decide the tasks and budget of the Secretariat;

(f) Consider the establishment of any subsidiary bodies as may be necessary to improve the

functioning of this Treaty; and

(g) Perform any other function consistent with this Treaty.

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5. Extraordinary meetings of the Conference of States Parties shall be held at such other

times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference of States Parties, or at the written

request of any State Party provided that this request is supported by at least two thirds of

the States Parties.

Article 18

Secretariat

1. This Treaty hereby establishes a Secretariat to assist States Parties in the effective

implementation of this Treaty. Pending the first meeting of the Conference of States

Parties, a provisional Secretariat will be responsible for the administrative functions

covered under this Treaty.

2. The Secretariat shall be adequately staffed. Staff shall have the necessary expertise to

ensure that the Secretariat can effectively undertake the responsibilities described in

paragraph 3.

3. The Secretariat shall be responsible to States Parties. Within a minimized structure, the

Secretariat shall undertake the following responsibilities:

(a) Receive, make available and distribute the reports as mandated by this

Treaty;

(b) Maintain and make available to States Parties the list of national points of

contact;

(c) Facilitate the matching of offers of and requests for assistance for Treaty

implementation and promote international cooperation as requested;

(d) Facilitate the work of the Conference of States Parties, including making

arrangements and providing the necessary services for meetings under this

Treaty; and

(e) Perform other duties as decided by the Conferences of States Parties.

Article 19

Dispute Settlement

1. States Parties shall consult and, by mutual consent, cooperate to pursue settlement of any

dispute that may arise between them with regard to the interpretation or application of

this Treaty including through negotiations, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement or

other peaceful means.

2. States Parties may pursue, by mutual consent, arbitration to settle any dispute between

them, regarding issues concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty.

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Article 20

Amendments

1. Six years after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose an

amendment to this Treaty. Thereafter, proposed amendments may only be considered by

the Conference of States Parties every three years.

2. Any proposal to amend this Treaty shall be submitted in writing to the Secretariat, which

shall circulate the proposal to all States Parties, not less than 180 days before the next

meeting of the Conference of States Parties at which amendments may be considered

pursuant to paragraph 1. The amendment shall be considered at the next Conference of

States Parties at which amendments may be considered pursuant to paragraph 1 if, no

later than 120 days after its circulation by the Secretariat, a majority of States Parties

notify the Secretariat that they support consideration of the proposal.

3. The States Parties shall make every effort to achieve consensus on each amendment. If

all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment

shall, as a last resort, be adopted by a three-quarters majority vote of the States Parties

present and voting at the meeting of the Conference of States Parties. For the purposes of

this Article, States Parties present and voting means States Parties present and casting an

affirmative or negative vote. The Depositary shall communicate any adopted amendment

to all States Parties.

4. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 shall enter into force for each

State Party that has deposited its instrument of acceptance for that amendment, ninety

days following the date of deposit with the Depositary of the instruments of acceptance

by a majority of the number of States Parties at the time of the adoption of the

amendment. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party ninety days

following the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance for that amendment.

Article 21

Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature at the United Nations Headquarters in New York

by all States from the Third Day of the Sixth Month of 2013 until its entry into force.

2. This Treaty is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by each signatory State.

3. Following its entry into force, this Treaty shall be open for accession by any State that

has not signed the Treaty.

4. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with

the Depositary.

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Article 22

Entry into Force

1. This Treaty shall enter into force ninety days following the date of the deposit of the

fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval with the Depositary.

2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or

accession subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, this Treaty shall enter into

force for that State ninety days following the date of deposit of its instrument of

ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 23

Provisional application

Any State may at the time of signature or the deposit of instrument of its ratification,

acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally Article 6 and

Article 7 pending its entry into force.

Article 24

Duration and Withdrawal

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw

from this Treaty. It shall give notification of such withdrawal to the Depositary, which

shall notify all other States Parties. The notification of withdrawal may include an

explanation of the reasons for its withdrawal. The notice of withdrawal shall take effect

ninety days after the receipt of the notification of withdrawal by the Depositary, unless

the notification of withdrawal specifies a later date.

3. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising

from this Treaty while it was a Party to this Treaty, including any financial obligations

that it may have accrued.

Article 25

Reservations

1. At the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, each State may

formulate reservations, unless the reservations are incompatible with the object and

purpose of this Treaty.

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2. A State Party may withdraw its reservation at any time by notification to this effect

addressed to the Depositary.

Article 26

Relationship with other international agreements

1. The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States

Parties with regard to existing or future international agreements, to which they are

parties, where those obligations are consistent with this Treaty.

2. This Treaty shall not be cited as grounds for voiding defense cooperation agreements

concluded between States Parties to this Treaty.

Article 27

Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Treaty.

Article 28

Authentic Texts

The original text of this Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and

Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the

United Nations.

DONE AT NEW YORK, this twenty-eighth day of March, two thousand and thirteen

http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/docs/Presidents_Non_Paper_of_27_March_2013_%28ATT_Final_Conference%29.pdf

 

US Senate Votes to Block UN Arms Trade Treaty

Tuesday, March 26th, 2013

Original Story Via:  PJ Media

by Howard Nemerov

During the Senate’s passing of their (congressional budget) Concurrent Resolution 8 on March 23, Oklahoma Senator James Inhofe successfully inserted Senate amendment 139 to “prevent the United States from entering into the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty.” (Text of bills can be retrieved from Library of Congress “Thomas” site.)

In a 53-49 vote, the Senate passed Inhofe’s amendment. The list of Yeas and Nays is what’s important going forward, and contains both good news and a warning.

Along with all 45 Republicans, 8 Democrat senators voted Yea:

  • Mark Begich, Alaska
  • Joe Donnelly, Indiana
  • Kay Hagan, North Carolina
  • Martin Heinrich, New Mexico
  • Heidi Heitkamp, North Dakota
  • Joe Manchin, West Virginia
  • Mark Pryor, Arkansas
  • Jon Tester, Montana

Full story:  http://pjmedia.com/tatler/2013/03/26/senate-votes-to-block-un-arms-trade-treaty/

Stacked Deck at UN ATT Talks

Thursday, March 21st, 2013

Via TheGunMag.com

By Philip L. Watson

The Second Amendment Foundation released a statement today highlighting testimony to the UN on the pending ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty.

Little reported was the fact pro self-defense advocates received 15 minutes to address the global body; however, the ‘Control Arms Coalition’ was allotted 35 minutes.

There is currently no explanation for this disparity listed on any of the UN websites.

Julianne Versnel represents three groups at the UN, the American Conservative Union (ACU), the Second Amendment Foundation (SAF), and the International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (IAPCAR). Her statements highlighted self-defense as a human right.

“The right of self-defense is particularly important to women,” Versnel stated. “As women, we have a right to protect our bodies and to protect ourselves against assault and rape. No one questions that violence against women is endemic.”

There are genuine concerns that any international gun control treaty would ultimately strip individual firearms rights from people all over the world.

“Most of the delegates here know that in the U.S. there is extensive firearms ownership,” Versnel testified. “What they do not know is that almost half of the handguns in the US are owned by women. They are used daily for self-defense. I fully endorse, as should every person in this room, the idea that women must have the means to defend themselves. Nothing that is in an Arms Trade Treaty should affect a woman’s right to defend herself.”

The UN ATT talks are scheduled to wrap up by the end of next week.

SAF and IAPCAR Defend Women’s Right of Self-Defense at UN

Thursday, March 21st, 2013

The Second Amendment Foundation today defended the right of women to defend themselves with firearms during testimony at the United Nations regarding the proposed Arms Trade Treaty.

Speaking for SAF was Julianne Versnel, who was also representing the American Conservative Union and the International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (IAPCAR). She told the world body that “the right to life must be given real meaning” and that “A right to life must include the fundamental right to defend that life.”

“The right of self-defense is particularly important to women,” Versnel stated. “As women, we have a right to protect our bodies and to protect ourselves against assault and rape. No one questions that violence against women is endemic.”

There are genuine concerns that any international gun control treaty would ultimately strip individual firearms rights from people all over the world.

“Most of the delegates here know that in the U.S. there is extensive firearms ownership,” Versnel testified. “What they do not know is that almost half of the handguns in the US are owned by women. They are used daily for self-defense. I fully endorse, as should every person in this room, the idea that women must have the means to defend themselves. Nothing that is in an Arms Trade Treaty should affect a woman’s right to defend herself.”

She reminded the panel that former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, a staunch supporter of the United Nations and the first U.S. ambassador to the organization, also carried a handgun for personal protection while working in the South on civil rights issues.

“Eleanor Roosevelt was known and revered for her beliefs in woman’s rights—including the right to defend oneself with a firearm if necessary,” Versnel stated. “Mrs. Roosevelt practiced what she preached. In 1958 Mrs. Roosevelt drove though the American South by herself. The Klu Klux Klan had put a $25,000 bounty on her head and the Secret Service told her not to go. She went anyway and on the seat of the car was her own .38 caliber revolver.

“We can learn from Mrs. Roosevelt,” she concluded. “No one supported the U.N. more than she did, but at the same time she insisted on her right, as a woman and as a person to have the means to defend herself.”

EDITORIAL: Gun control by the U.N.

Thursday, March 21st, 2013

Original article via:  The Washington Times

Bureaucrats from 150 nations are ramping up efforts to impose gun control through international pact. Here in the United States, the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty has become the vehicle to drive an agenda that is deeply controversial because once a treaty is ratified by the Senate, it becomes the supreme law of the land.

Last week, Secretary of State John F. Kerry — no friend of the Second Amendment — announced support for the treaty, which calls for international regulations on firearms, including personal firearms as well as military weapons. During the presidential campaign, President Obama was evasive about his position on the treaty. Now that he has fully “evolved” on the Second Amendment, he has the “flexibility” of not having to face voters again, and is pushing for the treaty.

There are plenty of reasons to be concerned about what’s being cooked up in Turtle Bay. Proponents say the treaty is only meant to crack down on illegal gun-smuggling, and the only people who ought to be concerned are military strongmen looking for a good deal on black-market rocket launchers. Of course, there’s more to the story. The exact wording of the agreement, and more importantly, how vague passages can be interpreted and twisted by the courts, will determine what the treaty actually means. It could, for example, force America to implement a national gun-registration scheme, ban importation of weapons and impose burdensome regulations on transfers.

The “Review Conference on Illicit Small Arms Trade” adopted a “consensus outcome document” that states in Article 2, Paragraph 4 that signatories to the treaty would “establish or update, as appropriate, and maintain a national control list that shall include the items that fall within paragraph A1 .” Paragraph A1 includes small personal firearms.

Under Article 6, Paragraph 3, signatories (including the United States) would be required to set up an “effective, transparent and predictable national control system regulating the transfer of conventional arms .” Once again, “conventional arms” would include civilian firearms protected by the Second Amendment.

Article 8, Paragraph 2 requires countries to “put in place adequate measures that will allow them, where necessary, to monitor and control imports of items covered by the scope of this Treaty.” This could prevent U.S. gun owners from buying foreign guns and parts. Other provisions of the document “underscored efforts in marking, record-keeping and cooperation in tracing small arms .” Tracing weapons is legalese for the creation of a gun registry.

The administration pretends that ratification of this deal would do nothing to undermine constitutional rights. “We will not support any treaty that would be inconsistent with U.S. law and the rights of American citizens under our Constitution,” says Mr. Kerry. The secretary forgets that we can read, too. The written provisions of the treaty and the administration’s domestic agenda on these issues make such reassurance hollow, indeed.

In the wake of the Newtown, Conn., school massacre, Mr. Obama unleashed his all-out effort to ban “assault weapons” — the most popular type of rifle sold in America today. The White House proposals, however, should be doomed in the Republican-dominated House of Representatives. Use of the treaty process is a way to bypass that uncooperative body and accomplish many of the same gun-control goals with only 67 Senate votes.

If proponents of the arms-trade treaty are honest about their intentions, they should have no problem amending the draft treaty to explicitly limit the agreement to large, military weapons and exclude all civilian firearms that fall under the protection of the Second Amendment. The National Rifle Association has offered language that would amend the treaty to eliminate any exploitable ambiguity. Unless such corrections are made, the Senate should stand strong against international deals to trash the constitutional rights of Americans.

The Washington Times

U.N. global gun control effort begins anew

Wednesday, March 20th, 2013

Via Dave Workman, Seattle Gun Rights Examiner

New talks about an old subject – international gun control – begin today at the United Nations in New York, and sure to be involved at some point is the Bellevue-based International Association for the Protection of Civilian Arms Rights (IAPCAR), founded with the cornerstone involvement of gun rights advocates Alan Gottlieb and Julianne Versnel.

IAPCAR Executive Director Phil Watson keeps an office at Gottlieb’s Liberty Park complex. Attorney Mark Barnes is IAPCAR’s managing director with an office in Washington, D.C.

In addition, the National Rifle Association is keenly interested in these talks. Indeed, U.S. gun rights organizations have every reason for alarm, in the wake of a statement published Friday by the Washington Post from Amnesty International’s Michelle A. Ringuette.

“The NRA claim that there is such a thing as ‘civilian weapons’ and that these can and need to be treated differently from military weapons under the Arms Trade Treaty is — to put it politely — the gun lobby’s creativity on full display,” Ringuette insisted, according to the newspaper. “There is no such distinction. To try to create one would create a loophole that would render the treaty inoperative, as anyone could claim that he or she was in the business of trading ‘civilian weapons.’ ”

This suggests that global gun banners equate rifles and shotguns with tanks and surface-to-air missiles. For example, during last Thursday’s Senate Judiciary debate on her gun ban legislation, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) defended her efforts to ban “just a few guns” and leave others alone by arguing, “Is this not enough for the people of the United States? Do they need a bazooka?”

Raising further alarms is the fact that within hours of confirming his re-election in November. President Barack Obama had joined a handful of other nations to rekindle the U.N.’s long-running effort to adopt an international gun control treaty. Gottlieb, who heads the Second Amendment Foundation, raised alarms about this last Nov. 7.

Amnesty International is part of an international gun control group called IANSA (International Action Network on Small Arms). That group also includes the Brady Campaign for the Prevention of Gun Violence, and the Law Center for Smart Gun Laws (LCSGL).

It could be that the deck has been carefully stacked by the U.N. According to Fox News, last week, IANSA co-hosted – with the UN – a “series of meetings” with representatives from 48 African nations to push global gun control. The session was held in Addis Ababa, Ethopia.

Gottlieb was in Europe recently attending a meeting of the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting, and he takes the threat of global gun control seriously. That the U.N. is hosting these talks on American soil, in a building that has a statute out front of a Colt Python with its barrel twisted into a knot is a not-so-subtle insult to the Second Amendment and American firearms owners.

Gun rights leaders are warning American gun owners that this is not the time to become complacent, or to be entirely focused on state-level gun control measures, or bills passed out of the Senate Judiciary Committee last week, including Sen. Dianne Feinstein’s effort to renew and make permanent a ban on so-called “assault rifles” and ammunition magazines.

That all of this is occurring at the same time – barely two months into Obama’s second term – does not seem coincidental to some activists, who are now saying “We warned you.”

UNLIKELY CONSENSUS: Commentary & Outlook for the UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty

Tuesday, March 12th, 2013

Via Jeff Moran | Geneva

Revised and updated, 10 March 2013.

UnlikelyConsensusBookCover

TSM Worldwide LLC has published its executive e-briefing of selected context and issues going into the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Conference scheduled for 18-28 March 2013 in New York.  It also models five possible outcomes and explains the key factors for why consensus is possible, but not likely.

This concise resource can serve as a sense-making tool for diplomats, international legal specialists, civil society activists, trade groups, academics, students, and strategic business leaders alike.

The author, a former military diplomat and strategy leader at a leading defense/aerospace company, consulted over thirty ATT process insiders to develop this his assessment. For example, this e-briefing incorporates insights and feedback from members of State delegations, humanitarian and arms rights civil society groups, academics and policy analysts, business managers, and trade associations. It also includes original statistical analysis and several insightful graphics that help illustrate the points made.

The brief endeavors to:

1.  Explain how a faction of approximately 30 countries presents a major wildcard for the Conference and what their vision for a future treaty might entail if they decide to break consensus to realize it.

2.  Explore the multi-dimensional quantitative challenge of commanding consensus by examining estimated opposition and support for the ATT, and to suggest where and how prospects for consensus could be improved the most.

3.  Describe three assumptions widely held by some States and their humanitarian partners, and explain why these assumptions are perceived as a form of misguided or dishonest humanitarianism which drives against consensus.

4.  Survey several complexities with respect to the United States, and highlight three conditions the ATT must meet if it is ever to be ratified there.

5.  Present a probability framework for five potential scenarios with respect to reaching consensus at the Conference.

6.  Explain why the most likely scenario for the Conference is that a faction breaks consensus by mounting a coup to pursue their own more progressive version of the ATT.

After reading a preliminary draft, one diplomat assigned to the UN based in Geneva said: “This is extremely interesting and I will send it to my colleagues who will represent us at the Conference later this month.”

The e-briefing is approximately 25 pages and is for sale on Amazon.com for use on all desktops, laptops, Kindle readers, tablets, ipods, and smart phones through Amazon’s free Kindle ap.  The price is $2.99 USD.  Click here to link to Amazon.com.  Click here download free apps for viewing electronic publications for Windows (XP, Vista, 7) and Mac (OS X 10.5 and above).

Amazon link: http://www.amazon.com/Unlikely-Consensus-ebook/dp/B00BPEOJ7K/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1362993000&sr=8-1&keywords=unlikely+consensus